Szabo v. Muncy Indus., LLC

661 F.Supp.3d 337

Ric SZABO, Plaintiff, v. MUNCY INDUSTRIES, LLC, Defendant.

No. 4:21-CV-00468

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

Signed March 10, 2023

Michael P. Murphy, Mary Kramer, Murphy Law Group, LLC, Philadelphia, PA, Benjamin D. Salvina, Marzzacco Niven & Associates, Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiff.

Gregory A. Stapp, Stapp Law, LLC, Williamsport, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Matthew W. Brann, Chief United States District Judge

Plaintiff Ric Szabo sues his former employer, Muncy Industries, LLC (hereinafter, "Muncy"), for violating federal and state labor laws by failing to pay him overtime. Szabo, a salaried calibration technician, alleges that he should have paid overtime.

Muncy disagrees, arguing that Szabo falls into a narrow category of employees exempted from overtime pay requirements because their work necessitates irregular hours. Accordingly, Muncy moves for summary judgment in its favor. For his part, Szabo also moves for summary judgment, arguing that he is not an executive or professional employee, two categories of workers exempted from overtime requirements. For the following reasons, the Court denies Muncy's motion and grants Szabo's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Facts¹

Jason Fetter, one of Muncy's vice presidents, hired Szabo in December 2017.² Szabo's title was "calibration technician."³ He would be Muncy's first calibration technician.⁴ Muncy hired him after expanding its operations into the calibration space.⁵ He would calibrate load cells sent to Muncy's plant and travel to customers' places of business to calibrate load cells on site.⁶

When Szabo was hired, he was essentially Muncy's entire calibration department.⁷ Szabo was already certified to do calibrations by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.⁸ While working for Muncy, he created a certification program.⁹ Through the program, he taught other Muncy employees, including Fetter, how to calibrate load cells, ultimately certifying them to calibrate.¹⁰

As noted, Szabo's work often required him to visit Muncy's customers at their places of business and service their machines.¹¹ He estimates that he spent eighty percent of his time on the road calibrating machines.¹² But he was not responsible for hiring, firing, or supervising other Muncy calibration technicians.¹³ He considered himself and the other technicians to be on equal footing.¹⁴

Fetter offered Szabo a starting annual salary of $37,000, with a $2,000 increase for every set of thirty-four calibrations Szabo completed up to a maximum of $50,0000, at which point Muncy would provide Szabo a bonus of $500 for every additional set of twenty calibrations.¹⁵ Szabo also received additional miscellaneous bonuses from time to time.¹⁶ Additionally, Muncy purchased Szabo's car for him, paid some of his moving expenses, and provided him with a company phone and credit card.¹⁷

Szabo understood his arrangement with Muncy to mean that he would normally work Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and occasionally on weekends, but he would always be paid for forty hours of work per week, even if he worked more.¹⁸ If needed, he would work through lunch or past 5:00 p.m.¹⁹ Megan Delahoussaye, one of the employees charged with sending Szabo his assignments, claimed that Szabo worked an alternating schedule.²⁰ He would spend the first week at Muncy's Pennsylvania office and then spend the next week traveling to customer sites.²¹ Szabo disputes that he worked a fixed alternating scheduled but acknowledges that he spent time both in the field and at Muncy facilities.²² As stated earlier, Szabo estimated that he spend "[eighty] percent" of his time "out on the road and calibrating machines."²³

Delahoussaye and Kimberly Bunting, another Muncy employee, were responsible for sending Szabo his itineraries, which Fetter helped prepare and ultimately approved.²⁴ But Szabo would be responsible for making his own travel arrangements with his company credit card based on the plan Fetter approved.²⁵ Bunting suggested that a majority of Szabo's travel weeks involved travelling on weekdays, but also indicated that if the schedule so required, Szabo would travel outside of working hours.²⁶

