Sunrise Resort Ass'n, Inc. v. Cheboygan Cty. Rd. Comm'n

999 N.W.2d 423

511 Mich. 325

SUNRISE RESORT ASSOCIATION, INC., Gregory P. Somers, Melissa L. Somers, and Karl Berakovich, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.CHEBOYGAN COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 163949

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued on application for leave to appeal May 10, 2023

Decided July 24, 2023

Aaron J. Gauthier, J.

Harris Law, PC, Petoskey (by Jennifer J. Schafer) for plaintiffs.

Henn Lesperance PLC (by William L. Henn, Benjamin M. Dost, and Andrea S. Nester) for defendant.

Fahey Schultz Burzych Rhodes PLC, Okemos (by Stacy L. Hissong and Stephen J. Rhodes) for Michigan Association of County Drain Commissioners, Michigan Townships Association, and Michigan Association of Counties, amici curiae.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

OPINION

Clement, C.J.

₃₂₉The plaintiffs brought this action after the defendant modified a storm water drainage system, allegedly causing flooding onto their property. The plaintiffs raised two distinct claims that remain at issue on appeal: a claim under the sewage-disposal-system-event (SDSE) exception to governmental immunity under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., and a common-law trespass-nuisance claim seeking injunctive relief.

The trial court dismissed both claims as untimely under the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Like the Court of Appeals, we disagree and hold that the SDSE claim, which seeks relief only in connection with flooding that occurred within the three-year window, was timely. However, unlike the Court of Appeals, we conclude that because the defendant is immune with respect to the plaintiffs’ common-law trespass-nuisance claim, that claim was properly dismissed. In light of this holding, we vacate as unnecessary the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trespass-nuisance claim was timely. Finally, because the plaintiffs only seek injunctive relief in connection with that claim, ₃₃₀their request for an injunction is invalid. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to the defendant with respect to the plaintiffs SDSE claim, affirm with respect to the commonlaw trespass-nuisance claim, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiffs¹ are a group of landowners who own property on West Burt Lake Road. In 2020, they initiated this lawsuit against the defendant, the Cheboygan County Road Commission. In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant oversees a storm water drainage system that directs water through a series of ditches and culverts, some of which pass through the plaintiffs’ respective properties. In 2013, when a bicycle path was constructed along West Burt Lake Road, the defendant modified the drainage system. In 2015, after the bicycle path was washed out, the defendant modified the drainage system again to prevent another washout. Thereafter, Sunrise Resort Association, Inc., contacted the defendant to explain that it had suffered "minor damage" from these modifications and that more severe damage would likely result if the drainage system was not fixed. Then, in 2018, the plaintiffs’ properties sustained significant damage by way of erosion caused by an overflow and backup of the defendant’s storm water drainage system.

In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs raised three counts. First, they brought a claim under MCL 691.1417(3) of the SDSE exception to the GTLA. Under ₃₃₁this claim, the complaint stated that the . "overflow and backup referenced previously in this complaint"—i.e., the 2018 overflow and backup—"was an ‘event’ as defined by MCL 691.1416(k)." The SDSE claim does not directly refer to the alleged minor flooding that occurred sometime around 2015.

Second, the plaintiffs brought a gross-negligence claim. Because they conceded in the trial court that this claim was barred by governmental immunity, it is not at issue on appeal, and we will discuss it no further.

And third, the plaintiffs brought a claim for injunctive relief to abate an ongoing trespass-nuisance. The complaint states that because the ongoing nuisance "cannot be remedied by money damages alone," it can "only be remedied by injunctive relief …." In their prayer for relief, the plaintiffs request both money damages and injunctive relief, but they expressly tie their request for injunctive relief to the trespass-nuisance claim alone.

In response to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, the defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). It argued first that the SDSE claim was untimely under the applicable three-year statute of limitations. See MCL 600.5805(2). And second, it argued that the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief to abate an ongoing trespass-nuisance must be dismissed because injunctive relief is categorically unavailable under the SDSE exception to the GTLA.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) to the defendant. It held that the plaintiffs’ SDSE claim began to accrue in 2015, when the minor flooding occurred and that, therefore, the claim was not timely under the three-year statute of limitations. Next, it held that the plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief failed for two ₃₃₂reasons. First, it was also untimely. And second, because the SDSE exception abrogated the common-law trespass-nuisance exception to governmental immunity, the defendant was immune with respect to the claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Sunrise Resort Ass’n, Inc. v Cheboygan Co. Rd. Comm., 339 Mich App 440, 983 N.W.2d 436 (2021). The Court of Appeals held that both the plaintiffs’ SDSE claim and common-law claim were timely. The panel reasoned that the claims did not accrue until 2018, when the overflow and backup occurred and that, therefore, the claims fell within the applicable statutory limitations period. Id. at 451, 983 N.W.2d 436. It also concluded that injunctive relief was broadly available under the SDSE exception to avoid future harm rather than remedy past harms. Id. at 456-457, 983 N.W.2d 436. For those reasons, the panel concluded that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition with respect to both the SDSE claim and the commonlaw claim.

The defendant then sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we ordered oral argument on the application to address:

(1) [W]hether the [plaintiffs’] claims accrued in 2015 and are barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and (2) whether the [plaintiffs’] claim for injunctive relief is barred by the Government Tort Liability Act, MCL 691.1401 et seq., and/or other applicable law, or is otherwise not obtainable as the functional equivalent of a claim for a writ of mandamus. [Sunrise Resort Ass’n, Inc. v Cheboygan Co. Rd. Comm., 509 Mich. 983, 984, 973 N.W.2d 914 (2022).]

We now affirm the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the plaintiffs’ SDSE claim was timely and not barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. However, we reverse its conclusion that injunctive ₃₃₃relief was available to the plaintiffs. We hold that the common-law exception to immunity for trespass-nuisance claims was abrogated by the Legislature’s passage of the SDSE exception to the GTLA. MCL 691.1417(2). Because the plaintiffs only sought injunctive relief in connection with a claim from which the defendant is immune, we hold that the request for an injunction is invalid. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition with respect to the SDSE claim because it is timely. But we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition with respect to the common-law claim because the defendant is immune from it.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1, 2] The defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), which allows for "dismissal of the action" because of "immunity granted by law or statute of limitations …. " We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). When a party brings a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), "[t]he contents of the complaint are accepted as true unless contradicted by the documentation submitted by the movant." Id. at 119, 597 N.W.2d 817. For purposes of this appeal, the defendant concedes that the facts in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint are accepted as true.

[3–6] We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Madugula v Taub, 496 Mich. 685, 695, 853 N.W.2d 75 (2014). The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Id. at 696, 853 N.W.2d 75. To do so, we "focus[ ] first on the statute’s plain language" ₃₃₄and "examine the statute as a whole, reading individual words and phrases in the context of the entire legislative scheme." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). "When a statute’s language is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

B. THE SDSE EXCEPTION TO THE GTLA

[7] The GTLA established a general rule that a "governmental agency is immune from tort liability if the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function." MCL 691.1407(1). This Court has explained that "the immunity conferred upon governmental agencies is broad, and the statutory exceptions thereto are to be narrowly con- strued." Nawrocki v Macomb Co. Rd. Comm., 463 Mich. 143, 158, 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000).

In 2002, the Legislature passed the SDSE exception to the GTLA. MCL 691.1416 through MCL 691.1419. Under the SDSE exception:

A governmental agency is immune from tort liability for the overflow or backup of a sewage disposal system unless the overflow or backup is a sewage disposal system event and the governmental agency is an appropriate governmental agency. [MCL 691.1417(2).]

[8] In short, the SDSE...