Sylla v. United States

RAHEEM SYLLA, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 16-8124 (ES)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

September 10, 2020

Not for Publication

AMENDED OPINION

MCNULTY, DISTRICT JUDGE

Petitioner Raheem Sylla, a prisoner currently confined at the Federal Correctional Institution, Fort Dix, moves to vacate, correct, or set aside his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Petition)¹. Respondent United States of America opposes the motion. (Answer). Also before the Court is Sylla's "motion for issuance of subpoena for in camera review" of information relating to "the dual prosecution agreement between the United States Attorney's Office and State's Attorney's Office for Essex County New Jersey that is a part of Project Exile and Project Safe Neighborhood Program." (Motion for Discovery.). Additionally, Sylla filed a motion to stay the case pending the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis. (DE 19). The stay motion was denied as mootafter the Supreme Court rendered its decision, reported as United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). (DE 21) I consider the effect of the Davis decision in this Opinion. For the reasons explained herein, the Court denies the Petition, the Motion for Discovery, any claims Sylla may have raised based on Davis, and a certificate of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

Sylla was charged in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in a two-count information for (i) carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) (Count I), and (ii) during and in relation to the carjacking charged in Count I, knowingly using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Count II). (United States v. Sylla, Crim. No. 15-0338, DE 11). Sylla submits that he was initially charged in state court, but his case was then referred to the United States Attorney's Office while the state prosecution concluded with the entry of a nolle prosequi. (Petition at 5-6; see Motion for Discovery at 5).

On July 7, 2015, Sylla waived hi rights to be prosecuted by indictment and instead pleaded guilty before this Court to the two-count information pursuant to a written plea agreement. (DE 12; Plea Tr. at 28:9-29:5). On October 27, 2015, the Court sentenced Sylla to thirty months on Count I and eighty-four months consecutive on Count II, for a total of 114 months' imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. (United States v. Sylla, Crim. No. 15-0338, DE 18 at 2-3). Sylla did not file a direct appeal. (Petition at 3).

On October 31, 2016, Sylla filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (DE 1), which was administratively terminated because of Sylla's failure to comply with filing requirements (DE 4). Thereafter, Sylla refiled this Petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Sylla's claims include (i) a challenge to his conviction for not having an opportunity to enter a plea agreement with the state before he was prosecuted by the United States Attorney's Office; and (ii) ineffective assistance of both his state and federal counsel. (Id. at 5-6). The Government filed its Answer on June 14, 2017.

On the same day Sylla filed his original petition, he also filed a Motion for Discovery, seeking a subpoena under Rule 1 and Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, as well as Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Motion for Discovery at 6). The Government opposes the Motion for Discovery in a footnote to its Answer. (Answer at 10 n.1).

As noted above, while this Petition was pending the Supreme Court filed its decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). (DE 19). This Court ordered supplemental briefing addressing the effect of Davis. (D.E. Nos. 21 & 22). The Government filed a brief on January 30, 2020. (DE 27). Sylla's Petition and Motion for Discovery are fully briefed and ready for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Section 2255 Standard

Section 2255 provides in relevant part as follows:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A district court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion unless the "motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show" that the movant is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see also United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 545-46 (3d Cir. 2005).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The United States Supreme Court set forth the two-prong standard by which courts must evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "The first part of the Strickland test requires 'showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.'" United States v. Bui, 795 F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 2015)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Counsel's performance is deficient if his representation falls "below an objective standard of reasonableness" or outside of the "wide range of professionally competent assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 & 690. In examining the question of deficiency, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Id. at 689. In addition, judges must consider the facts of the case at the time of counsel's conduct and must make every effort to escape what the Strickland court referred to as the "distorting effects of hindsight." Id. The petitioner bears the burden of showing that counsel's challenged action was not sound strategy. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). To satisfy the second "prejudice" prong, a petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

With respect to the sequence of the two prongs, "a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed." Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 201 (3d. Cir. 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Section 2255 Petition and Motion for Issuance of Subpoena

Sylla appears to be arguing that, because he was initially in state custody, he was wronged because he was prosecuted in federal court rather than in state court. (See Petition at 5). Specifically, Sylla alleges that the federal prosecutor and the state prosecutor were involved in "Federal-State Joint Programs," under which the prosecutors must adhere to certain mandates. (Id.). One such mandate, according to Sylla, requires that the United States Attorney's Office inform a defendant who was "in state court prior to any federal indictment or complaint" that "the defendant could avoid federal prosecution by accepting thecontract plea offer." (Id.). Sylla alleges that he and his attorney "were not informed of the program, nor any federal involvement, [nor] that [Sylla] could avoid federal prosecution." (Id.).

Related to that argument is a Motion for Discovery, wherein Sylla seeks

records reflecting how his case was accepted and transferred for Federal prosecution, dishonesty, lack of candor, misconduct, inaccurate and misrepresentation, fraud on State and Federal Courts, intentional failure/refusal to adhere to the U.S. Department and/or any other acts which would reflect defects in the integrity of State and/or Federal Court plea proceedings resulting in a miscarriage of justice . . .

(Motion for Discovery at 5).² Sylla asks these records to be submitted for the Court's in camera review "to determine whether if they contain Brady and Giglio material." (Id. at 6).

The basis of Sylla's discovery request appears to be a document titled "Baltimore EXILE—A Comprehensive Strategy to Reduce Gun Violence," published by the United States Attorney's Office in the District of Maryland (the "Baltimore Exile Memorandum"). (DE 1-2; see Motion for Discovery at 3; DE 1 at 13-14). It provides details regarding the City of Baltimore's "unified and comprehensive strategy to combat gun crime that combines law enforcement efforts, community action and revitalization, and public awareness." (DE 1-2 at 2). The Baltimore Exile Memorandum states that, in appropriate cases where the Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") has made a determination that "the case is ready to be indicted prior to the date of the arraignment on the pending state charge or within 90 days of the date of arrest," the State's Attorney's Office for Baltimore City will communicate the AUSA's intentions to the defendant and his counsel. (Id. at 4; see also Motion for Discovery at 4). So informed, thedefendant has the option to accept a mandatory five-year state term, at which point "the federal case will be declined without ever having been indicted." (DE 1-2 at 4). But "if the defendant does not accept the five-year plea and is not in state custody," the defendant will be taken into federal custody and be prosecuted federally. (Id.).

That Memorandum, of course, is an agreement among the authorities in Maryland. Sylla speculates, however, that similar "Federal-State [j]oint [p]rograms" govern his New Jersey case and that he was wronged because, "at no time during Petitioner's state court proceedings was he, nor his court-appointed defense counsel informed of a contract plea offer, the [U]nited [S]tates [A]ttorney's [O]ffice's...