Delahoussaye would send Szabo emails that contained a schedule of his assigned customer visits and travel estimates, as well as which cities he would spend his nights in.²⁷ She also suggested that Szabo could choose to travel during work hours.²⁸ Szabo claims that he sometimes travelled between jobs on weekends.²⁹ At his deposition, Szabo vaguely recalled instances when Fetter rejected his requests to travel on weekdays but also later stated he never requested to travel during work hours because he knew such requests would be futile.³⁰ He also never requested overtime pay.³¹

Fetter claims that travel arrangements were entirely up to Szabo.³² But for substantial changes, Szabo would need to communicate with Bunting, who would loop in Fetter if necessary.³³ Fetter's authorization would be necessary if, for example, Szabo missed a flight or needed additional time to complete a calibration.³⁴

Szabo left his employment with Muncy in July 2020, after working there for two-and-one-half years.³⁵

B. Procedural History

Szabo alleges that Muncy violated both the Federal Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (Count I), and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act of 1968, 43 P.S. § 333 et seq. (Count II), by failing to compensate him for his overtime.³⁶ He also claims that Muncy willfully violated the FLSA.³⁷ He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs.³⁸

Muncy now moves for summary judgment on Szabo's claims, claiming that Szabo is exempt from overtime requirements because his work necessitates irregular hours.³⁹ Szabo moves for partial summary judgment, seeking a determination that he is not exempt from overtime requirements because he is not an executive or professional employee, which are two categories of exempt workers.⁴⁰ Both motions are ripe for disposition.

II. LAW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."⁴¹ Material facts are those "that could alter the outcome" of the litigation, "and disputes are 'genuine' if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct."⁴² A defendant "meets this standard when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff's case."⁴³ Conversely, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must "point to admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie case under applicable substantive law."⁴⁴

The party requesting summary judgment bears the initial burden of supporting its motion with evidence from the record.⁴⁵ When the movant properly supports its motion, the nonmoving party must then show the need for a trial by setting forth "genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party."⁴⁶ The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explains that the nonmoving party will not withstand summary judgment if all it has are "assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions."⁴⁷ Instead, it must "identify those facts of record which would contradict the facts identified by the movant."⁴⁸ Indeed, "the party opposing a motion for summary judgment 'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.' "⁴⁹ "Rather, that party must point to specific factual evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute on a material issue requiring resolution at trial."⁵⁰

In assessing "whether there is evidence upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the [nonmoving] party,"⁵¹ a court "must view the facts and evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."⁵² Moreover, "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c)," the court may "consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion."⁵³ Finally, although "the court need consider only the cited materials, . . . it may consider other materials in the record."⁵⁴

III. ANALYSIS

Through their respective motions, both parties essentially ask the Court to determine whether Szabo is exempt from overtime by virtue of three exemptions. Title 29 U.S.C. § 207 sets forth the FLSA's overtime rules.⁵⁵ Under section 207, unless an exemption applies, an employer must pay any employee who works more than forty hours during a week at an increased rate. Muncy's motion asserts that there is no factual dispute that an exemption for employment necessitating irregular hours of work (the "Belo" exemption⁵⁶) applies to Szabo.⁵⁷ Szabo's motion asserts that there is no factual dispute that the executive employee and professional employee exemptions do not apply to him.⁵⁸ Courts narrowly construe the FLSA's exceptions and exemptions, and as the party invoking the exception, Muncy carries the burden to prove that Szabo is exempt at trial.⁵⁹ The Court first addresses Muncy's motion asserting that the Belo exception applies, followed by Szabo's motion and the executive and professional employee exemptions.

A. The Belo Exception Does Not Apply to Szabo's Employment

Muncy seeks summary judgment on the grounds that Szabo falls into the narrow Belo exception for employees whose work necessitates irregular hours. As the employer, Muncy carries the burden of showing the exemption applies. And as the movant on this issue, Muncy also carries the burden to establish the absence of any disputed material facts regarding the exemption's applicability. The Court takes all reasonable inferences in favor of...