Stulp v. Schuman

410 P.3d 457

John STULP, Commissioner of Agriculture for the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Dean SCHUMAN and Schuman Cattle, LLC, Defendants–Appellants.

No. 11CA1825.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. VII.

Aug. 30, 2012.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Billy L. Seiber, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Alison Ruttenberg, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendants–Appellants.

Opinion by Judge TERRY.

¶ 1 In this action under the Animal Protection Act, sections 35–42–101 to – 115, C.R.S.2011, plaintiff, John Stulp, the Commissioner of Agriculture (Commissioner), sought an order permanently enjoining defendants, Dean Schuman and Schuman Cattle, LLC, from owning, managing, controlling, or otherwise possessing livestock in Logan County. The trial court entered such an injunction, and defendants now appeal on the grounds that the injunction was unwarranted and violated the United States and Colorado Constitutions. We affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 Defendants' cattle ranch became the focus of an investigation by the Logan County Sheriff's Department in February 2010. One month later, the Colorado Department of Agriculture Bureau of Animal Protection (CDA) inspected the property after receiving complaints of dead cattle on the ranch.

¶ 3 The Commissioner petitioned the trial court for injunctive relief to remove any livestock from defendants' ranch; allow state officials to enter defendants' property to provide veterinary care, food, and water to the livestock; and prohibit defendants from violating any other provision of the Act. After holding a hearing, the court issued an "Order Granting Preliminary Injunction and Regarding Fitness of Ownership and Disposition of Property," finding that "[d]efendants are not fit to provide adequately for the health and well[-]being of the cattle that they own and are not fit to own these cattle or any cattle during the pendency of this matter." The order permitted the Commissioner to seize all cattle from defendants' ranch and sell them at auction.

¶ 4 In a parallel criminal proceeding, defendant Dean Schuman was convicted of fourteen counts of cruelty to animals.

¶ 5 Before the scheduled permanent injunction hearing, the parties filed a joint motion for summary judgment, in which defendants stipulated to the facts contained in the Commissioner's amended complaint. Because the only contested issue was the appropriate remedy to be imposed by the court, no evidentiary hearing was held regarding the permanent injunction.

¶ 6 After considering the parties' briefs, the trial court issued a permanent injunction finding defendants unfit to provide for the health and well-being of livestock. The court permanently enjoined defendants from owning, managing, controlling, or otherwise possessing livestock in Logan County.

¶ 7 This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

¶ 8 Defendants contend the trial court exceeded its authority by permanently enjoining them from owning, managing, controlling, or possessing livestock in Logan County. We are not persuaded.

A. Standards of Review

¶ 9 We review the trial court's order permanently enjoining defendants from owning livestock for an abuse of discretion, see People v. Reyes, 166 P.3d 301, 302 (Colo.App.2007), and we defer to the trial court's factual findings pertaining to the requested injunctive relief if they are supported by the record, see Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 620 (Colo.2010).

¶ 10 A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. E–470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 140 P.3d 227, 230 (Colo.App.2006). A court also abuses its discretion when it misconstrues or misapplies the law. Reyes, 166 P.3d at 302.

¶ 11 Our review of statutory provisions is de novo. Shelby Resources, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 160 P.3d 387, 389 (Colo.App.2007).

¶ 12 The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the General Assembly's intent. People v. Nance, 221 P.3d 428, 430 (Colo.App.2009). If legislative intent is clear from the plain language of the statute, other rules of statutory interpretation need not be applied. Id. The words of statutes are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty–Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 35 (Colo.2000).

B. Animal Protection Act Provisions

¶ 13 As pertinent here, the Act provides: "No animal shall be mistreated or neglected to such degree or abandoned in any circumstance so that the animal's life or health is endangered." § 35–42–109(1), C.R.S.2011. The Act defines "abandon" as "the leaving of an animal without adequate provisions for the animal's proper care by its owner," "mistreat" as "every act or omission which causes or unreasonably permits the continuation of unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering," and "neglect" as the "failure to provide food, water, protection from the elements, or other care generally considered to be normal, usual and accepted." § 35–42–103(1), (9) - (10), C.R.S.2011.

