Strzykalski v. Bd. of Educ.

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LISA STRZYKALSKI, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SUMMIT HILL SCHOOL DISTRICT 161, PRINCIPAL LAURA C. GOEBEL and SUPERINTENDENT PAUL MCDERMOTT, Defendants.

No. 23 CV 1284

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

November 6, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Manish S. Shah United States District Judge

Plaintiff Lisa Strzykalski was a junior high school teacher and overheard one of her students say that she was sexually assaulted and harassed by another student. Strzykalski reported the accusations to the Department of Children and Family Services. Subsequently, defendants Laura Goebel (the school principal), Paul McDermott (the district superintendent), and the school district board disciplined Strzykalski for reporting to DCFS. Strzykalski brought this case with claims under Title IX, the Illinois Whistleblower Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After parts of her complaint were dismissed for failure to state a claim, Strzykalski filed a second amended complaint. Defendants move to dismiss Strzykalski's Illinois whistleblower and § 1983 claims.

I. Legal Standards

When reviewing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court accepts all well-pled allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Gociman v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 41 F.4th 873, 881 (7th Cir. 2022). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead ‘only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

II. Facts

The facts remain nearly identical to those in the First Amended Complaint. See Strzykalski v. Bd. of Educ. of Summit Hill Sch. Dist. 161, No. 23 CV 1284, 2024 WL 580012, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2024). In brief, plaintiff Lisa Strzykalski was a teacher at Summit Hill Junior High School, part of Summit Hill School District 161. [47] ¶ 2.^[1]In October 2021, she overheard a student complain about being sexually assaulted and sexually harassed by another student. [47] ¶¶ 37-38. She reported the allegations to the Department of Children and Family Services, believing that she was obligated to do so under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, 325 ILCS 5/4(a)(4). [47] ¶¶ 24, 30, 49.

Defendant Laura Goebel was principal of Summit Hill and Strzykalski's supervisor. [47] ¶¶ 22, 39, 43. The accused student was Goebel's son. [47] ¶ 39. Defendant Paul McDermott, the superintendent of District 161, informed Goebel that Strzykalski reported the accusations against Goebel's son to DCFS. [47] ¶ 50.

Goebel, McDermott, and the District 161 Board took allegedly retaliatory actions against Strzykalski, including initiating disciplinary proceedings, issuing reports that mischaracterized Strzykalski's response to the accusations, lodging negative student reports in Strzykalski's record, submitting written complaints to District 161, hindering Strzykalski's nomination for a teaching award, suspending her for one day without pay, denying her grievances, giving her low performance ratings, transferring her, issuing a notice to remedy, and threatening to bring charges against her and terminate her. [47] ¶¶ 56-58, 63-99, 102-35.

Strzykalski brought this case alleging Title IX, Illinois Whistleblower Act, “Monell Liability,” and “respondeat superior” claims against Goebel, McDermott, and District 161. [1], [20]. Her Monell and part of her whistleblower claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim. Strzykalski, 2024 WL 580012, at *4-6.

McDermott then allegedly retaliated against Strzykalski for filing this lawsuit. [47] ¶¶ 216-17. McDermott prevented Strzykalski from being rehired to a similar teaching position that she held before being demoted for reporting the alleged sexual misconduct. [47] ¶ 218. McDermott instructed those involved in hiring to interview Strzykalski for the position, but not give it to her. [47] ¶¶ 219-22. McDermott failed to inform the Union Executive Board that Strzykalski interviewed for the position. [47] ¶ 226. The hired teachers, who had not sued McDermott, had less experience and lower qualifications than Strzykalski. [47] ¶ 227.

Strzykalski filed a Second Amended Complaint. [47]. Defendants move to dismiss her 740 ILCS 174/15(a) whistleblower, 42 U.S.C § 1983, and “respondeat superior” claims. [50].

III. Analysis

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Strzykalski alleges that Summit Hill School District 161 is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). [47] ¶¶ 179-188. Section 1983 creates a right of action against persons who violate another's federal rights while acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 362 (2017). “Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Thus, a § 1983 claim requires that a federal constitutional or statutory injury exists. See First Midwest Bank Guardian v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 987 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding “the first step in every § 1983 claim” is the plaintiff “initially prov[ing] that he was deprived of a federal right.”).

Strzykalski alleges that “District 161's violation of Title IX constitutes a violation of federal and a basis to hold the Defendant [sic].” [47] ¶ 187. She does not name any other federal law or constitutional deprivation as the basis for her claim. See [48] ¶¶ 179-188. In her response brief, Strzykalski disclaims that her § 1983 claim is predicated on a Title IX violation. [57] at 3. Instead, she argues that it is based on congruent constitutional violations, in particular District 161's retaliatory acts. [57] at 3-4 (citing [47] ¶¶ 115-20, 183-85). She does not specify which constitutional right these retaliatory acts violated, but cites to Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246 (2009), in which the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may bring an Equal Protection Clause claim under § 1983 alongside a Title IX claim. [57] at 4.

Intentional sex discrimination and sexual harassment against public employees by persons acting under color of state law violate the Equal Protection Clause and are actionable under § 1983. Locke v. Hassig, 788 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2015). Strzykalski makes no allegations of sex discrimination or sexual harassment directed at her. Instead, she alleges that she was retaliated against for reporting sexual harassment directed at one of her students. [47] ¶¶ 37-38, 49, 56-58, 63-99, 102-35. “[Retaliating against a person for filing charges of sex discrimination is not the same as discriminating against a person on grounds of sex.” Boyd v. Ill. State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 898 (7th Cir. 2004). “[T]he right to be free from retaliation may be vindicated under the First Amendment or Title VII,^[2]but not the equal protection clause.” Id.

To the extent Strzykalski's § 1983 retaliation claim is predicated on the First Amendment, it also fails. To establish a First Amendment retaliation, a public employee must show that her speech was constitutionally protected. Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013). A public employee's speech is only constitutionally protected if the employee made the speech as a private citizen. Id.

Strzykalski specifically alleges that her report of the alleged sexual misconduct was made within her scope of duties because teachers are mandatory reporters. See [47] ¶¶ 24, 30, 47-48, 180. Even if Strzykalski did not have a duty to report, a “public employee's commentary about misconduct affecting an area within her responsibility is considered speech as an employee even where investigating and reporting misconduct is not included in her job description or routine duties.” See McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 705 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2013). “[P]rotection of a government employee's exposure of misconduct involving [her] workplace is more properly provided by whistleblower protection laws and labor codes.” Id. Strzykalski has failed to state a § 1983 claim based on a First Amendment violation.

Although Strzykalski has disclaimed the theory that her § 1983 claim is solely predicated on Title IX, the complaint can be read this way. Defendants argue that the Supreme Court foreclosed § 1983 claims based on Title IX in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246, 257-58 (2009), but the Court only held that Title IX doesn't preclude concurrent § 1983 claims based on constitutional violations. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals similarly has not specifically addressed whether Title IX precludes actions under § 1983. Most circuits have held that § 1983 claims cannot be based on Title IX violations. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234 n.8 (10th Cir. 1996); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 176-79 (1st Cir. 2007) (overruled on other grounds); Bruneau ex rel. Schofield v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1998); Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990); Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 754-58 (5th Cir. 1995); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282, 1300 (11th Cir. 2007); but see Communities for Equity v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 459 F.3d 676, 684-86 (6th Cir. 2006) (permitting § 1983 Title IX claims); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997) (same).

Evaluating whether relief is available under § 1983 for a statutory deprivation involves two questions: (1) do the statutory provisions “unambiguously confer individual federal rights;” and if so, (2) does the statute itse...