O'Sullivan v. Haught

Argued September 13, 2023

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, tortious interference with an expected inheritance, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Sheridan, J., denied in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which granted the plaintiffs motion to dismiss the appeal, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgement directed; further proceedings.

Kirk D. Tavtigian, with whom, on the brief, was Peter J. Alter, for the appellant (defendant).

Jesse A. Mangiardi, with whom was John L. Bonee III, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins and Ecker, Js.

OPINION

ROBINSON, C. J.

In this certified appeal, we consider the scope of an appellate court's jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the ground of collateral estoppel that is based on the preclusive effect of a Probate Court decree. The defendant, Alan F. Haught, appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification,^[1] from the Appellate Court's dismissal of his appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment with respect to the claim of tortious interference with an expected inheritance brought in a tort action by the plaintiff, David O'Sullivan. Specifically, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly granted the motion to dismiss his appeal because a trial court's denial of a summary judgment motion based on a colorable claim of collateral estoppel is an immediately appealable final judgment. We agree with the defendant and conclude that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed the defendant's appeal from the decision of the trial court.

Reaching the merits of the defendant's collateral estoppel claim pursuant to our supervisory powers over the administration of justice, and guided by our recent decision in Barash v. Lembo, 348 Conn. 264, 303 A.3d 577 (2023), we also conclude that, because there is an appeal pending in the trial court from the decree of the Glastonbury-Hebron Probate Court (Probate Court), which is in the form of a trial de novo, the probate decree does not have a preclusive effect on the issue of undue influence in the plaintiff's tortious interference with an expected inheritance claim. Accordingly, we remand the case to the Appellate Court with direction to affirm the trial court's denial of summary judgment as to count three of the complaint on the ground of collateral estoppel.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The underlying case involves a probate dispute over the will of Stephanie B. Haught (decedent), between the plaintiff, the decedent's only child, and the defendant, the decedent's second husband. In 2013, the decedent revoked a preexisting will that had left her entire estate to the plaintiff and executed a new will (2013 will). The 2013 will named the defendant as the decedent's sole beneficiary and expressly disinherited the plaintiff. Following the decedent's death in 2017, the defendant applied to have the 2013 will admitted to probate in the Probate Court. The plaintiff contested the 2013 will, claiming, among other things, that the defendant had exercised undue influence over the decedent in the creation of the 2013 will by isolating her from her family and friends and by tricking her into naming the defendant as her sole beneficiary. The Probate Court, following a contested evidentiary hearing and posttrial briefs, found "no evidence to support

a finding that the decedent was not exercising her own free will in altering her estate plan" and admitted the 2013 will to probate. The plaintiff appealed from the decree of the Probate Court to the trial court. That appeal remains pending before the trial court and will be heard as a trial de novo pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-186.

While the probate appeal was pending, the plaintiff also filed a separate tort action in the trial court that asserted three claims: (1) the inter vivos transfer of the decedent's assets to the defendant was invalid because of the defendant's undue influence, (2) the inter vivos transfer of the decedent's assets to the defendant was invalid because of the defendant's breach of his fiduciary duty, and (3) the defendant had tortiously interfered with the plaintiffs expected inheritance. The trial court subsequently consolidated the probate appeal with the tort action.

The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in the tort action, claiming, among other things, that the plaintiffs claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to counts one and two on the ground of res judicata but denied the motion as to count three, alleging tortious interference with the plaintiffs expected inheritance. With respect to the third count, the trial court concluded that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel were inapplicable because the plaintiff did not have an adequate opportunity to fully litigate the interference with an expected inheritance claim in the Probate Court.

The defendant appealed from the trial court's partial denial of his motion for summary judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had denied his motion for summary judgment as to count three, alleging tortious interference with an expected inheritance. In a summary order, the Appellate Court subsequently granted the plaintiffs motion to dismiss the defendant's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that there was no appealable final judgment. The defendant then filed a motion for reconsideration en banc, which the Appellate Court denied, also by summary order. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 1 of this opinion.

With respect to the certified question, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed his appeal because it is well established that a trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment, when based on the ground of collateral estoppel, is an immediately appealable final judgment. See, e.g., Santorso v. Bnstol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 346 n.7, 63 A.3d 940 (2013) ("[w]hen the decision on a motion for summary judgment ... is based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the denial of that motion does constitute a

final judgment for purposes of appeal" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Convalescent Center of Bloom-field, Inc. v. Dept. of Income Maintenance, 208 Conn. 187, 194, 544 A.2d 604 (1988) ("we view the issue of collateral estoppel as ripe for immediate appellate review"); Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates, Inc., 173 Conn.App. 630, 647-48, 164 A.3d 731 (2017) ("Although, as a general matter, this court . . . has jurisdiction to hear appeals [only] from final judgments, there are particular circumstances in which we may hear an appeal from an otherwise interlocutory judgment. The trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment raising a claim of res judicata or collateral estoppel presents such an instance."), aff'd, 332 Conn. 67, 208 A.3d 1223 (2019). In response, the plaintiff concedes that this court has concluded that the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the ground of collateral estoppel can be an appealable final judgment. Nevertheless, he argues that, because the defendant cannot prevail on the merits of his collateral estoppel claim, the Appellate Court's dismissal of the defendant's appeal was ultimately proper.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the legal principles that govern our review of the certified question. Because an appellate court's jurisdiction over appeals is prescribed by statute, specifically, General Statutes § 52-263,^[2] "we must always determine the threshold question of whether the appeal is taken from a final judgment . . . ." State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). "[W]e have recognized that limiting appeals to final judgments serves the important public policy of minimizing interference with and delay in the resolution of trial court proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928, 937, 293 A.3d 851 (2023). Although the "subject matter jurisdiction of our appellate courts is limited by statute to appeals from final judgments . . . the courts may deem interlocutory orders or rulings to have the attributes of a final judgment . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blakely v. Danbury Hospital, 323 Conn. 741, 745, 150 A.3d 1109 (2016). In Curcio, we determined that there are two circumstances in which an otherwise interlocutory order is appealable under § 52-263, namely, "(1) [when] the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) [when] the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them." State v. Curcio, supra, 31. Relevant here is the second prong of the Curcio test, which "boils down to whether, as a practical and policy matter, not allowing an immediate appeal will create irreparable harm insofar as allowing the litigation to proceed before the trial court will-in and of itself-function to deprive a party of that right." Halladay v. Commissioner of Correction, 340 Conn. 52, 62-63, 262 A.3d 823 (2021). "The second prong of the Curcio test focuses on the nature of the right involved.

It requires the parties seeking to appeal to establish that the trial court's order threatens the preservation of a right already secured to them and that that right will be irretrievably lost and the [party] irreparably harmed unless they may immediately appeal. . ....