Stuckey v. State

682 S.W.3d 75

Jordan D. STUCKEY, Appellant,

v.STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. ED 111093

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION TWO.

FILED: December 26, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Honorable Jason M. Sengheiser, Judge

For Appellant: Gwenda R. Robinson, 1010 Market St. Ste. 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101.

For Respondent: Garrick F. D. Aplin, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102.

KURT S. ODENWALD, Presiding Judge

Introduction

Jordan D. Stuckey ("Stuckey") appeals from the motion court’s judgment denying his Rule 29.15¹ motion for post-conviction relief. Stuckey raises three points on appeal alleging the motion court clearly erred in denying his claims of ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel. Stuckey first contends Trial Counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the investigating detective’s testimony that Stuckey did not act in self-defense, which prejudicially impaired Stuckey’s self-defense claim. In Points Two and Three, Stuckey argues Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses—a mental health expert and C.B., a character witness—during the penalty phase of his trial to present mitigation testimony, which prejudiced Stuckey in that the jury might have recommended a lesser sentence. Because Trial Counsel opened the door to the detective’s testimony, an objection would not have been meritorious, and we deny Point One. Because Trial Counsel made a strategic decision not to call a mental health expert and instead maintain a consistent theory of self-defense, we deny Point Two. Because the motion court was free to believe Trial Counsel’s testimony that Stuckey did not tell him about C.B. as a potential character witness, we deny Point Three. Accordingly, we affirm the motion court’s judgment.

Factual and Procedural History

The facts underlying this case involve the shooting death of Victim arising out of a heated exchange between Stuckey and Victim relating to a romantic partner ("Witness") in January 2017. The State charged Stuckey with first-degree murder and armed criminal action. Stuckey was eighteen years old at the time of the offenses.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. Stuckey claimed self-defense. The State called the investigating detective (the "Detective") to testify. On cross-examination, Trial Counsel questioned the Detective about his training in self-defense and, based on his training and experience, when it was reasonable to shoot someone in self-defense. Trial Counsel presented the Detective with a hypothetical scenario of a person approaching him with their hands behind their back, threatening to kill him, and moving their hand forward, while another person unsuccessfully attempted to intervene and stop them. The Detective agreed those circumstances might require shooting in self-defense. Following cross-examination, the trial court held a sidebar, during which the State reasoned that Trial Counsel opened the door to inquire about Stuckey’s and Victim’s postures and behaviors as recorded in the video surveillance footage of the shooting in this case.² Subsequently, on redirect examination by the State, the Detective testified that he had reviewed the video of the shooting in this case and that the shooting did not appear to him to have been done in self-defense. The Detective described Stuckey’s and Victim’s actions in the video, which was played for the jury. The Detective noted that the Witness stepped between Stuckey and Victim to try to intervene. The Detective further explained that Victim made no aggressive movements, never moved his hand, and had started to walk away prior to Stuckey shooting him. Trial Counsel did not object to the Detective’s testimony.

Stuckey took the stand and testified that he shot Victim in self-defense. Stuckey testified that Victim gave him every reason to believe he had a weapon and was ready and willing to use it.

At the close of all evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on murder in the first degree as well as several lesser-included offenses, including voluntary manslaughter. The trial court also instructed the jury on armed criminal action and the justification of self-defense. The jury found Stuckey guilty of voluntary manslaughter and armed criminal action.

The case proceeded to the penalty phase before the same jury. Trial Counsel called no witnesses. The jury recommended sentencing Stuckey to fifteen years in prison for voluntary manslaughter and ten years for armed criminal action. At sentencing, Trial Counsel called three character witnesses to testify on Stuckey’s behalf: a family friend and two family members. The trial court sentenced Stuckey as recommended by the jury, with the terms to be served consecutively. Stuckey appealed from his convictions and sentences, which this Court affirmed in State v. Stuckey, 600 S.W.3d 858 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (per curiam).

