Strop v. Clarkson

Christine Marie Strop, petitioner, Respondent,

v.Timothy James Clarkson, Appellant.

A11-975

STATE OF MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed February 21, 2012

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2010).

Affirmed Halbrooks, Judge

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-FA-000213129

Ben M. Henschel, Henschel Moberg, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Karim El-Ghazzawy, Donald L. Enockson, El-Ghazzawy Law Offices, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Stoneburner, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

HALBROOKS, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court's denial of his posttrial motion for amended findings or a new trial. Because we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Timothy Clarkson and respondent Christina Strop were married on August 14, 1982. They have one child together, who was born on April 14, 1991. Appellant is employed as an independent stock broker with R.J. Steichen. Respondent, who is legally blind and unemployed, receives Social Security disability benefits.

Respondent petitioned for divorce on May 26, 1995. The district court placed the dissolution proceedings on inactive status for one year to allow the parties to mediate the issues of child support, spousal maintenance, and attorney fees. Three years later, in September 1998, the parties signed a stipulated marital termination agreement (MTA). The district court entered judgment based on the MTA on January 19, 1999.

Pertinent as background for this appeal, appellant was ordered under the terms of the judgment to pay, inter alia, monthly spousal maintenance of $4,900. Regarding the duration of the spousal-maintenance award, paragraph 15 of the judgment incorporated the parties' agreed-upon language:

a. AMOUNT: Beginning January 1, 1999, [appellant] is hereby ordered to pay to [respondent] $4,900/month in spousal maintenance.

b. DURATION: Maintenance shall terminate upon the death of either party or the remarriage of [respondent], whichever happens first.

1) Income via maintenance: Maintenance shall continue, subject to cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) until [appellant] has increased [respondent's] investment account to $500,000 and [respondent] is able to regularly meet her monthly needs (net $4,900 or adjusted amount) without invading principal of $500,000.00. If both conditions exist then, [appellant] is not required to pay maintenance. When[respondent] is of a sufficient age to access money from her retirement account, without penalty, then both her retirement account and her investment account shall be included to determine if maintenance should terminate.

Neither party appealed from the judgment.

In August 2009, respondent moved the district court for an order to show cause and to hold appellant in constructive civil contempt based on his failure to pay child support, unreimbursed and uninsured medical and dental and college expenses for the child, and spousal maintenance. Respondent also sought to remove appellant as the stock broker on her investment accounts and requested attorney fees. Appellant filed a responsive motion, asking the district court to (1) deny respondent's motion in its entirety, (2) find that respondent is "of a sufficient age to access money from her retirement account, without penalty" pursuant to the parties' judgment, (3) determine the aggregate value of all of respondent's investment and retirement accounts, (4) find that respondent is not in need of on-going monthly spousal maintenance, (5) determine respondent's reasonable monthly budget, (6) appoint a special master to reconcile accounts and determine whether appellant owes any child support or spousal maintenance arrears, and (7) order respondent to pay appellant's reasonable attorney fees.

The parties were unsuccessful in resolving the disputes in mediation. As a result, they agreed that the district court would hear testimony limited to the meaning of the language in paragraph 15.b.1, the income-via-maintenance provision, of the judgment, focusing specifically on the sentence: "When [respondent] is of sufficient age to access money from her retirement account, without penalty, then both her retirement accountand her investment account shall be included to determine if maintenance should terminate."

Following a hearing, the district court found that the parties' agreed-upon language was unambiguous. The district court stated that "[t]he parties' intent was to allow [respondent's] retirement account to grow without distribution for a period of time, specifically until [respondent] reached the statutory age at which time she could withdraw from her IRA without penalty, without regard to her disability." The district court denied appellant's motions that were based on his arguments as to how paragraph 15 should be interpreted and scheduled trial on the remaining issues.

Following a two-day trial, in an extensive and thorough order discussing the issues and the evidence, the district court concluded, inter alia:

1. [Appellant] has failed to comply with the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and Decree of this Court, entered on January 15, 1999 . . . .

2. Said failure on the part of [appellant] constitutes constructive civil contempt of court . . . .

3. [Appellant] owes monthly spousal maintenance arrearages from 2002 through August 2010 in the amount of $272,322.

4. [Appellant] owes upward adjustments for spousal maintenance, net of downward adjustments, in the amount of $47,407.

. . . .

7. [Respondent] did not commit fraud on the court prior to or at the time of the entry of the Judgment and Decree on January 15, 1999. . . .

8. [Respondent] did not commit fraud on the court after the entry of the Judgment and Decree on January 15, 1999 by not providing updated reports of her savings or acquisition of assets to [appellant]. . . .

. . . .

13. Conclusion of Law Paragraph 28 of the Judgment and Decree is a legally enforceable provision requiring an award of attorney's fees to [respondent]. In addition, [appellant's] conduct of not following the Judgment and Decree and his conduct in these proceedings have unreasonably contributed to the length and costs of these proceedings. An award of attorney's fees is appropriate in the amount of $125,000.

The district court subsequently denied appellant's posttrial motion for amended findings

or a new trial. This appeal follows.

DECISION

I.

A. Motion for amended findings

A party may move the district court to amend its findings or make additional findings. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02. A motion to amend must be based only on the evidence that is part of the record. Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2006). To bring a motion, the party "must both identify the alleged defect in the challenged findings and explain why the challenged findings are defective." State by Fort Snelling State Park Ass'n v. Minneapolis Park & Recreation Bd., 673 N.W.2d 169, 178 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Mar. 16,2004). This court reviews the denial of a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. Zander, 720 N.W.2d at 364.

In his posttrial motion, appellant listed 80 findings that he wanted the district court to strike or amend. But appellant did nothing more. He did not provide any explanation of the alleged defects in the challenged findings or any proposed findings. The district court denied appellant's motion to amend, stating, in part:

[Appellant]'s submissions do not identify the alleged defect in each [of] the findings he attacks and explain why each challenged finding is defective. He does not (1) address the record evidence related to each specific finding challenged, (2) explain why the record does not support that specific finding, and (3) explain why the proposed findings are appropriate for each of the findings attacked . . . .

[Appellant]'s Motion makes eighty requests to simply strike findings, or amend them in some unspecified manner in keeping with [his] understanding of this case. His Memorandum lays out in broad strokes the issues and disagreements that [he] has with the Court's November 30 Order generally. . . . [H]is Motion and Memorandum represent a reiteration of his original view of the case.

The alleged defects that appellant identified reflect his disagreement with the district court, but he ignores the evidence that supports the district court's findings and the credibility determinations made by the district court. Even if there is conflicting evidence on certain points, the district court is not required to amend its order. Fort Snelling, 673 N.W.2d at 178. Because appellant failed to properly identify and support his alleged defects, the district court acted properly by denying the motion to amend the findings and conclusions of law.

B. Motion for a new trial

Appellant moved for a new trial under Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(a), (f), and (g). A party may seek a new trial when there are errors of law at trial, when a party is deprived of a fair trial due to irregularities in the proceedings, or if the decision is not justified by the evidence or is contrary to law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(a), (f), (g). The district court has the discretion to grant a new trial, and this court will not disturb that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Willis v. Ind. Harbor Steamship Co., 790 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Minn. App. 2010) (citing Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co., 454 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1990)), review denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 2010).

Appellant argued that a new trial was necessary because the district court, by adopting respondent's proposed order almost verbatim, failed to conduct its own fact finding and legal analysis. While the "verbatim adoption of a party's proposed findings and conclusions of law is not reversible error per se[,] . . . we have strongly...