Sutherlin v. Phx. Closures, Inc., 2:17-cv-00489-RLM-DLP

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1404(A)

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion by the Defendant, Phoenix Closures, Inc., to change venue under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a). (Dkt. 21). Defendant contends that transfer to the Northern District of Illinois is warranted for convenience of the parties and witnesses and for the public interest. (Dkt. 22). Having examined the facts in light of the applicable standards, the Court DENIES the Defendant's Motion to Change Venue under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a).

This Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") action was filed in the present Court in October 2017 (Dkt. 1), with an amended complaint having been filed in November 2017. (Dkt. 7). Plaintiffs are opt-in members of a putative FLSA collective action and, thus far, are the only five Plaintiffs who have signed on.¹ Plaintiffs allege that the

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Defendant, Phoenix Closures, Inc. ("Phoenix") employed each of them at its Greencastle, Indiana facility. (Dkt. 7, ¶¶ 1, 3). Plaintiffs further allege that Phoenix misclassified each plaintiff as an exempt, salaried employee during the relevant period when they should have been treated as non-exempt and therefore entitled to overtime pay for the hours they worked in excess of forty hours a week. (Dkt. 7, ¶¶ 3-8).

On December 29, 2017, Defendant filed its Motion to Change Venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), requesting that the present case be transferred from the Southern District of Indiana to the Northern District of Illinois. (Dkt. 21). The Plaintiffs filed their response brief on January 11, 2018, opposing the transfer. (Dkt. 27). The Defendant submitted a reply brief in support of their Motion to Change Venue on January 25, 2018 (Dkt. 32). The parties do not dispute that all named Plaintiffs are residents of the Southern District of Indiana, nor do they dispute that the Defendant's headquarters is located in the Northern District of Illinois.

"A federal district court, in which a suit is filed with proper venue, may [f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice . . . transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it may have been brought." Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). When a Defendant requests a transfer of venue, the movant bears the burden of establishing three things: 1) venue is proper in the transferor district; 2) venue and jurisdiction would be proper in the transferee district; and 3) the transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and is in the interest of justice. Id. Section

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1404(a) does not indicate the relative weight to afford to each of these factors; this is left to the discretion of the district court. Id; Amorose v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 3d 731, 734 (N.D. Ill 2007). "The weighing of factors for and against transfer necessarily involves a large degree of subtlety and latitude, and, therefore, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219; Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964) (noting that the remedial purpose of § 1404(a) requires "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness").

In this case, the parties do not dispute that venue or jurisdiction is proper in both the Southern District of Indiana and in the Northern District of Illinois. The only disputed issues between the parties are whether the Northern District of Illinois is more convenient and whether such a transfer would be in the interest of justice.

In determining whether a forum is more convenient and whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice, the court must consider the private interests of the parties as well as the public interest of the court. Research Automation, Inc. v. Shrader-Bridgeport Int'l., Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2010). Private interests include: 1) the plaintiff's choice of forum; 2) the situs of material events; 3) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; and 4) the convenience to witnesses and parties. Id; Nicks v. Koch Meat Co., 260 F. Supp. 3d 942, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2017). "Where the balance of convenience is a close call, merely shifting inconvenience from one party to another is not a sufficient basis for transfer." Research Automation, 626 F.3d at 978-79.

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A. Private Interests of the Parties

1. Plaintiff's Choice of Forum

"A plaintiff's choice of forum is generally given substantial weight, particularly when it is the plaintiff's home forum." Amorose, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 735. "[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Id (citing In re Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003)). A plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to less deference "when another forum has a stronger relationship to the dispute, when the forum of the plaintiff's choice has no significant connection to the site of material events, or in the context of nationwide class actions." Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299, 304 (7th Cir. 1955).

Several courts have observed that the FLSA provides an "opt-in" procedure under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and have accordingly concluded that "Congress intended to give plaintiffs considerable control over the bringing of an FLSA action." Nicks v. Koch Meat Co., 260 F. Supp. 3d at 955-56 (quoting Alix v. Shoney's, Inc., No. 96-2812, 1997 WL 66771 *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1997)); McKee v. PetSmart, Inc., No. CA 12-1117-SLR-MPT, 2013 WL 1163770, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 20, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 2456719 (D. Del. June 5, 2013); Onyeneho v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 n. 2 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating that "collective actions under the FLSA require prospective plaintiffs to affirmatively op-in to the action, unlike class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, in which plaintiffs are included unless they opt-out"); Guerrero v. Habla Communicacions, No. Civ.A. H-05-3620, 2006 WL 696646

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*2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2006) (observing that "[i]f such a plaintiff decides that it would be too inconvenient to opt-in here, he or she can file suit closer to home. A plaintiff who does choose to opt-in here would presumably be signaling his judgment that the relative inconvenience was not particularly significant"); Johnson v. VCG Holding Corp., 767 F. Supp. 2d 208, 215-16 (D. Maine 2011) (concluding that the plaintiff's choice of forum in a FLSA case is entitled to more deference than the choice of forum in Rule 23 national class action cases).

Thus far, five plaintiffs have opted in to the present collective action, all of whom live within the Southern District of Indiana and, more...