Summit Medical Center of Alabama, Inc. v. Riley

Page 1262

274 F.Supp.2d 1262

SUMMIT MEDICAL CENTER OF ALABAMA, INC., New Women's Health Care; Beacon Women's Center; on behalf of themselves and their patients seeking abortions, Plaintiffs, v. Bob RILEY, in his official capacity as Governor for the State of Alabama and his agents and successors; Bill Pryor, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Alabama and his agents and successors; Donald Williamson, M.D., in his official capacity as State Health Officer for the Alabama Department of Public Health and his agents and successors; and Ellen Brooks, in her official capacity as Montgomery District Attorney, Defendants.

No. CIV.A.02-A-1064-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

July 25, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

M. Wayne Sabel, Sabel & Sabel, P. C., Montgomery, AL, David A. Gespass, Gespass & Johnson, Birmingham, AL, Linda A. Rosenthal, Angela Hooton, Center for Reproductive Rights, New York City, for Plaintiffs.

William H. Pryor, Jr., Attorney General, Charles B. Campbell, Office of the Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, A. Eric Johnston, Birmingham, AL, Patricia E. Ivie, John R. Wible, Alabama Department of Public Health, Troy R. King, Office of the Governor, Montgomery, AL, William D. Dill, Office of the Attorney General, Troy R. King, Office of the Governor, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ALBRITTON, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 69), and the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and to Dismiss (Doc # 71).

The Plaintiffs, a group of health care facilities which provide abortion services in the State of Alabama, filed a Class Action Complaint on September 17, 2002, challenging, on behalf of themselves and their patients seeking abortions, the constitutionality of The Woman's Right to Know Act ("Act"). See Ala.Code §§ 26-23A-1 to 13 (Supp.2002). The Defendants include the Governor of the State of Alabama, the Attorney General, the State Health Officer, and the Montgomery District Attorney.¹ The Plaintiffs request that the court enjoin the Defendants from enforcing the Act and to issue a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional.

In addition to their Complaint, the Plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 2) to prevent the Act from taking effect on October 14, 2002. The court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs' motion on September 26-27, 2002. Following the hearing, the court issued a Memorandum Opinion (Doc. # 18) and accompanying Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 19) on September 30, 2002. See Summit Med. Ctr. v. Siegelman, 227 F.Supp.2d 1194 (M.D.Ala.2002). In the Order, the court granted the Motion for Preliminary Injunction in part and denied it in part. The Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Motion for Clarification (Doc. # 21) on October 4, 2002. In response, the court issued an Amendment to Order and Preliminary Injunction on October 14, 2002 (Doc. # 25).

On February 25, 2003, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Class Action Complaint raising eleven claims for relief (Doc. # 51). The Defendants filed an Answer on March 10, 2003 (Doc. # 53). On April 9, 2003, the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Dismissal (Doc. # 67) with respect to the following named Plaintiffs in the Amended Complaint: 1) Reproductive Health Services; 2) West Alabama Women's Center; 3) Center for Choice; 4) Dr. Richard Stuntz, M.D.; and 5) Dr. Louis T. Payne, M.D. The court subsequently treated the Plaintiffs' notice as a Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the foregoing Plaintiffs with prejudice (Doc. # 87).²

The Plaintiffs and Defendants filed cross motions for partial summary judgment on April 15 and 16, 2003, respectively. The court heard oral argument on the motions on July 3, 2003.

For the reasons to be discussed, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 69) is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and to Dismiss (Doc # 71) is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing, or pointing out to, the district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, the evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

III. THE WOMAN'S RIGHT TO KNOW ACT

The State of Alabama adopted The Woman's Right to Know Act ("Act") on April 17, 2002. See Ala.Code §§ 26-23A-1 to 13. Its purpose is "to ensure that every woman considering an abortion receives complete information on the procedure, risks, and her alternatives." Id. at § 26-23A-2(b). In similarity to statutes passed by an increasing number of states, the Act is an "informed consent" statute by which providers of abortions are required to provide a woman seeking an abortion with: 1) a designated set of printed informational materials at least twenty-four hours prior to an abortion procedure, either in person or by certified mail; and 2) additional information regarding the specific characteristics of the woman's abortion in person at any point prior to the procedure. Id. at §§ 26-23A-4(a), (b). Additionally, "the woman shall complete and sign a form that she has received" both the printed and in-person information, "and does provide her informed consent for an abortion on her unborn child." Id. at § 26-23A-(4)(c).

Currently, only two provisions of the Act are in dispute between the parties. First, the Plaintiffs contend that the Act's mandatory payment and distribution provisions, §§ 26-23A-4(a), 5(c), violate their First Amendment rights because it requires them to purchase and distribute speech they find ideologically objectionable. See Complaint, ¶ 99. Second, the Plaintiffs argue that the Act's civil liability provision, § 26-23A-10(a), violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it creates "prima facie presumptions of liability for offenses such as parental and judicial consent completely unrelated to the scope of the Act's provisions." Id. at ¶ 101. The specific language of these two provisions is as follows.

A. Mandatory Distribution and Payment Provisions

The Act requires the Alabama Department of Public Health ("ADPH") to create an informational brochure containing the following information:

(1) Geographically indexed printed materials designed to inform the woman of public and private agencies and services available to provide medical and financial assistance to a woman through pregnancy, prenatal care, upon childbirth, and while her child is dependent. The materials shall include a comprehensive list of the agencies, a description of the services offered, and the telephone numbers and addresses of the agencies.

(2) The printed materials shall include a list of adoption agencies geographically indexed and that the law permits adoptive parents to pay the cost of prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care.

(3) Printed materials that inform the pregnant woman of the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the unborn child at two-week gestational increments from fertilization to full term. It shall include color photographs of the developing child at each of the two-week gestational increments, a clear description of the unborn child's development, any relevant information on the possibility of the unborn child's survival, and dimensions of the unborn child. The materials shall be realistic, clear, objective, non-judgmental, and designed to convey only accurate scientific information about the unborn child at the various gestational ages.

(4) The materials shall contain objective information describing the methods of abortion procedures commonly employed and the medical risks of each, and the medical risks associated with carrying a child to term.

(5) The printed materials shall list the support obligations of the father of a child who is born alive.

(6) The printed materials shall...