Stuckey then moved for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15. In his amended motion, Stuckey raised various claims of ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel, including the three claims raised in this appeal: (1) failure to object to the Detective’s opinion testimony that Stuckey did not shoot Victim in self-defense; (2) failure to call a mental health expert during the penalty phase to offer mitigation evidence as to the difference between adult and juvenile brains and how those differences affect decision-making and determine relative culpability; and (3) failure to call certain character witnesses during the penalty phase, including a dropout recruiter, C.B. In a separate point, Stuckey also claimed Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to present a diminished-capacity defense during the guilt phase of trial. The motion court granted an evidentiary hearing.

At the evidentiary hearing, Trial Counsel testified that he did not object to the Detective’s self-defense testimony because the testimony was not improper. Specifi- cally, Trial Counsel explained that the testimony was not an expert opinion, but presented the investigating officer’s explanation of how he arrived at his determination that led him to initiate the filing of the charges against Stuckey.

Regarding penalty phase witnesses, Stuckey testified via deposition that he had informed Trial Counsel that he had been diagnosed with ADHD, depression, post-concussion syndrome, and had recently sustained a concussion in a car accident. Stuckey stated that Trial Counsel had supplied authorization forms for release of medical information, which Stuckey completed. Stuckey called a mental health expert (the "Mental Health Expert"), a forensic psychiatrist, to testify via deposition. The Mental Health Expert stated he had been available to evaluate Stuckey and testify at trial. The Mental Health Expert diagnosed Stuckey with multiple disorders, of which he found the most significant to be the traumatic brain injury from a recent car accident, which could have impacted Stuckey’s cognitive understanding of the situation at the time of the offense. The Mental Health Expert further opined that because Stuckey was eighteen years old at the time of the offense, his brain was not yet fully developed. The Mental Health Expert explained that adolescent thinking is reflexive, reactionary, impulsive, immature, and not based on a consideration of facts and circumstances, and that those factors would have had a higher impact on Stuckey, who was the victim of a traumatic brain injury and suffering from depression.

Trial Counsel testified that he had extensive discussions with Stuckey about trial strategy. He had explained to Stuckey that a defense based on diminished capacity or disability conflicted with a defense based on self-defense, and that Stuckey had to choose one or the other, and Stuckey chose self-defense. Trial Counsel stated he similarly discussed with Stuckey what strategy to use during the penalty phase, including that exploring how mental health issues could have impacted his behavior at the time of the shooting would be inconsistent with his self-defense claim from the guilt phase. Trial Counsel stated he did not call an expert regarding juveniles because he did not think it would be helpful as Stuckey was eighteen years old at the time of the offense and was pursuing a justification theory of self-defense.

Stuckey testified that he gave Trial Counsel a list of names to call as potential witnesses for the penalty phase and that C.B.’s name was on the list, C.B. testified at the evidentiary hearing that he would have been available to testify as a character witness. C.B. would have testified that Stuckey had contacted him about completing his high school education and, over the next three years, C.B. found Stuckey to be warm and helpful with other students, capable of leadership, and never displayed any behavioral problems. Trial Counsel denied ever hearing of C.B. Trial Counsel explained he had strategic reasons for calling and not calling particular character witnesses, such as considering what negative testimony could be elicited on cross-examination from otherwise good character witnesses.

Following the evidentiary hearing, the motion court denied Stuckey’s Rule 29.15 motion. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the motion court found Stuckey’s claims had no merit. Stuckey now appeals.

Points on Appeal

Stuckey raises three points on appeal alleging the motion court erred in denying his Rule 29.15 motion. Point One maintains Trial Counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the Detective’s testimony that Stuckey did not act in self-defense, which prejudiced Stuckey by impacting the effectiveness of his self-defense claim. Point Two argues Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to call a mental health expert to testify during the penalty phase. Point Three asserts Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to call C.B. as a character witness during the penalty phase, which prejudiced Stuckey because he might have gotten a lesser...