Stuckey v. Brookdale Emp'r Servs.

CHARLES STUCKEY, Plaintiff, v. BROOKDALE EMPLOYEE SERVICES, LLC, Defendant.

No. 5:21-cv-01717-AKK

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northeastern Division

April 19, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ABDUL K. KALLON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Charles Stuckey sues Brookdale Employee Services, LLC, for alleged violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C § 2601 et seq. Doc. 1. Stuckey contends that Brookdale denied his entitlement to paternity leave and retaliated against him by investigating and discharging him upon his return to work. See id. at 7-10. Brookdale moves to compel arbitration and either to stay or to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Doc 6. After thorough consideration, the court will grant the motion to compel and dismiss the case in light of the arbitration agreement.

I.

Under the Federal Arbitration Act, “no party can be compelled to arbitrate unless that party has entered into an agreement to do so.” Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Bright Metal Specialties, Inc., 251 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001); see 9 U.S.C § 1 et seq. To determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, the court considers: “(1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate; and (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that agreement.” Scurtu v. Int'l Student Exch., 523 F.Supp.2d 1313, 1318 (S.D. Ala. 2007). “To resolve these questions, courts apply state-law principles relating to ordinary contract formation and interpretation, construed through the lens of the federal policy favoring arbitration.” Id. Thus, “[f]ederal law establishes the enforceability of arbitration agreements, while state law governs [their] interpretation and formation, ” and doubts “should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Employers Ins. of Wausau, 251 F.3d at 1322.

In addition, courts may treat motions to compel arbitration as motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Medica Healthcare Plans, Inc., 376 F.Supp.3d 1298, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)). In other words, in lieu of staying a case, a court may dismiss it when all of the issues raised must proceed to arbitration. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992); Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 333 F.Supp.2d 1367, 1379 (N.D.Ga. 2004) (granting motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss the case), aff'd, 428 F.3d 1359, 1379 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he district court properly granted [the] defendants' motions to dismiss and to compel arbitration.”).

II.^[1]

In 2016, Brookdale promoted Stuckey to “Director of Financial Services/Human Resources” of Brookdale Jones Farm. Doc. 1 at 3. See also doc. 15 at 5-6 (Stuckey's offer letter). Brookdale offered Stuckey a base salary of $1, 615.38 biweekly, classified him as an overtime-exempt employee, and allowed him to enroll in its medical, dental, vision, and disability insurance programs. Docs. 1 at 3; 15 at 5. Stuckey's offer letter stated that his employment “[would] be considered ‘at will'” and that he “[would] be offered a binding arbitration agreement.” Doc. 15 at 6. The offer letter further stated that if Stuckey “chose not to sign that agreement and beg[a]n working, [he] [would] still be bound by the binding arbitration agreement, as binding arbitration [was] a condition of employment with Brookdale.” Id. Stuckey signed the offer letter next to the word “ACCEPTED.” See id.

During his employment with Brookdale, Stuckey received an Associate Handbook, see id. at 8, 15, that stated that Brookdale “instituted a mandatory binding arbitration procedure for all associates, ” id. at 10. It also stated that “[b]inding arbitration [was] a condition of employment at Brookdale” and that Stuckey “[would] be required to sign a separate Binding Arbitration Agreement in order to remain employed at Brookdale.” Id. “By accepting Brookdale's offer of employment or accepting continued employment, ” the Handbook read, “[the associate] and Brookdale [were] agreeing to the terms of the [Binding Arbitration] Procedure.” Id. Covered claims included “violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).” Id. Stuckey signed an “Associate Handbook Receipt and Acknowledgement.” Id. at 15.

Brookdale's “Dispute Resolution Agreement” required “any legal dispute arising out of or related to [an associate's] employment . . . [to] be resolved using final and binding arbitration and not by a court or jury trial.” Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted). Legal disputes included “any claims that c[a]me about through the . . . Family and Medical Leave Act.” Id. The associate “[would] pay for [their] attorney, ” and Brookdale “[would] pay for its attorney” and for “the Arbitrator and arbitration fees.” Id. at 22. The agreement provided that “even if [the associate] [did] not sign this Agreement, if [they] c[a]me to work after being given this Agreement, [they] [were] agreeing to it and so [was] Brookdale.” Id. The parties do not supply a signed copy of this agreement.

