Strojnik v. Vill. 1017 Coronado, Inc.

PETER STROJNIK, Plaintiff, v. VILLAGE 1107 CORONADO, INC., Defendant.

No. 19-cv-02210-BAS-MSB

United States District Court, S.D. California

December 21, 2021

ORDER: (1) GRANTING REQUEST TO RECONSIDER CONTEMPT RULINGS (ECF No. 51); (2) VACATING CONTEMPT RULINGS (ECF Nos 44, 45, 56); (3) TERMINATING AS MOOT MOTIONS TO STAY (ECF Nos. 50, 57); AND (4) TERMINATING AS MOOT SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR CONTEMPT (ECF No. 61)

Hon Cynthia Bashant United States District Judge

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Peter Strojnik, Sr.'s request to reconsider the Court's contempt rulings (ECF No. 51) and the parties' other contempt-related motions (ECF Nos. 50, 57, 61). This action started as an unremarkable disability discrimination case. It took a turn when the Court ordered Mr. Strojnik to pay Defendant $21, 995 in attorney's fees under the Americans with Disabilities Act's fee-shifting provision for filing a frivolous lawsuit. Mr. Strojnik refused to comply, claiming an inability to pay.

Defendant moved for contempt, highlighting that Mr. Strojnik has received hundreds of thousands of dollars in settlement payments just in the past few years. Ultimately, the Court held an evidentiary hearing. The Court determined Mr Strojnik is not credible, is concealing his substantial income, and can pay the attorney's fee award. Consequently, the Court found Mr. Strojnik to be in civil contempt and ordered him to pay additional fees as compensatory damages.

Although Mr. Strojnik's lack of candor is repugnant, the Court erred in using civil contempt in these circumstances. The Court's fee award is a money judgment, not a sanction for misconduct. The proper recourse for Defendant was to execute on the final judgment, not seek civil contempt. Therefore for the following reasons, the Court grants Mr. Strojnik's motion for reconsideration, vacates the contempt rulings, and terminates as moot the parties' remaining motions.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Allegations

Mr. Strojnik, proceeding pro se, ^[1] filed this Complaint against Defendant Village 1017 Coronado (“Defendant” or the “Hotel”) alleging three counts for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the California Unruh Act and the California Disabled Persons Act (“DPA”), and one count of negligence. (Compl., ECF No. 1.)

Mr. Strojnik claimed he is disabled “by virtue of a severe right-sided neural foraminal stenosis with symptoms of femoral neuropathy, prostate . . . and renal cancer [and] missing part of a limb (prosthetic right knee).” (Compl. ¶¶ 2-3.) Mr. Strojnik said he “walks with difficulty and pain and requires compliant mobility accessible features at places of public accommodation.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Mr. Strojnik did provide greater detail as to the “mobility accessible features” he requires, but he claimed that “[b]y virtue of his disability, [he] requires an ADA compliant lodging facility particularly applicable to his mobility, both ambulatory and wheelchair assisted.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Mr. Strojnik alleged he visited the Hotel and “encountered barriers to accessibility documented in Addendum A” to the Complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) Addendum A provides blurry photographs, presumably taken from Defendant's website purporting to show items like “improperly configured handrails.” (Id., Addendum A.) Notably, Mr. Strojnik did not allege that he personally encountered these barriers, visited the Hotel at 1017 Coronado, or called the facility to see if these barriers exist or if alternative options are available for those with Mr. Strojnik's disabilities.

B. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of standing. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 4.) The Court granted the request, reasoning:

In this case, even if the Court was to construe [Defendant's motion] solely as a facial attack, Plaintiff has alleged insufficient facts to support standing. He does not allege he ever visited the Hotel. Instead, he apparently looked online and took screenshots of photographs that he believed showed barriers to him entering the property. He does not claim that he called and confirmed that these barriers existed. He does not allege that he attempted to see if alternate accommodations were available to him. Clearly, he does not establish “injury-in-fact.” However, he also does not establish deterrence. He does not allege sufficient facts to show actual knowledge of anything about the Hotel. And his claims about the alleged barriers he would encounter, accompanied by grainy photographs of undistinguishable features, are insufficient to show that any barriers existed at the Hotel.

Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges insufficient facts to show that he intends to return to the Hotel. He lives in Phoenix, quite a distance from San Diego. He has apparently never visited the Hotel. Although Plaintiff initially counters that his “past patronage of the Napa area is confirmed by Exhibit 1, ” (Opp'n at 6:26-28), he fails to attach any Exhibit 1, and the Court notes that the Napa area is hundreds of miles and a full day's drive from San Diego. Plaintiff then alleges he traveled to the San Diego area five times in 2019. (Id. at 7:3-19). However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff filed recent lawsuits against at least 22 other lodging establishments in San Diego. In each of these cases, Plaintiff alleges that he plans to return to this lodging establishment when the alleged barriers he encountered online are removed. It defies credulity that Plaintiff intends to visit over twenty different establishments in San Diego when he lives in Phoenix. See Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).

And the Court may look beyond the allegations in the Complaint. The Court has observed personally that, at least on some occasions, Plaintiff is able to walk without the assistance of a wheelchair or walker. Plaintiff does not allege when he needs the assistance of a wheelchair or that he needed the assistance of a wheelchair at the time he wished to visit the Hotel. As such, he has alleged insufficient facts to show even that he was disabled at the time he intended to visit San Diego. See Rutherford v. Caesar's Mexican Rest., LLC, No. 19-cv-1416-LAB (JLB), 2019 WL 4193392 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2019) (finding lack of standing because plaintiff did not indicate when or how often he uses a wheelchair or a cane).

(Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss 5:11-6:15 (footnote omitted).) Because Mr. Strojnik did not have a viable federal claim, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and directed the Clerk to close the case. (Id. 8:6-14.) The Clerk entered an appropriate Clerk's Judgment. (ECF No. 16.)

C. Request for Fees or Sanctions

Defendant later brought a motion for attorney's fees or sanctions. (ECF No. 17.) Defendant first requested fees under the ADA's fee-shifting provision-42 U.S.C. § 12205. Section 12205 allows a court to award a party who prevails in a lawsuit filed under the ADA “a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses and costs.” The purpose of awarding fees to a prevailing defendant is “to deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation.” CRST Van Expedited, Inc., v. E.E.O.C., 578 U.S. 419, 432 (2016) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 420 (1978)). The Supreme Court, therefore, has interpreted an analogous statute “to allow prevailing defendants to recover [only] when the Plaintiff's ‘claim was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.'” Id. (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421). This standard “applies to the award of both fees and costs to a prevailing defendant under the ADA.” Green v. Mercy Hous., Inc., 991 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 2021).

The Court granted Defendant's motion. (Order Granting Mot. for Atty's Fees, ECF No. 22.) After concluding Defendant was the prevailing party, the Court addressed whether this lawsuit was “frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.” (Id. 5.) The Court explained that the lawsuit met this test because: (1) Mr. Strojnik has had numerous ADA cases dismissed for lack of standing on similar grounds; (2) Mr. Strojnik's lack of specificity in his many complaints allows him to avoid alleging the specifics of his disability and the impact of the alleged barriers he encountered; and (3) Mr. Strojnik's has a practice of filing lawsuits without apparently traveling to the defendant lodging facilities, tactics that led him to being disbarred by the State of Arizona. (Id. 5-7.)

Therefore, the Court found fees were appropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Consequently, although the Court stated “it is likely that Defendant can establish evidence to justify sanctions under” 28 U.S.C. § 1927-which addresses an unreasonable and vexatious increase in court proceedings, the Court did “not reach this issue.” (Order Granting Mot. for Atty's Fees 7-8.) The Court likewise did not consider Defendant's request for sanctions under the Court's inherent authority. (See id.) The Court then determined $21, 995 in attorney's fees were reasonable and ordered Mr. Strojnik “to pay this amount forthwith” (“Fee Award”). (Id. 8.)

D. Request for Final Judgment

After the fee ruling, Defendant's counsel lodged a proposed Final Judgment, which included the Fee Award, addressed post-judgment interest, and substituted Defendant's counsel in lieu of Defendant as the judgment creditor. (ECF No. 24.) After analyzing the request for post-judgment interest, the Court entered the Final Judgment, stating:

JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED in favor of Philip H. Stillman, attorney for Defendant Village 1107 Coronado, Inc. and against plaintiff Peter Strojnik, Sr., in the amount of $21, 995.00,

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