Szymanski v. Cnty. of Wayne

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DAVID J. SZYMANSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF WAYNE and WARREN EVANS, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 366882

Court of Appeals of Michigan

April 25, 2024

UNPUBLISHED

Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 21-017542-AW

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and JANSEN and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court order denying plaintiff summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, County of Wayne and Warren Evans, Chief Executive Officer of Wayne County under MCR 2.116(I)(2), in this dispute regarding retiree benefits. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff was elected to the Wayne County Probate Court in 1990; he began his term on January 1, 1991. In 1993, the County adopted the "Amann Resolutions," entitling county employees who retire from specific positions serving the County for eight or more years to postemployment healthcare. Wayne County Resolution 93-742 stated:

2. If a person is separated from the County after January 1 1994, with at least a total of eight years of county service, who at the time of separation is serving as an elected executive officer of the County, . . . or as an appointed department head or deputy department head, . . . that person shall upon attaining age 45, be entitled to the same insurance and health care benefits for himself or herself, his or her spouse and dependents, as a retiree from the Defined Benefit Plan 1.

Resolution 93-742 was amended by Wayne County Resolution 94-903 in 1994, maintaining the eight-year county-service requirement.

In December 2010, plaintiff retired as a probate court judge and accepted the position of Wayne County Chief Deputy treasurer because he was told by Tim Wilson, Wayne County Director of Human Resources (HR), that his years as a probate court judge would count toward the eight-year county-service requirement for Amann eligibility if he was appointed to a qualifying position. The Amann Resolution was again amended in 2011, ending benefits for qualifying employees who began their service after October 1, 2011, citing a budget crisis in Wayne County. Wayne County Resolution 2011-512. Taylor confirmed that plaintiff and his dependents would receive healthcare whenever he retired in a January 25, 2011 e-mail.

During the summer of 2015, a meeting was held at the Treasurer's office with Ken Wilson, another County HR employee. Plaintiff asserted that Wilson said that employees retiring in September 2015 would be entitled to benefits, and he could not speak to those entitled to Amann benefits, but opined it would be the same as employees subject to a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA). Plaintiff allegedly asked Wilson if he retired in September 2015 would his benefits vest, but if he stayed through October he would lose them, and Wilson said that was the likely outcome.^[1] Plaintiff tried to contact the HR department for further clarification through the end of the summer, but got no response. When he requested retirement information, he was given a calculation sheet dated August 22, 2015, indicating he had 25 years and eight months eligible time for "Benefit Service," "Eligibility Service," and "Vesting Service," and was eligible for life and health insurance benefits. Thus, plaintiff retired in September 2015.

Plaintiff asserts he received Amann healthcare benefits from the date of his retirement through December 2015, as he was notified in November 2015 that his benefits would be terminating January 1, 2016. In February 2018, plaintiff contacted the County HR department inquiring about his benefits as he was contemplating leaving his current job with the Detroit Land Bank. Zenna Elhasan, Wayne County Corporate Counsel, responded on March 12, 2018, clarifying that when plaintiff retired as Chief Deputy Treasurer he was given a stipend for healthcare under the Executive Benefit Plan, and now that he was leaving his other employment he wanted to resume receiving the stipend. Elhasan made clear that plaintiff was not eligible for Amann now, nor was he when he retired in 2015, because he did not meet the years-of-service requirement. Amann benefits were reinstated in June 2018 to some employees other than plaintiff.

Thus, plaintiff filed suit in December 2021, seeking a writ of mandamus and costs and fees, and making claims for promissory estoppel and breach of contract. After defendants answered the complaint denying liability, plaintiff moved for summary disposition of his promissory estoppel claim only under MCR 2.116(C)(D). He argued that he was promised healthcare in retirement by County representatives, he reasonably relied on those promises in making career choices, and was ultimately denied the benefits, so the elements of promissory estoppel were met and he was entitled to summary disposition. Defendants responded and moved for judgment as a matter of law under MCR 2.116(I)(2), asserting that plaintiff failed to qualify for the Amann benefits because he did not meet the eight-year county-service requirement. He only served approximately five years in the treasurer position plus a period of employment in the 1970s, and his tenure as probate court judge did not count because probate court judges are state employees, not county employees.

The trial court agreed with defendants, and concluded that plaintiff lacked the requisite years of service for Amann benefits because the service earned as a probate court judge did not apply because it was state employment. The court denied plaintiff summary disposition, and granted defendants summary disposition. Plaintiff now appeals.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich.App. 222, 229; 964 N.W.2d 809 (2020). Plaintiff moved for summary disposition of his promissory estoppel claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10). "A trial court may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when the affidavits or other documentary evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

If the moving party properly supports his or her motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. Where the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue rests on a nonmoving party, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. If the opposing party fails to present documentary evidence establishing the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly granted. Our review is limited to the evidence that had been presented to the circuit court at the time the motion was decided. [In re Guardianship of Malloy, 343 Mich.App. 548, 558-559; 997 N.W.2d 733 (2022) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

In their response to plaintiff's motion, defendants asserted they were entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2). "If it appears to the court that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment, the court may render judgment in favor of the opposing party." MCR 2.116(I)(2). This case also includes questions of statutory interpretation, construction, and application, which are also reviewed de novo. Johnson v Johnson, 329 Mich.App. 110, 118; 940 N.W.2d 807 (2019).

III. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

The trial court properly denied plaintiff summary disposition and properly granted defendants summary disposition because there is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff did not meet the requirements to receive retiree healthcare benefits under the plain language of the Amann Resolution, and as such, plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim fails.

The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are "(1) a promise, (2) that the promisor should reasonably have expected to induce action of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee, and (3) that in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that nature in circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided." Cove Creek Condo Ass'n v Vistal Land &Home Dev, LLC, 330 Mich.App. 679, 713; 950 N.W.2d 502 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The promise giving rise to an actionable claim must be clear and definite. Bodnar v St John Providence, Inc, 327 Mich.App. 203, 227; 933 N.W.2d 363 (2019). "To determine whether a promise existed, courts must objectively evaluate the circumstances of the transaction, including the parties' words, actions and relationship." Id. Moreover, "[t]he doctrine of promissory estoppel must be cautiously applied only where the facts are unquestionable and the wrong to be prevented undoubted." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleged that defendants promised he would be entitled to healthcare benefits under the Amann Resolution in retirement that defendants should have reasonably expected this promise to induce action on plaintiff's part regarding his career choices, and that plaintiff did in fact rely on this promise when he retired from his treasurer position, and the injustice to be avoided is plaintiff having to pay for his own health care out-of-pocket. Plaintiff's claim for promissory estoppel, however, depends on his eligibility for those benefits under the...