Sturgis v. Suffolk Cnty. Jail

JEMMY LEE STURGIS, Plaintiff,

v. SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE, SUFFOLK COUNTY D.A.,P.O. JOHN DOE, P.O. WILLIE WOE, P.O. TOMMY TOE, P.O. JANE DOE, Defendants.

12-CV-5263 (SJF)(ETB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: January 22, 2013

ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, District Judge:

I. Introduction

On October 17, 2012, incarcerated pro se plaintiff Jemmy Lee Sturgis ("plaintiff") filed a civil rights complaint in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") against defendants, Suffolk County Jail ("the Jail"), Suffolk County Police ("SCPD"), Suffolk County D.A. ("the District Attorney") and four (4) unidentified Suffolk County Police Officers allegedly employed at the 6th Precinct ("the 'John Doe' officers") (collectively "defendants"), accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Since plaintiff's financial status, as set forth in his declaration in support of his application to proceed in forma pauperis, qualifies him to file his complaint without prepayment of the filing fees, the application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. However, for the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's claims against the Jail, the SCPD and the District Attorney are dismissed.

II. The Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that shortly after "a supposed scizophrenic [sic] co-defendant" implicated him in a crime on January 9, 2010, the four (4) "John Doe" officers "'barge[d]' into" his wife's apartment, at which he did not reside, arrested him without a warrant and transported him to theSixth Precinct. (Compl., ¶ IV). According to plaintiff, he was arraigned and detained for more than twenty (20) days and the case was dismissed in his favor after the District Attorney stated that "There is no evidence to support the charges[.]'" (Id. (emphasis omitted)). Plaintiff claims psychological and emotional distress, as well as "financial losses [and] property losses, (Compl., ¶ IV. A), and seeks compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of thirty-eight thousand dollars ($38,000.00). (Compl., ¶ V).

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Under both the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the in forma pauperis statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a district court must dismiss acomplaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B). See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding both Section 1915 and Section 1915A to be applicable to a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis).

It is axiomatic that district courts are required to read pro se complaints liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quotineEstelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)):Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) and to construe them "to raise the strongest arguments [that they] suggest[]."Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotations, alterations and citations omitted). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of "all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint." Harrington v. County of Suffolk, 607 F.3d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2010): see also Ashcrofty. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

Nevertheless, a complaint must plead sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed.2d929 (2007). The pleading of specific facts is not required; rather a complaint need only give the defendant "fair notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."Erickson, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. at 2200 (quotations and citation omitted);see also Anderson News. LLC v. American Media. Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 182 (2d Cir. 2012) cert, denied by Curtis Circulation Co. v. Anderson News. LLC, 2013 WL 57139 (Jan. 7, 2013) (accord). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,"Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of further factual enhancement."Id. (quoting Twombly. 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955); see also Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011) (accord). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, * * * on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact),"Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. at 1959: see also Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment 592 F.3d 314. 321 (2d Cir. 2010) (accord). The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949;see also Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co.. Inc., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011) (accord).

B. Section 1983

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides, in relevant part:

"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the challenged conduct was "committed by a person acting under color of state law," and (2) that such conduct "deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Cornejo v. BelL, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotingPitchell v. Callaa, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir.1994): see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497,1501-02, 182 L. Ed. 2d 593 (2012).

1. Claims Against the Jail and SCPD

"[U]nder New York law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and therefore, cannot sue or be sued." See Davis v. Lvnbrook Police Dep't, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N. Y. 2002); see also Robischung-Walsh v. Nassau County Police Department, 699 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565 (E.D.N. Y. 2010), aff'd, 421 Fed. Appx. 38 (2d Cir. Apr. 29, 2011). Since the Jail and SCPD are administrative arms of the County of Suffolk ("the County"), they lack the capacity to be sued. See, e.g. Carthew v. County of Suffolk, 709 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195 (E.D.N. Y. 2010); Davis v. Riverhead Correction Facility, No. 11-cv-5667, 2011 WL 6131791, at * 2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2011). Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice as against the Jail and SCPD. However, since plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his complaint will be construed as being brought against the County.

"[A] municipality [or municipal entity] can be held liable under Section 1983 if the deprivation of the plaintiffs rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the municipality [or municipal entity]." Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). "Absent such a custom, policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis for the tort of its employee." Id.; see also Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011) (holding that under Section 1983, governmental bodies are not vicariously liable for their employees' actions); Los Angeles County. California v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 452, 178 L. Ed. 2d 460 (2010) ("[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely for the acts of others, e.g., solely because it employs a tortfeasor." (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation omitted)); Monell v. Department of Social Services of City ofNew York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim against a municipal entity, a plaintiff must show: "(1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury." Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359 ("Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under Section 1983 must prove that 'action pursuant to official municipal policy' caused their injury." (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018)); Humphries, 131 S.Ct. at 452 ("[A] municipality may be held liable when execution of a government's policy or custom . .. inflicts the injury." (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation omitted)).

"A municipal policy may be pronounced or tacit and reflected in either action or inaction." Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741, 182 L. Ed. 2d 528 (2012), "Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1359. In addition, municipal liability can be established "by showing that a policymaking official ordered or ratified the employee's actions- either expressly or tacitly." Jones, 691 F.3d at 81. "Thus, a plaintiff can prevail against a municipality [or municipal entity] by showing that the policymaking official was aware of the employee's unconstitutional actions and consciously chose to ignore them." Id. To establish such deliberate indifference, "a plaintiff must show that a policymaking official was aware of constitutional injury, or the risk of constitutional injury, but failed to take appropriate action to prevent or sanction violations of constitutional rights." Id. "Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring...