Students for Sensible Drug Policy v. Spellings, Civ. 06-1010.

460 F.Supp.2d 1093

2006 DSD 17

STUDENTS FOR SENSIBLE DRUG POLICY FOUNDATION, on behalf of itself and its members; and Kraig Selken, Nathan Bush & Alexis Schwab, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. Margaret SPELLINGS, Secretary of the United States Department of Education, in her official capacity, Defendant.

No. Civ. 06-1010.

United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Northern Division.

October 27, 2006.

Adam Wolf, Graham A. Boyd, M. Allen Hopper, ACLU Drug Law Reform Project, Santa Cruz, CA, Erwin Chemerinsky, Duke University School of Law, Durham, NC, Ronald Arthur Wager, Bantz, Gosch & Cremer, L.L.C., Aberdeen, SD, for Plaintiffs.

Diana J. Ryan, U.S. Attorney's Office, Sioux Falls, SD, Marcia Berman, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

ORDER AND OPINION

KORNMANN, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

[¶ 1] Plaintiff Students For Sensible Drug Policy Foundation ("Foundation") and three of its members instituted suit seeking a declaration that 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) is unconstitutional, namely in violation of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs seek an injunction prohibiting the Department of Education ("DOE") from enforcing § 1091(r). Plaintiffs have filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion for class certification. Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) was enacted as part of The Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub.L. 105-244, Title IV, § 483(f)(1). Section 1091(r) suspends eligibility for federal student aid for students convicted of any drug related offense. In 2006, Congress enacted The Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005, re-writing § 1091(r) to clarify that the suspension provisions applied only to students who were already receiving federal student financial aid at the time of their drug conviction. Pub.L. 109-171, Title VIII, § 8021.

[¶ 3] 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) provides:

(r) Suspension of eligibility for drug-related offenses

(1) In general¹

A student who is convicted of any offense under any Federal or State law involving the possession of a controlled substance for conduct that occurred during a period of enrollment for which the student was receiving any grant, loan, or work assistance under this subchapter and Part C of subchapter I of chapter 34 of Title 42 shall not be eligible to receive any grant, loan, or work assistance under this subchapter and Part C of subchapter I of chapter 34 or Title 42 from the date of that conviction for the period of time specified in the following table:

If convicted of an offense involving:

The possession of a controlled          Ineligibility
 substance:                               period is
   First offense ............................. 1 year
   Second offense ........................... 2 years
   Third offense ......................... Indefinite
                                         Ineligibility
The sale of a controlled substance:        period is
   First offense ............................ 2 years
   Second offense ....................... Indefinite

(2) Rehabilitation

A student whose eligibility has been suspended under paragraph (1) may resume eligibility before the end. of the ineligibility period determined under such paragraph if —

(A) the student satisfactorily completes a drug rehabilitation program that —

(i) complies with such criteria as the Secretary shall prescribe in regulations for purposes of this paragraph; and

(ii) includes two unannounced drug tests; or

(B) the conviction is reversed, set aside, or otherwise rendered nugatory.

(3) Definitions

In this subsection, the term "controlled substance" has the meaning given the term in section 802(6) of Title 21.

[¶ 4] The plaintiffs contend that the denial of continuing federal student financial aid based upon the conviction of a drug offense under § 1091(r) (which they have termed the HEA Aid Elimination Provision) violates the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it singles out, for denial of financial aid, the category of individuals with a controlled substances conviction. Plaintiffs contend that § 1091(r) violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because denial of educational loans to students convicted of a drug offense constitutes an additional criminal punishment.

DECISION

I. Equal Protection.

[¶ 5] The standard for reviewing the constitutionality of a federal statute that is alleged to apply to a certain class of individuals in violation of the Equal Protection Clause is well known. "Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976)). Accord Weems v. Little Rock Police Department, 453 F.3d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 2006).

"[A] statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Lukowski v. INS, 279 F.3d 644, 647 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)).

Gonzalez v. Chertoff, 454 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir.2006).

[¶ 6] Persons convicted of drug trafficking or possession offenses are not a suspect class. Rem v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 320 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir.2003). The Constitution affords no right to a higher education. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1299, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2398, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). Likewise, there is no fundamental right to the receipt of federal student financial aid.

[¶ 7] Because § 1091(r) does not implicate a suspect classification or infringe on a fundamental right, the legislation must be upheld if there is a rational basis for singling out students convicted of drug offenses which is related to a legitimate federal interest. Rational basis review is highly deferential to the legislative branch. Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir.2006). Thus, the classification (convicted drug offenders) created by § 1091(r) is afforded a "strong presumption of validity." Id. (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993)).

[¶ 8] The classification "must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).

Thus, because all that must be shown is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification, it is not necessary to wait for further factual development. In other words, a district court may conduct a rational basis review on a motion to dismiss.

Carter v. Arkansas, 392 F.3d 965, 968 (8th Cir.2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted). All that the defendant must show is that a rational reason exists for the classification. Knapp v. Hanson, 183 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir.1999). "Rational basis review does not require us to identify the legislature's actual rationale for the distinction; rather, we will uphold the statute if `there are plausible reasons for Congress' action.'" Geach v. Chertoff, 444 F.3d 940, 946 (8th Cir.2006) (citing Hamama v. INS, 78 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir.1996) (quoting United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980))). It is enough if the proffered purpose "may reasonably have been the purpose and policy" of Congress. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2334, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). The district court is entitled to consider the language of the statute, together with any proffered assumption of legislative purpose, in its rational basis analysis. Knapp v. Hanson, 183 F.3d at 789 n. 5.

[¶ 9] Defendant proffers two justifications for the special treatment of students receiving federal financial aid who are convicted of drug offenses: (1) section 1091(r) deters drug-related offenses on college campuses and (2) prevents taxpayer subsidization of such conduct. The latter justification is enough, standing alone, to survive rational basis analysis. In fact, the legislative history of the 2006 amendment to § 1091(r) confirms that § 1091(r) "serves the purpose for which it was intended: to serve as a deterrent to prevent drug offenses while students are enrolled in higher education at taxpayer expense." H.R. Report No. 109-231.

[¶ 10] Plaintiffs do not contest that the two purposes identified by defendant are legitimate governmental interests. Plaintiffs contend, however, that this court must determine whether the actual effects of § 1091(r) are contrary to the goals of the HEA as originally enacted in 1965 and whether denying federal financial aid to students who are convicted of drug offenses is rationally related to the goals of the HEA. I reject this contention outright. Plaintiffs' argument would constrict the ability of all future legislatures to add to or change a statute once enacted. Congress is not subject to a legislative form of stare decisis. The question is not whether § 1091(r) is rationally related to the original purposes of the 1965 HEA but instead whether 1091(r) is rationally...