Stricklen v. Multiple Inj. Tr. Fund

542 P.3d 858

2024 OK 1

Gary STRICKLEN, Petitioner,

v.MULTIPLE INJURY TRUST FUND, and The Workers’ Compensation Commission, Respondents.

No. 120,753

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Filed: January 30, 2024

As Corrected: January 31, 2024

PROCEEDING TO REVIEW, THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION EN BANC

¶0 Petitioner filed a claim for permanent total disability with the Workers’ Compensation Commission. An administrative law judge sustained a motion to dismiss filed by the Multiple Injury Trust Fund, and petitioner sought review before the Commission en banc, and the Commission affirmed the decision by the administrative law judge. Petitioner sought review of the Commission’s decision in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, and filed a motion to retain review in this Court. Petitioner’s motion to retain the proceeding in this Court was granted. We hold: the phrase "subsequent employer" in 85A O.S.Supp.2019 § 32 refers to the employer at the time of employee’s "subsequent injury" also referenced in 85A O.S.Supp.2019 § 32, which injury is used for the purpose of that statute for a claim against the MITF in accordance with that statute.

ORDER OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Darrel R. Paul, Quandt Law Firm, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for petitioner.

Travis R. Colt, Connor E. Brittingham, Latham, Steele, Lehman, Keele, Ratcliff, Freije & Carter, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for respondent, Multiple Injury Trust Fund.

EDMONDSON, J.

I. Summary

¶1 Petitioner brought a claim against the Multiple Injury Trust Fund (MITF) based upon his permanent total disability from a combination of previously adjudicated injuries. The Fund argued it was not liable because the phrase "subsequent employer" in 85A O.S.Supp.2019 meant that a claim against the Fund required petitioner’s previously adjudicated injuries to have occurred with an employer other than his employer at the time of his last and most recent injury. Petitioner argued the MITF’s view of "subsequent employer" made the statute an unconstitutional "special law." The Commission’s administrative law judge and the Commission agreed with the MITF and denied petitioner’s claim. We need not address the constitutional issue raised by the parties because: (1) We conclude the controverted statutory language does not have a meaning which would raise the constitutional issue addressed by the parties; (2) We reverse the Commission’s order that was based upon the erroneous view of the controverted statutory language; and (3) The cause is remanded for additional proceedings before the Commission on petitioner’s claim.

II. Parties’ Claims

¶2 The parties agree petitioner had four previous workers’ compensation adjudications for injuries between 2008 and 2019. His injuries occurred during twenty years he was employed by the Grand River Dam Authority (GRDA). Petitioner’s last injury was adjudicated in June 2021, and he filed a claim in July 2021 for permanent total disability (PTD) with the Workers’ Compensation Commission.

¶3 Petitioner sought compensation for PTD from the MITF. The administrative law judge’s order stated: "Claimant satisfies the requirements of 85A O.S. § 30(A)(3), and was a ‘physically impaired person’ when he suffered his last injury on September 25, 2019."¹ The administrative law judge’s order states petitioner’s "total combined disability, including the permanent partial disability previously adjudged … and the permanent partial disability resulting from Clamant’s last inju- ry of September 19, 2019, is 54% to the body as a whole."²

¶4 The MITF argued petitioner’s claim was not allowed against the MITF because 85A O.S.Supp.2019 § 32 required a claimant’s employer for his last injury to be a different employer than the employer for his previous injuries. An administrative law judge sustained the MITF’s motion to dismiss on June 8, 2022, and petitioner requested review by the Workers’ Compensation Commission en banc.³ The Commission concluded the administrative law judge’s decision was "neither against the clear weight of the evidence, nor contrary to law," and sustained the dismissal.⁴ After the Commission’s decision, petitioner filed a petition for review in this Court⁵ and requested we retain the matter. We granted petitioner’s motion to retain and the parties filed briefs for our review.

¶5 The parties discuss 85A O.S. 2019 § 32, and state language therein refers to different employers for successive workers’ compensation injuries. A portion of this statute states as follows.

