Szulczewski v. Cox Enters., Inc., 3:19CV479-GCM

JULIE SZULCZEWSKI, Plaintiff, v. COX ENTERPRISES, INC., COX MEDIA GROUP, LLC andWSOC TELEVISION, LLC d/b/a WSOC-TV, Defendants.

3:19CV479-GCM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION

April 6, 2020

ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Cox Enterprises, Inc's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 9). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Julie Szulczewski commenced this action against Defendants Cox Enterprises, Inc. ("Cox Enterprises"), Cox Media Group, LLC ("CMG") and WSOC Television, LLC d/b/a WSOC-TV ("WSOC") for employment discrimination related to the terms and conditions of her employment generally, and the termination of her employment specifically, each in violation of Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and the Equal Employment Practices Act. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 77-88.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "acted in concert with" one another in violating these statutes. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

Defendant Cox Enterprises is a privately held global corporation with its principal place of business and headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia and employs approximately 55,000 employees, with $21 billion in total revenue. (Id. at ¶ 1). Defendant CMG is a wholly owned subsidiary of Cox Enterprises, and owns radio and television stations as well as newspapers. (Id. at ¶ 2). WSOC is a subsidiary of CMG and CMG operates WSOC-TV in Charlotte, North Carolina. (Freeman Decl. ¶ 16; Compl. ¶ 3).¹ All three Defendants share a principal place of business at 6205 Peachtree Dunwoody Road, Atlanta, Georgia. (Rodriguez Decl. pp. 1-2; Doc. Nos. 15, 15-1, 15-2, and 15-3).² In addition, CMG, Cox Enterprises, and WSOC share certain officers. (Doc. Nos. 15-3, 15-4, and 15-5).

WSOC employed Plaintiff as a News Director in Charlotte, North Carolina from 2011 until it terminated her employment on or around March 8, 2018. (Compl. ¶ 6). Plaintiff was 50 years old at the time of her termination. (Id. at ¶ 14). Plaintiff's termination occurred after an investigation into allegations of Plaintiff's workplace misconduct. (Id. at ¶¶ 50-62). Plaintiff's manager at the time of her employment, Cedric Thomas, informed Plaintiff of the termination of her employment (Id. at ¶ 62). Ray Carter promoted Mr. Thomas to the position from which he supervised Plaintiff and terminated Plaintiff's employment. (Id. at ¶ 35). Both Mr. Thomas and Mr. Carter worked for CMG. (Freeman Decl. ¶ 15). Neither worked for Cox Enterprises. (Id. at ¶ 24). Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC against WSOC and CMG but did not name Cox Enterprises in the charge.

Cox Enterprises runs a Leadership Program to identify talented professionals across industries in its companies for promotion opportunities and Plaintiff alleges that in 2017, Jane Williams recommended Plaintiff to participate in the Cox Leadership Program where Plaintiff would be groomed by Cox for higher level leadership positions in the organization. (Compl. at ¶23).³ In February 2017, Plaintiff was offered a contract renewal for the News Director position for three more years from April 13, 2017 to April 14, 2020. (Id. at ¶ 24). Plaintiff alleges that senior leadership at Cox Enterprises and CMG had spoken to the Plaintiff and suggested that they expected she would soon be promoted to the next leadership level position for her, which was General Manager. (Id. at ¶26).

In September 2017, while on an Outward Bound trip in the mountains of Western North Carolina that was part of the Cox Leadership Program curriculum, Plaintiff tore the ACL in her right knee, a painful injury that underlies her disability discrimination claim. (Id. at ¶30).

Cox Enterprises has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint against it for lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. According to the Declaration of Joe Freeman, Cox Enterprises does not maintain any offices in North Carolina, does not have an interest in any real property in North Carolina, and does not possess real property in North Carolina. (Freeman Decl. at ¶ 5). Cox Enterprises does not regularly do or solicit business in North Carolina, nor does it direct or maintain facilities in North Carolina.⁴ (Id. at ¶ 6.) Cox Enterprises does not maintain any corporate books or records in North Carolina, does not own, maintain or possess any bank accounts in North Carolina, and does not have income subject to taxation in North Carolina. (Id. at ¶ 7.)

