Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside

318 Cal.Rptr.3d 47

SYMONS EMERGENCY SPECIALTIES, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.CITY OF RIVERSIDE, Defendant and Respondent.

E078113

Court of Appeal,

Fourth District, Division 2.

Filed January 9, 2024

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Thomas S. Garza, Judge. Affirmed. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1516027)

Stream Kim Hicks Wrage & Alfaro, Theodore K. Stream and Jamie E. Wrage, Riverside, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Phaedra A. Norton, City Attorney, Rebecca L. McKee-Riembold, Assistant City Attorney, and Brandon S. Mercer, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

FIELDS, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant and respondent City of Riverside (the City) regulates the provision of ambulance services operating within the City’s geographic limits under the Riverside Municipal Code (RMC). As relevant to this litigation, RMC section 5.66.020 prohibits persons from operating ambulance services originating in the City without first obtaining a valid franchise or permit from the City. Plaintiff and appellant Symons Emergency Specialties (Symons) filed a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City, arguing that RMC section 5.66.020 is invalid under the Emergency Medical Services System and Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Act (EMS Act; Health and Saf. Code, § 1797 et seq.¹).²

The parties do not dispute that, as a general matter, the EMS Act precludes cities from regulating the provision of emergency medical services. The only factual dispute presented in this case is whether the City regulated the administration of nonemergency ambulance services as of June 1,1980, such that it was entitled to continue doing so under grandfathering provisions of the EMS Act. (§ 1797.201.) The parties tried this factual dispute in a court trial; the trial court issued a statement of decision concluding that Symons had failed to meet its burden of proof on the issue; and judgment was entered in favor of the City.

Symons appeals, arguing that the judgment must be reversed because: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony of city employees regarding the interpretation of two city ordinances enacted in 1975 and 1980 (Ordinance 4183 and Ordinance 4768, respectively); (2) the trial court’s factual finding that the City replated nonemergency ambulance services as of June 1980 is not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) RMC section 5.66.020 is invalid as a matter of law because it violates federal anti-trust law. We disagree with each of these contentions and affirm the judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The EMS Act and Section 1797.201

[1] "‘The EMS Act aims to achieve integration and coordination among various government agencies and EMS providers.’ " (City of Oxnard v. County of Ventura (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1010, 1015, 286 Cal.Rptr.3d 815.) It " ‘create[s] a comprehensive system governing virtually every aspect of prehospital emergency medical services’" and ‘"accomplishes this integration through what is essentially a two-tiered system of regulation.’ " (Valley Medical Transport, Inc v. Apple Valley Fire Protection Dist. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 747, 754, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 647, 952 P.2d 664 (Valley Medical).) "The two tiers consist of a state Authority, which ‘performs a number of different functions relating to the coordination of EMS throughout the state’ (ibid.), and an EMS agency established by a county … which plans, implements, and evaluates emergency medical service systems on a countywide or multicounty basis …." (Ibid.) Generally, cities are "afforded no particular role" in administration of this local EMS agency. (County of San Bernardino v. City of San Bernardino (1997) 15 Cal.4th 909, 916, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 814, 938 P.2d 876 (County of San Bernardino).)

[2] However, the EMS Act includes a "grandfathering" provision in section 1797.201. (Valley Medical, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 758, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 647, 952 P.2d 664; § 1797.201.) Section 1797.201, "allow[s] cities … to maintain control of the services they operated or contracted for in June 1980, and permit[s] them to make decisions as to the appropriate manner of providing those services." (County of San Bernardino, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 930, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 814, 938 P.2d 876.) The grandfathering provision permits a city to retain this administrative control "[u]ntil such time that an agreement is reached" with a county "regarding the provision of prehospital emergency medical services for that city" (§ 1797.201) but "does not require cities … to enter an agreement by a particular time" (County of San Bernardino, at p. 930, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 814, 938 P.2d 876).

B. Relevant Evidence Presented at Trial³

The central factual dispute identified by both parties at trial was whether the City regulated the provision of ambulance services as of June 1, 1980, such that the City was entitled to continue regulating those services under section 1797.201.