¶ 14 The Act vests the Commissioner with the authority to enforce its provisions. § 35–42–112(1), C.R.S.2011. The provision of the Act at issue here states:

Whenever it appears to the [Commissioner] upon sufficient evidence satisfactory to the [Commissioner] that any person has engaged in or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of this article ... he may apply to any court of competent jurisdiction to temporarily or permanently restrain or enjoin the act or practice in question and to enforce compliance with this article....

§ 35–42–112(3), C.R.S.2011.

C. Appropriateness of Permanent Injunction

¶ 15 We first address and reject defendants' contention that the permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from owning livestock in Logan County was unwarranted.

¶ 16 The Act provides courts with authority "to enforce compliance with" the Act through injunctive relief. Id. That section exempts the Commissioner from having to prove irreparable injury, demonstrate the inadequacy of a remedy at law, or post bond as prerequisites to obtaining an injunction. Id.; see also Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329, 1334–35 (Colo.1997) (statutory scheme supersedes C.R.C.P. 65 requirements of proving irreparable injury, demonstrating inadequacy of remedy at law, or posting bond). The Commissioner may petition for injunctive relief whenever it appears, based on "sufficient evidence satisfactory to the [Commissioner]," that any person has violated, or is about to violate, any provision of the Act or any rule adopted under the Act. § 35–42–112(3).

¶ 17 "An injunction is an extraordinary and discretionary equitable remedy" that is "intended to prevent future harm." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Vandemoer, 205 P.3d 423, 430 (Colo.App.2008). Trial courts are vested with broad discretion to formulate the terms of injunctive relief. Colo. Springs Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. State, 780 P.2d 494, 498 (Colo.1989) ; see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 323, 81 S.Ct. 1243, 6 L.Ed.2d 318 (1961) ("[T]he suit has been a futile exercise if the Government proves a violation but fails to secure a remedy adequate to redress it.").

¶ 18 In the joint motion for summary judgment, defendants stipulated to the following facts:

• Defendants owned and grazed a herd of approximately fifty cattle on their property.

• An officer of the CDA made the following observations:

• the only available water source for the livestock was a pond or water collecting area that contained no fewer than four carcasses;

• cattle had evidence of hair loss and skin abrasions (evidence of possible external parasitism); and

• carcasses of dead cattle were scattered throughout the entirety of the twenty-acre pasture and inside the various out-buildings located on the property.

• A United States Department of Agriculture Veterinary Medical Officer observed:

• a cow with an increased respiratory rate (twice the normal rate) and a deformed left leg (forty percent lame);

• a cow with mucous coming from its nose, an increased respiratory rate, and a cough ;

• a cow with a severely deformed left leg (eighty percent lame);

• at least ten cattle with "bottle jaw," a clinical symptom of low blood protein;

• at least three carcasses in the pond from which the cattle drank; and

• of the fifty cattle on the property, none that could be considered "fat."

• The Chief Investigator for the Bureau of Animal Protection observed the following:

• cattle were feeding on foxtail millet, which is generally considered to be "filler" without the nutritional value of grass hay or alfalfa;

• cattle were eating at the bottom parts of round bales that were situated above them, making the bales unstable and likely to fall upon them; and

• in total, there were approximately sixty recent mortalities.

¶ 19 These stipulated facts supplemented the following testimony that had been presented at the preliminary injunction hearing:

• a veterinarian performing a necropsy on a heifer stated that it displayed "the most extreme example of starvation" she had ever seen;

• hay available to the cattle during the CDA's investigation was filled with urine and defecation;

• forage on the pasture was insufficient and immature; and

• there was one downed heifer that was severely emaciated and had not moved from her downed position for an extensive period of time, as evidenced by the amount of feces under her tail; the heifer was extremely weak and would not move her head to ward off flies that were landing on her face; and the heifer was euthanized to end her suffering.

¶ 20 Taken together, these facts support the trial court's conclusions that defendants violated the provisions of the Act and that the Commissioner was entitled to injunctive relief.

¶ 21 Defendants argue that the scope of the relief ordered by the trial court—permanently prohibiting defendants from owning livestock is—overly broad. We disagree.

¶ 22 Although defendants contended that their animal husbandry practices conformed to...