In addition, Cox Enterprises does not direct or manage either WSOC's or CMG's business operations or employees. (Id. at ¶ 23). Cox Enterprises did not, at any time, employ Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 24). Cox Enterprises likewise has never managed or directed the work of anyWSOC or CMG employees, including the employees whose complaints triggered the investigation leading to the termination of Plaintiff's employment, the human resources employee who conducted the investigation into Plaintiff's workplace misconduct, Mr. Carter, and Mr. Thomas. (Id.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard for personal jurisdiction:

The Court will first address Cox Enterprises' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Where, as here, the court rules on a 12(b)(2) motion relying on the Complaint, briefs, and affidavits alone, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the burden is on the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists.⁵ See Sneha Media & Entm't, LLC v. Associated Broad. Co. P Ltd., 911 F.3d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2018); Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993). All relevant pleading allegations must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. However, the Court need not "credit conclusory allegations or draw farfetched inferences." Masselli & Lane, PC v. Miller & Schuh, PA, 215 F.3d 1320 (table), 2000 WL 691100, at *1 (4th Cir.2000) (quoting Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir.1994)). In addition, "[b]lanket conclusory allegations as to multiple defendants are insufficient." Vision Motor Cars, Inc. v. Valor Motor Co., 981 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468 (M.D.N.C. 2013)

"It is axiomatic that, in order for a district court to validly assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized by the long-arm statute of the forum state, and, second, the exercise ofpersonal jurisdiction must also comport with Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements." Christian Sci. Bd. of Directors of First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2001), citing Stover v. O'Connell Assocs. Inc., 84 F.3d 132, 134 (4th Cir. 1996).

North Carolina's long arm statute provides for jurisdiction when a corporation is "engaged in substantial activity within [North Carolina]" or when the corporation's acts or omissions give rise to an action for injury to a person in North Carolina. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4. North Carolina's long-arm statute has been construed "to extend jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause." Christian Sci., 259 F.3d at 215, citing Century Data Systems, Inc. v. McDonald, 428 S.E.2d 190, 191 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). Accordingly, "the dual jurisdictional requirements collapse into a single inquiry" as to whether exercising personal jurisdiction comports with constitutional requirements. See Christian Sci., 259 F.3d at 215 (internal citations omitted); see also Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR, S.A,773 F.3d 553, 558-59 (4th Cir. 2014).

In turn, "[a] court's exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant comports with due process if the defendant has 'minimum contacts' with the forum, such that to require the defendant to defend its interests in that state 'does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Human Res. Certification Inst. v. Human Res. Prof'l Ass'n, 453 F. App'x 349, 350 (4th Cir. 2011), citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). International Shoe's minimum contacts framework both "protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum" and "acts to ensure that the States through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).

A court may exercise either "general jurisdiction over the defendant by demonstrating the defendant's continuous and systematic contact with [North Carolina]" or "specific jurisdiction over the defendant by demonstrating that the defendant purposely established minimum contacts in [North Carolina] such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there on a claim arising out of those contacts." See Sneha Media, 911 F.3d at198 (internal citations omitted).

B. Personal jurisdiction based on parent-subsidiary relationship:

Courts applying North Carolina law have long held that the parent-subsidiary relationship is not enough, on its own, to impute personal jurisdiction over the parent company. See Jim Myers & Son, Inc. v. Motion Indus., Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 595, 600 (W.D.N.C. 2001); see also Vision Motor Cars, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 468 (finding that "[a] parent-subsidiary relationship does not by itself support jurisdiction") (citing Saudi v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 427 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2005)).

Courts have carved out a narrow exception to the general jurisdictional rule regarding parent-subsidiary relationships and have found that the parent-subsidiary relationship, when coupled with the out-of-state's parent's substantial control over the subsidiary's activities, may serve as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over the parent. See Higgs v. Brian Ctr. Health & Ret./Windsor, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 3d 439, 449-50 (E.D.N.C. 2019) (noting that "[g]enerally the contacts...