1. City Ordinances

The evidence at trial included multiple ordinances adopted by the City from 1975 to the time of trial. Ordinance 4183 was adopted in 1975 and granted a franchise to Goodhew Ambulance Service (Goodhew) "to operate authorized emergency ambulance vehicles" within the City’s geographic limits. Ordinance No. 4768 was adopted in March 1980, and again granted a franchise to Goodhew "to operate authorized emergency ambulance vehicles" within the City’s geographic limits.

The City adopted subsequent ordinances extending the term of Goodhew’s franchise through at least 1999, without substantive change to the scope or conditions of the original franchise.⁴ However, Ordinance No. 16005 (Ordinance 16005), which extended the term of Goodhew’s franchise from March 1985 through January 1988, was not formally adopted until after the effective date of the extension.

In September 1989, the City adopted an ordinance adding chapter 5.66 to the municipal code. This chapter provided a more comprehensive set of definitions and rules governing the operation of ambulances within the City’s geographic limit, including the franchise and permit requirement set forth in section 5.66.020. However, the ordinance also expressly provided that this addition to the municipal code would not "affect the continued existence, operation and validity" of the existing franchise granted to Goodhew.

2. Witness Testimony

The deputy fire chief of administration for the City of Riverside Fire Department testified that he was originally hired in 1993 and had been assigned as the City’s ambulance administrator since 2015. His duties required him to be familiar with the statutes and ordinances pertaining to ambulance operation, as well as the City’s franchise and contract agreements pertaining to ambulance operation. The deputy chief explained that, in the context of ambulance transports, the terms "emergency" and "nonemergency" are not used to describe a type or level of service. Instead, the terms refer only to whether the request for service originated through the 911 emergency system or another source. As a result, the term "emergency ambulance vehicles" as used in Ordinance 4183 includes vehicles that respond to both emergency and nonemergency calls.

A battalion chief with the City of Riverside Fire Department testified that he had been working for the City for over 20 years. Prior to working for the City, the battalion chief worked as a paramedic for Goodhew and its successor companies from 1990 through 2000. He confirmed that the distinction between "emergency" and "nonemergency" transports is based upon how the call for service originated and not the type of vehicle or service being provided. He also testified that while working as a paramedic from 1990 through 2000, he performed both emergency and nonemergency transports within the City’s geographic limits on behalf of Goodhew.

A medical doctor testified that he is shareholder, current member of the board of directors, and former chief operating officer of Symons. He has been involved in the provision of emergency medical services in various capacities since 1991. Given this experience, he has followed the various laws and regulations relating to the provision of EMS services. The doctor testified that "there’s a lot of different definitions on emergency ambulance," but he admitted that in "the general common usage," the phrase typically describes a call for service generated through the 911 emergency call system. The doctor further explained that "in the very beginning of EMS …—there weren’t clear definitions" describing different types of ambulances. However, "[i]n the ‘90s," the federal Medicare guidelines began differentiating between four different classifications of ambulance. Despite this, each type of ambulance can provide both "emergency" and "nonemergency" services.

The doctor recalled that in 2009, the City denied a request by one of Symons’s predecessor companies to operate ambulances for the purpose of providing nonemergency transport within the City’s geographic limits. This predecessor company later merged with Symons, but Symons did not separately reapply for a franchise or permit from the City based upon legal advice from various third party sources.

C. Statement of Decision and Judgment

On August 18, 2021, the trial court issued a statement of decision concluding that Symons "did not meet its burden to prove its allegations" that RMC section 5.66.020 was invalid. Judgment was entered in favor of the City, and Symons appeals from this judgment.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Admission of Evidence

[3, 4] The first argument advanced by Symons on appeal is that the trial court erred by permitting the deputy fire chief and battalion chief to testify that the scope of the franchise granted in Ordinance 4183 and Ordinance 4768 included both emergency and nonemergency ambulance transports. According to Symons, this testimony was inadmissible because both witnesses lacked sufficient personal knowledge to testify on this topic as required by Evidence Code...