Summers v. Louisville Metro Gov't

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DELL F. SUMMERS, Plaintiff, v. LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:23-CV-00189-CHB

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

September 11, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CLARIA HORN BOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Dell F. Summers, a pretrial detainee, filed this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner civil-rights action against Louisville Metro Government (“LMG”) Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (“LMDC”), and WellPath. [R. 1, p. 1]. At the time Plaintiff filed this action, he was proceeding pro se. On April 2, 2023, counsel entered an appearance for Plaintiff. [R. 9]. This matter is before the Court on initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will allow some of Plaintiff's claims to proceed and dismiss other claims.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is an incarcerated individual suing governmental defendants, the Court must conduct an initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2) of the complaint. 28 U.S.C § 1915A(a) (“The court shall review. . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997) (“A district court is required to screen all civil cases brought by prisoners, regardless of whether the inmate paid the full filing fee, is a pauper, is pro se, or is represented by counsel as the statute does not differentiate between various civil actions brought by prisoners.”), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Under § 1915A, the Court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604.

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere. Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).

A. LMDC

LMDC is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983 because municipal departments, such as detention centers, are not suable under § 1983. Marbry v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (holding that a jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983). In this situation, LMG is the proper defendant. Smallwood v. Jefferson Cnty. Gov't, 743 F.Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990). The Court therefore will construe the claims against LMDC as a claim brought against LMG. See Matthews v. LMPD, No. 3:19-CV-P581-RGJ, 2019 WL 5549209, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 25, 2019).

B. LMG and WellPath

“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, such as Louisville Metro Government, or private corporation, such as WellPath,^[1] the Court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality as an entity is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation' in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)); see also Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 Fed.Appx. 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001) (“CMS's [Correctional Medical Systems, Inc.,] liability must also be premised on some policy that caused a deprivation of [plaintiff's] Eighth Amendment rights.”).

1. Deliberate Indifference to Inmate Safety

Plaintiff alleges that LMG was deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm by failing to protect him from violence and sexual harassment at LMPD from other inmates and correctional officers. See [R. 1]. The Court construes the complaint as alleging claims against LMG for deliberate indifference to inmate safety or failure to protect. Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events in question, his claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Buetenmiller v. Macomb Cnty. Jail, 53 F.4th 939, 945 (6th Cir. 2022). Neither the Fourth Amendment nor Eighth Amendment applies to him, and claims brought under those Amendments will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Jail officials are obligated to protect pretrial detainees from “violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty., 29 F.4th 721, 726 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). To establish deliberate indifference for failure to protect under the Fourteenth Amendment, “‘a defendant officer must [1] act intentionally in a manner that [2] puts the plaintiff at a substantial risk of harm, [3] without taking reasonable steps to abate that risk, [4] and by failing to do so actually cause the plaintiff's injuries.'” Stein v. Gunkel, 43 F.4th 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Westmoreland, 29 F.4th at 729); see also Averhart v. Collins, No. 3:22-CV-P559-RGJ, 2023 WL 2386763, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 6, 2023).

Plaintiff alleges that he was robbed while an inmate at LMDC but that the corrections officers did nothing to prevent the robbery or rectify the issue. See [R. 1-1 (Statement of Facts/Claims)]. Plaintiff asserts that because of the design of LMDC and the lackadaisical attitudes of LMDC staff, robberies, assaults, and intimidation tactics are the norm at LMDC. Id. Plaintiff maintains that he felt “in imminent danger of injury to life, body, mind, and/or property” after the robbery and requested transfer to a different cell. Id. at 1. Plaintiff further alleges that despite being transferred to a different cell, several inmates in his new cell threatened Plaintiff's life on October 30, 2021. Id. Plaintiff contends that he requested to be removed from the cell immediately and he “needed to check out,” but two correctional officers denied his request and threatened him. Id. at 2. While being removed from that cell into protective custody by another correctional officer, the inmates threatened, “We're going to find you!” and “You're not safe anywhere!” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that when LMDC tried to return Plaintiff to a “Max Cell” on multiple occasions and he refused for fear for his life, he was placed into solitary confinement-“the hole”-and was issued a disciplinary complaint against him. Id.

Plaintiff states that during his incarceration, he has been subjected to sexual harassment by a homosexual inmate and observed numerous violent fights which were not prevented, curtailed, or properly addressed by LMG, including one that resulted in the death of an inmate. Id. at 3-4.

Plaintiff states that LMG regularly failed to abide by the “keep away” list of those inmates that cannot be placed in a cell together. Id. at 9. Plaintiff further claims that between May 2022 and December 2022, he “saw and heard” a corrections officer threaten inmates with spraying mace under the cell door. Id. at...