A. If an employee who is a "physically impaired person" receives an accidental personal injury compensable under the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act which results in additional permanent disability so that the degree of disability caused by the combination of both disabilities results in disability materially greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone, the employee may proceed against the Multiple Injury Trust Fund for permanent total disability. Only disability due to an injury to the body as a whole at a subsequent employer shall be combinable with, a prior body disability, except that disability to a member may be combined with disability to the body as a whole. If such combined disabilities constitute permanent total disability, as defined in Section 2 of this title, the employee shall receive full compensation as provided by law for the disability resulting directly and specifically from the subsequent injury. In addition, the employee shall receive compensation for permanent total disability if the combination of injuries renders the employee permanently and totally disabled. The employer shall be liable only for the degree of percent of disability which would have resulted from the subsequent injury if there had been no preexisting impairment. The compensation rate for permanent total disability awards from the Multiple Injury Trust Fund shall be the compensation rate for permanent partial disability paid by the employer in the last combinable compensable injury.

85A O.S.Supp.2019 § 32(A) (emphasis added). The administrative order sustaining the MITF’s motion to dismiss concludes the liability of the MITF should be based upon whether the GRDA was a "subsequent employer" for the purpose of 85A O.S.Supp.2019 § 32(A). The order states a "subsequent employer" must mean an employer "which follows a prior employer in time, order, or place."⁶ The order appears to indicate the MITF would be liable if any of petitioner’s adjudicated injuries occurred with an employer other than the GRDA. The MITF argues it is not liable because all of petition- er’s adjudicated injuries occurred while employed with the GRDA.

¶6 The MITF indicates the term "subsequent" is used in the statute to decrease MITF liability by increasing workers’ compensation liability for Oklahoma employers who continue to employ an injured employee with combinable adjudicated injuries until the employee would otherwise be entitled to PTD from the MITF if the employee had more than one employer. The MITF argues Stricklen’s disability is the type to be compensated by an employer. The MITF states its "purpose has never been to stand as a ‘prime, original, or substitute obligor,’ for the employer."⁷ In other words, the MITF argues it cannot be liable because the workers’ compensation liability for an employee’s PTD from combined adjudicated injuries should rest with the "prime, original, or substitute obligor," and not the MITF.

¶7 The MITF did not argue Stricklen actually possessed a workers’ compensation remedy for PTD against the GRDA. Instead, the MITF indicates different and successive injuries that are combined for an assessment of PTD is a type of disability which should be placed on an employer and not the MITF when the injuries involve a single employer. The MITF argues shifting MITF liability to an employer serves (1) the original purpose when the MITF was created as the State Indemnity Fund, and (2) a public purpose seeking to decrease MITF liability. The MITF appears to indicate its original purpose involved a public policy for assisting employers who hired employees with injuries, but not a policy to assist either employers who retained employees with injuries or injured employees desiring to be employed.

¶8 The MITF argues: (1) Two groups of employers, (a) those employers who employ a person who had a previous workers’ compensation injury with that employer, and (b) those employers with employees without a previous workers’ compensation injury with that employer, are not similarly situated employers for the purpose of the Oklahoma Constitution, and (2) The Legislature may possess a public policy to withdraw MITF liability for an employer who prefers to retain, or at least not terminate from employment, an employee who possessed a previously adjudicated workers’ compensation disability with the employer.

¶9 The petitioner claims the phrase "subsequent employer" in 85A O.S.Supp.2019 § 32 made the statute "an unconstitutional special law." The administrative law judge concluded: "Claimant has not identified which enumerated subject listed in Article 5, § 46 prohibits the application … [of the statute and] [without such identification, it is impossible for the Commission to determine whether a prohibited special law was passed in violation of Article 5 § 46."⁸ We have recently explained: "The Oklahoma Constitution, Art 5, § 46, prohibits the Legislature from passing special laws relating to specific subject areas, and Art. 5, § 59 requires the Legislature to enact a general law, and not a special law, whenever possible."⁹

¶10 Petitioner argues 85A O.S. Supp.2019 § 32 violates Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 46, and he quotes from: (1) Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 2006 OK 98, 113, 152 P.3d 861, 868, where we stated "The terms of art. 5, § 46 command that court procedure be symmetrical and apply equally across the board for an entire class of similarly situated persons or...