During the workday on May 16, 2021, Stuckey's wife, who was pregnant with twins, went into labor. Doc. 1 at 4. The following day, Stuckey informed Allen Jones, Jones Farm's executive director, that he and his wife “[would] not be in for work.” Id. Stuckey spoke “about [his] children's birth” with Jones and Lori Fisher, the assisted living administrator, and “worked from the [h]ospital by phone and email between May 17, 2021, and May 19, 2021.” Id. Over the next several days, the hospital discharged Stuckey's daughter and wife, and Stuckey worked from home. Id. at 4-5. On May 24, Stuckey returned to Jones Farm, and the hospital discharged his son several days later. Id. at 5.

Jones then informed Stuckey that “he was the subject of an investigation.” Id. “During a Zoom video conference call, Stuckey was questioned about Brookdale associates who were related” and “was also asked if he had taken ‘Paid Time Off' for his time away from work.” Id. Stuckey asked Jones if he “needed to put in [a] PTO request, ” to which Jones replied that “it was not required because Stuckey was working remotely all week.” Id. Later in June, however, Zachary Jacobsen, the director of district operations; Alma Cole, the area nurse manager; and Fisher “informed Stuckey he was terminated, ” allegedly for “falsification of his timecard.” Id.

Stuckey claims that he “was eligible to leave” under the FMLA and to request PTO when his wife went into labor and that Brookdale “was on notice” that his leave “was for the birth of his son and daughter.” Id. at 7. He also contends that Brookdale “was on notice” that Stuckey was not “on worksite” for approximately one week for the same reason and to care for his spouse and children. Id. He asserts that he notified Brookdale of his need to take leave “as soon as was reasonably possible” and that Brookdale nonetheless “did not designate days between May 16, 2021, and May 24, 2021, as FMLA-qualifying leave.” Id. Stuckey filed this lawsuit alleging interference with his leave and retaliation under the FMLA. Id. at 7, 9.

III.

Brookdale moves to compel Stuckey to arbitrate his claims under the Dispute Resolution Agreement. Doc. 6. For his part, Stuckey argues that “[Brookdale] invokes an improper mechanism to compel arbitration, ” doc. 18 at 4; “disputes the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, ” id. at 7; and contends that he did not assent to the arbitration process, that the Dispute Resolution Agreement is unconscionable, and that Brookdale waived its right to compel arbitration, id. at 9-13.

A.

Stuckey first claims that “numerous courts have found that [Rule 12(b)(1) motions] are an improper procedural mechanism for enforcement of an arbitration clause.” Id. at 5. However, the cases Stuckey cites to support this assertion come from outside of the Eleventh Circuit. See id. In this Circuit, courts may “treat[] a motion to compel arbitration as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter consideration.” Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 376 F.Supp.3d at 1304. Thus, Brookdale did not employ a novel or unauthorized mechanism to invoke arbitration in response to Stuckey's lawsuit.

Moreover, Stuckey's contention overlooks that Brookdale moves to compel arbitration and either to dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(1) or to stay the case pending the resolution of arbitration. See generally doc. 5. In either case, the court must look to the FAA and to Alabama law to determine whether “an enforceable contract or agreement to arbitrate exists, ” because the FAA provides that “a contract containing an arbitration agreement ‘shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'” Griggs v. Kenworth of Montgomery, Inc., 775 Fed.Appx. 608, 611-12 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Caley, 428 F.3d at 1368). Thus, Brookdale properly raises the issue of arbitrability, which may warrant a stay or dismissal under the Dispute Resolution Agreement notwithstanding Brookdale's invocation of Rule 12(b)(1).

B.

Stuckey also contests “the existence of an agreement to arbitrate” in accordance with the Dispute Resolution Agreement or Binding Arbitration Procedure. Doc. 18 at 7. In support, Stuckey offers that “[u]pon information and belief there are other versions of Brookdale's DRA and BAP between 2017 and 2021” and that any subsequent version “would revoke and replace any agreement to arbitrate in accordance with the terms of Brookdale's 2016 DRA and BAP.” Id. However, Stuckey does not allege any facts about a superseding agreement, such as by claiming that Brookdale provided or Stuckey signed a later arbitration agreement that carved out FMLA claims. ...