Suarez v. Paris

1

JULIO SUAREZ, DANIEL R. BINDERUP, DANIEL F. MILLER, FIREARMS POLICY COALITION, INC., and SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, Plaintiffs v. Col. CHRISTOPHER PARIS,^[1] Commissioner of Pennsylvania State Police, Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:21-CV-710

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

July 24, 2024

MEMORANDUM

Christopher C. Conner United States District Judge

Although there are numerous exceptions, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania generally permits open carry of firearms without a license. To carry a concealed weapon, however, you must be at least 21 years old and possess a firearms license issued by the sheriff of the county in which you reside.

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of several provisions of Pennsylvania's Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 (“UFA” or “the Act”). See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6101 et seq. The UFA regulates possession and use of firearms in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See Id. It provides for the issuance of firearms licenses, see id. § 6109; prohibits both concealed carry and transporting firearms in a vehicle without a firearms license, see Id. § 6106; prohibits possession of firearms in public by unlicensed individuals during a declared state of emergency, see id. § 6107; and prohibits unlicensed carry of firearms on public property and in the streets of Philadelphia, see id. § 6108.^[2] The Act also prohibits issuance of licenses to individuals who have been charged with or convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. See id. § 6109(e)(1)(viii).

Based upon evolving Second Amendment jurisprudence, we will uphold plaintiffs' challenge to the vehicle provision of Section 6106 as well as their challenge to Section 6107. We reject however, plaintiffs' challenge to the concealed carry provision of Section 6106 and the disqualification provision of Section 6109.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History^[3]

Plaintiffs Julio Suarez, Daniel R. Binderup, and Daniel F. Miller (collectively, “individual plaintiffs”) are residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as well as members of the Firearms Policy Coalition and the Second Amendment Foundation (collectively, “organizational plaintiffs”). (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 13-15; Doc. 39-6 ¶¶ 17-18, 29-30, 40-41; Doc. 45 ¶¶ 17-18, 29-30, 40-41).

Each individual plaintiff has been convicted of a criminal offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 37, 54, 70; Doc. 39-6 ¶¶ 17, 29, 40; Doc. 45 ¶¶ 17, 29, 40). For carrying a handgun without a license in Maryland in 1990, Suarez faced up to three years' imprisonment. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 38-39; Doc. 39-6 ¶ 38; Doc. 45 ¶ 38). For corruption of a minor in 1997, Binderup faced up to five years' imprisonment. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 55-56; Doc. 39-6 ¶ 42; Doc. 45 ¶ 42). And for making unsworn false statements to state officials and using an altered window tint exemption certificate in 1998, Miller faced up to five years' imprisonment. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 71-73; Doc. 39-6 ¶ 31; Doc. 45 ¶ 31).

Between November 2017 and April 2019, Suarez, Binderup, and Miller applied for licenses under Section 6109 of the Act. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 46-47, 62-63, 77-78; Doc. 39-6 ¶¶ 25, 36, 47; Doc. 45 ¶¶ 25, 36, 47). The Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) denied their applications pursuant to Section 6109(e)(1)(viii). (See id.)^[4]Plaintiffs instituted this action by filing a complaint in April 2021 against the Commissioner of PSP, alleging that his enforcement of the Act violates their Second Amendment rights.

In April 2021, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was subject to a state of emergency pursuant to several declarations by its Governor in response to the ongoing opioid epidemic and COVID-19 pandemic. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 28-29; Doc. 39-6 ¶¶ 9-10; Doc. 45 ¶¶ 9-10). The emergency declarations triggered Section 6107. (See id.) In their complaint, plaintiffs allege an intention to “travel throughout the Commonwealth” with both loaded and unloaded firearms, “whether concealed or openly,” regardless of whether a state of emergency is in effect. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 49, 65, 80; Doc. 39-6 ¶¶ 27-28, 38-39, 49-50; Doc. 45 ¶¶ 27, 38, 49).

Plaintiffs move for summary judgment. Commissioner Paris moves to partially dismiss plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and, in the alternative, seeks summary judgment. We will assume jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims regarding the constitutionality of Sections 6106, 6107, and 6109 of the Act and address the merits of the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment. We will dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction insofar as it seeks declaratory and injunctive relief regarding Section 6108 of the Act; we will grant leave to amend, but we will also sever and transfer this claim to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

II. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In addition to reviewing the facts contained in the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, [and] undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Such jurisdictional challenges take one of two forms: (1) parties may levy a “factual” attack, arguing that one or more of the pleading's factual allegations are untrue, removing the action from the court's jurisdictional ken; or (2) they may assert a “facial” challenge, which assumes the veracity of the complaint's allegations but nonetheless argues that a claim is not within the court's jurisdiction. Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008)). In either instance, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish jurisdiction. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The burden of proof tasks the nonmoving party to come forth with “affirmative evidence, beyond the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief. See Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The court is to view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non[]moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). This evidence must be adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving party on the claims. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action proceed. See Pappas, 331 F.Supp.2d at 315.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires movants and nonmovants alike to support factual assertions by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or otherwise “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Rule 56(e) allows the court to deem undisputed any fact not properly countered by record evidence. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2). Local Rule of Court 56.1 undergirds these principles by requiring Rule 56 motions to “be accompanied by a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” M.D. PA. L.R. 56.1. Local Rule 56.1 further requires the nonmovant to file a responsive statement identifying genuine issues to be tried and mandates that both parties' submissions “include reference to the parts of the record that support the statements.” Id.

Courts may resolve cross-motions for summary judgment concurrently. See Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Johnson v. FedEx, 996 F.Supp.2d 302, 312 (M.D. Pa. 2014); 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2720 (3d ed. 2015). When doing so, the court is bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party with respect to each motion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 310 (quoting Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968)).

III. Commissioner Paris's Motion to Dismiss

Commissioner Paris challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims regarding Section 6107 based upon mootness, and he asserts that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge Section 6108. (See Doc. 43 at 22-27). Jurisdiction is “a fundamental pre-requisite to the exercise of...