Sweet v. Reese

Tony T-Juan Sweet, Plaintiff, v. Andrew Reese, Michael Rainey, John Thomas Edwards, Defendants.

C. A. No. 6:21-00046-HMH-JDA

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division

September 2, 2021

OPINION & ORDER

Henry M. Herlong, Jr. Senior United States District Judge

This matter is before the court with the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin, made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 of the District of South Carolina.^[1] Tony T-Juan Sweet (“Sweet”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his person and property were illegally seized and unlawfully searched in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights by Defendants Deputy Andrew Reese (“Deputy Reese”), Deputy Michael Rainey (“Deputy Rainey”), and Deputy John Thomas (“Deputy Thomas”), (collectively “Defendants”) of the Greenville County Sheriffs Office (“GCSO”). (Compl., generally, ECF No. 1.) The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 18.) In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Austin recommends granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (R&R, generally, ECF No. 24.)

For the reasons stated below, the court adopts the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Viewed in the light most favorable to Sweet, the non-movant, the record reflects the following.

This matter arises from Sweet’s arrest at 320 Bailey Street in Greenville, South Carolina (“the residence”). (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.) At the time of the arrest, Deputy Reese had approximately nine years in total law enforcement experience. (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 2), ECF No. 18-2.) The residence was known to law enforcement as a high crime area with pervasive drug use typified by transient visitors and vehicles not registered to the address frequently arriving and departing. (Id. Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 3), ECF No. 18-2.) Deputy Reese had significant prior knowledge that illegal drugs were often sold and trafficked from the residence based on interviews with multiple subjects and information acquired from other deputies. (Id. Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 4), ECF No. 18-2.) He was also personally involved in two separate arrests for drug offenses arising from traffic stops of vehicles arriving at the residence on December 14, 2019 and January 7, 2020. (Id. Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 5), ECF No. 18-2.) In addition, Deputy Reese was aware that Deputy Edwards had been involved in a drug arrest at the residence on December 29, 2019. (Id. Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 5), ECF No. 18-2.) All three drug arrests occurred within the month preceding Sweet’s arrest. Because of this, Deputy Reese would regularly surveil the property, driving by the residence approximately ten times during his shifts. (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 3), ECF No. 18-2.)

At approximately 7:45 p.m. on January 12, 2020, Deputy Reese was patrolling the area of the residence when he observed a vehicle backing out of the driveway. (Id Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 6), ECF No. 18-2.) Upon seeing Deputy Reese’s patrol vehicle, the vehicle changed direction and pulled forward towards the residence. (Id. Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 6), ECF No. 18-2.) Deputy Reese initiated a traffic stop “to speak with the occupant [of the vehicle],” because “[b]ased on the extensive [criminal activity] at [the] residence[,] [he] felt that the occupant was likely involved in criminal activity.” (Id. Ex. D (GCSO Incident Report 5), ECF No. 18-5.) Deputy Reese initiated the traffic stop by pulling into the driveway behind the vehicle, blocking the exit. (Id. Ex. D (GCSO Incident Report 5), ECF No. 18-5.)

Sweet exited the vehicle and was given an order to return to the vehicle. (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. D (GCSO Incident Report 5), ECF No. 18-5.) Around this time, Deputy Edwards arrived after receiving a routine request for backup. (Id. Ex. B (Edwards Aff. ¶ 4), ECF No. 18-3.) Deputy Edwards observed Sweet running to the back yard of the residence. (Id. Ex. B (Edwards Aff. ¶ 4), ECF No. 18-3.) Deputy Reese and Deputy Edwards began to search for Sweet, but were unable to find him. (Id. Ex. B (Edwards Aff. ¶ 4), ECF No. 18-3.) On a second search, they observed a rear door to the house open and found Sweet hiding behind a trash can. (Id. Ex. B (Edwards Aff. ¶ 4), ECF No. 18-3.) After receiving several commands to move away from the residence, Sweet complied and was detained for further investigation. (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 8), ECF No. 18-2); (Id. Ex. B (Edwards Aff. ¶ 4), ECF No. 18-3.) Deputy Reese conducted a search of the area where Sweet was hiding and found two bags of a clear crystal substance and a key to the vehicle Sweet was driving. (Id. Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 8), ECF No. 18-2.) The substance field tested positive for methamphetamine and Sweet was arrested. (Id. Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 8), ECF No. 18-2.)

A search of the vehicle incident to Sweet’s arrest revealed 1.22 pounds of methamphetamine, 2.1 grams of cocaine, 3.8 grams of marijuana, prescription pills, drug paraphernalia, multiple cell phones, and a Smith & Wesson 9 mm handgun listed as stolen in the National Crime Information Center (“NClC”) database. Sweet was also in possession of $5,733.00 in cash on his person. (Id. Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 9), ECF No. 18-2.) Deputy Reese identified Sweet, and an NCIC database search revealed four unrelated and outstanding general sessions bench warrants. (Id. Ex. A (Reese Aff. ¶ 10), ECF No. 18-2.) Deputy Reese transported Sweet to the Greenville County Detention Center, where he was held on several drug and weapons charges stemming from this arrest and the unrelated bench warrants. (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. Ex. D (GCSO Incident Report 6), ECF No. 18-5.) Upon Sweet’s release in July 2020, the solicitor dismissed the forfeiture action concerning the $5,733.00, and the GCSO returned the money to him. (Id. Ex. D (GCSO Incident Report 27-29), ECF. No. 18-5; (Compl. 6, ECF No. 1.)^[2]

On January 3, 2021,^[3] Sweet filed the instant case. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on April 16, 2021. (Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 18.) Sweet filed a response in opposition on May 24, 2021. (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Summ. J., ECF No. 21.) Defendants filed a reply on June 1, 2021. (Reply, ECF No. 22.) On July 2, 2021, the magistrate judge issued the Report and Recommendation recommending that the court grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (R&R, generally, ECF No. 24.) On July 16, 2021, Defendants filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Defs.’ Obj., ECF No. 29.) On August 18, 2021, Sweet filed his objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Pl.’s Obj., ECF No. 30.) This matter is ripe for review.

II. DISCUSSION OF THE LAW

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in his favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.

A litigant “cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). “[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate.” Monahan v. Cty. of Chesterfield, Va., 95 F.3d 1263, 1265 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Ballenger v. N.C. Agric. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d l001, l005 (4th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Report and Recommendation

In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Austin recommends granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. First, she recommends, and Sweet concedes, that summary judgment should be granted to Deputy Rainey on all claims, including on the basis of qualified immunity, because he was not involved in any of the events alleged in Sweet’s complaint. (R&R 10, ECF No. 24; Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J. 13, ECF No. 21.) Finding that the initial stop of Sweet’s vehicle was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the magistrate judge also recommends denying summary judgment to Deputy Reese to the extent that he violated Sweet’s Fourth Amendment rights by initiating the traffic stop. (R&R 10-14, ECF No. 24.) In addition, the magistrate judge further noted that Sweet is entitled to, at most, an award of nominal damages due to the minimal amount of time that he was unlawfully seized. (R&R 14, ECF No. 24.)

Finally, the magistrate judge recommends granting summary judgment to all Defendants on Sweet’s § 1983 claim to the extent that he challenges his arrest or the searches of his person and property, because Deputies Reese and Edwards had probable cause to arrest Sweet after discovering the methamphetamine where he was hiding and the outstanding, unrelated bench warrants. (R&R 15-17, ECF No. 24.)

C. Objections

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