Support H.R.H. v. Heath

IN RE THE PARENTING AND SUPPORT OF H.R.H.,^† RACHEL M. CHRISP, Respondent, v. MARK C. HEATH, Appellant.

No. 46473-0-II

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II

December 15, 2015

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SUTTON, J. — Mark Heath and Rachel Chrisp are the parents of HRH. Heath and Chrisp were unable to agree on HRH's first name prior to his birth, and Chrisp listed her chosen first name on HRH's birth certificate. Heath appeals the trial court's denial of his request for mediation over HRH's first name and order that HRH's first name would remain the same. Heath argues that the trial court discriminated against him on the basis of his gender, violated his constitutional right to name his child, and abused its discretion. We hold that the trial court did not discriminate against Heath on the basis of his gender, there is no constitutional right to name one's child, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS

Chrisp and Heath discussed HRH's first name before he was born, while Chrisp was in labor at the hospital, and again after HRH was born. The parties could not come to an agreement on HRH's first name. Heath consistently objected to the first name Chrisp favored because he was uncomfortable with the choice. However, Chrisp and Heath agreed on HRH's middle name and surname. Chrisp listed the first name she chose on HRH's birth certificate.

Chrisp filed a petition for a parenting plan and for an order of child support. Heath acknowledged paternity, but raised the issue of HRH's first name in the parenting plan proceedings. Heath asked the trial court to order the parties to engage in "good faith" mediation over HRH's first name.¹ Clerk's Papers (CP) at 12, 14. The trial court entered a temporary parenting plan reserving the issue of HRH's name for trial.

Following a settlement conference, the parties continued to disagree over HRH's first name, and the trial court conducted a bench trial to resolve the issue.² At trial, Heath againrequested mediation to resolve the dispute. The trial court denied Heath's request for mediation over HRH's first name and ordered that HRH's legal name would remain the same. Heath appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court's decisions relating to a parenting plan for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 889, 184 L. Ed. 2d 661 (2013). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 35.

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST HEATH ON THE BASIS OF GENDER

Heath first argues that the trial court discriminated against him on the basis of his gender. Heath asserts that the trial court improperly denied his request for mediation because no statute allows a mother to choose the first name of a couple's child over the father's objection and the trial court's ruling favored the mother's choice. Therefore, Heath further argues the trial court engaged in gender discrimination.³ We disagree.

The record shows that the trial court did not deny Heath's request for mediation because of his gender. The trial court began its ruling by stating that HRH was the child's legal name and that Heath's mediation proposal was "essentially a request to order a name change." Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 63. The trial court stated that it was "not endorsing any such process" where only a mother has the authority to select the child's name. VRP at 64. Rather, the trial court denied Heath's request expressly because Heath was not denied the opportunity to participate in choosing his son's name and further mediation did not have a realistic chance of success.

The trial court explained, "What occurred in this particular case is that the parents discussed, but could not agree upon each of the three names that were given to this child." VRP at 64. Chrisp and Heath discussed HRH's first name before HRH's birth, while Chrisp was in labor, and after HRH's birth. The trial court found it significant that Heath and Chrisp agreed on a middle name and the surname, but they could not agree on a first name. Heath "did not get his choice of a first name" because "he did not persuade [Chrisp] to go with a different name." VRP at 64. "[T]hat does[ not] mean that Mr. Heath . . . did not participate in the selection of a name." VRP at 64. Furthermore, the trial court reasoned that further mediation would not likely be successful and questioned what "bad faith" mediation would look like in this context. VRP at 65 ("Who is it that would measure and determine whether one party was acting in bad faith? . . . Would continuing disagreement by the parents . . . be the same thing as bad faith?") Thus, the trial court's denial of Heath's request for mediation over HRH's first name was not based on his gender and the trial court did not discriminate against him.

III. WASHINGTON LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO NAME ONE'S CHILD

Heath next argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to name his child. We disagree because there is no constitutional right to name one's child.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent's right to "autonomous decision making" in child rearing. Am. Legion Post No. 149 v. Dep't of Health, 164 Wn.2d 570, 599, 192 P.3d 306 (2008). Parents have the fundamental right "to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). When the State restricts the exercise of a fundamental right, strict scrutiny applies to our review of State action. Johnson v. Dep't of Fish & Wildlife, 175 Wn. App. 765, 775, 305 P.3d 1130 (2013).

Heath cites Troxel to assert that he has the fundamental right to name his child. But Heath fails to cite any authority that encompasses a parent's choice of his or her child's first name within a parent's fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child. No Washington case has held that a parent has a constitutional right to name one's child. Thus, Heath fails to adequately support his argument with controlling case law and his claim of error fails. DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962) (where a party does not cite authority for a proposition, we will ordinarily not consider it unless it is apparent without further research that the assignment of error is well taken).

IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION

Lastly, Heath argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for mediation over HRH's first name. We disagree for three reasons.

A. The Trial Court Considered the Best Interest of HRH

A party in a paternity proceeding who desires to change the name of his or her child "must set forth the reasons for the change [according to the criteria of RCW 4.24.130]. The [trial] court in its discretion may order a change of the name when found to be in the best interests of the child."⁴ Daves v. Nastos, 105 Wn.2d 24, 29-30, 711 P.2d 314 (1985). A trial court's final order in a parenting plan petition must contain appropriate provisions for any matter that is in the best interest of the child. RCW 26.26.130(3).

Here, the trial court determined that it would be in HRH's best interest to not change his first name. HRH already had a legal name and the bench trial occurred many months after his birth. Further, HRH shared Heath's surname, and Heath and Chrisp agreed on HRH's middle name. The trial court noted that perhaps HRH might choose to call himself by his middle name or a nickname, but "that will be his choice when he is older." VRP at 66. The trial court acknowledged Heath's discomfort with HRH's first name, but urged him to overcome it "in [HRH's] best interest." VRP at 66. The trial court thus satisfied its statutory duty to fashion a parenting plan that met HRH's best interests.

B. Heath Participated in Naming HRH

Next, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it recognized that Heath was not denied the opportunity to participate in the choice of HRH's first name. The parties testified that they discussed HRH's first name before and after his birth, but they could not come to an agreement. The trial court explained that "the fact that [Heath] did not get his choice of a first name and that he did not persuade [Chrisp] to go with a different name, . . . doesn't mean that Mr. Heath . . . did not participate in the selection of a name." VRP at 64. The trial court found it significant that although Heath was not successful in persuading Chrisp on a different first name, HRH was given Heath's surname, and he and Chrisp had agreed on a middle name. Based on this history, the trial court did not believe that a formal process through mediation would resolve the dispute. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

C. The Choice of HRH's First Name Was Not a Future Decision

Lastly, we disagree with Heath's argument that, based on RCWs 26.09.187 and .191, the trial court abused its discretion because no statutory grounds existed to deny him mutual decision-making with Chrisp. RCWs 26.09.187 and .191 provide that, under certain circumstances, the trial court should not require the parents in a final parenting plan to engage in mutual decision-making or require the parents to engage in dispute resolution processes other than court action.⁵ But neitherof these statutes apply to the issue of HRH's first name because that issue was not a future decision that Heath and Chrisp would need to make jointly. As the trial court correctly stated, HRH already had a legal first name; thus, the issue of HRH's first name was not a future decision. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that HRH's first name would remain the same and denying Heath's request for mediation.

We...