T.C. v. Hempfield Area Sch. Dist.

T.C., MR J.C., and MRS. K.C., in their own right, Plaintiffs, v. HEMPFIELD AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

HEMPFIELD AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. CENTRAL WESTMORELAND CAREER & TECHNOLOGY CENTER, Third-Party Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-1507

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 1, 2019

Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

Re: ECF No. 37

OPINION AND ORDER

KELLY, Magistrate Judge

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs T.C. and his parents Mr. J.C. and Mrs. K.C., in their own right ("Plaintiffs"), initiated this action on November 17, 2017, against Defendant Hempfield Area School District ("Hempfield"), alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (the "IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs' claims arise out of a series of bullying episodes suffered by T.C., a student with a disability, that included alleged physical and sexual assaults, being locked in a room by peers, and peers pounding on the restroom door when T.C. was using the facility. Each of the incidents is alleged to have occurred while T.C. was a student in the Hempfield Area School District and, pursuant to his Individual Education Plan ("IEP"), was enrolled in the Central Westmoreland Career & Technology Center ("CTC") at the CTC Vocational Technical Program ("VTP").

On February 12, 2018, Hempfield filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss certain of Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 9. Subsequent to the denial of the Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 14, Hempfield filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses, ECF No. 15. On December 26, 2018, Hempfield filed a Motion for Leave to Join CTC as a Third-Party Defendant pursuant to Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 26. The Court granted the motion on January 11, 2019, and Hempfield filed its Third-Party Complaint against CTC. ECF Nos. 30 and 31.

In the Third-Party Complaint, Hempfield sets forth a claim for contribution and/or indemnity as to Counts V through X of Plaintiffs' Complaint (Count I),¹ and a state law claim for negligence arising out of CTC's breach of a duty owed to Hempfield to provide Hempfield students attending the VTP proper supervision and a safe environment from bullying and sexual assault (Count II). ECF No. 31.

In response to the Third-Party Complaint, CTC filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and Motion for a More Definite Statement Pursuant to Rule 12(e). ECF No. 37. CTC contends that Hempfield is the real party in interest and bears all potential liabilityregardless of CTC's actions or inaction with regard to T.C.'s attendance at the VTP. ECF No. 38 at 2-6. In addition, CTC argues that as to Plaintiffs' underlying claims, CTC did not bear a qualifying special custodial relationship to T.C. upon which a duty to protect him from abuse can be predicated, nor did it create or enhance a risk of danger or harm upon which liability otherwise may be imposed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. 6-10. Further, CTC contends the Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for the violation of protected parental liberty interests. Id. 10-11. With regard to Plaintiffs' claim for failure to train, CTC contends that Plaintiffs' have failed to sufficiently identify the training that was not provided, or facts establishing the requisite deliberate conduct on CTC's part upon which liability may be based. Accordingly, CTC seeks dismissal of Hempfield's third-party complaint or, in the alternative, an Order compelling Plaintiffs to make a more definite statement of their failure to train claim. Id. at 11-13. Finally, as to Plaintiffs' demand for attorney's fees, CTC contends that in the absence of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed. Id. at 12.

Hempfield has filed a brief in opposition to CTC's Motion to Dismiss the Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 46, contending that CTC misapprehends the law with regard to indemnity and contribution by an agent. Hempfield further indicates that its indemnity and contribution claims against CTC are not duplicative of Plaintiffs' claims against Hempfield and as such, CTC has not stated a legal basis for dismissal of the third-party complaint. Id. at 3-4.

Plaintiffs also filed a brief in opposition to CTC's Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the underlying Complaint adequately sets forth facts upon which the requisite "special relationship" may be predicated and otherwise sufficiently states claims for the violation of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 38.

For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and Motion for More Definite Statement Pursuant to Rule 12(e) will be granted in part and denied in part.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A third-party defendant "must assert any defense against the third-party plaintiff's claim under Rule 12" and "may assert against the plaintiff any defense that the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim." Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(2)(A); (a)(2)(C). A motion to dismiss a third-party complaint is generally analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Empl. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004), citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id., citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of theelements of a cause of action" do not suffice but, rather, the complaint "must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct" and that are sufficient "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s of his claim]").

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has prescribed the following three-step approach to determine the sufficiency of a complaint:

First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011), citing Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Agency and Indemnity/Contribution

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a)(1) provides that a "defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it." Based on this language, the defendant cannot plead a claim that the third-party defendant is directly liable to the plaintiff or a claim that the third-party defendant is solely responsible for the plaintiff's injury. Toberman v. Copas, 800 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Instead, the defendant must plead the secondary or derivative liability of the third-party defendant, meaning that if the defendant is found liable to the plaintiff, the third-party defendant is liable to the defendant on a theory of indemnity or contribution, or some other form of derivative liability. Id. See also FDIC v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 873 (3d Cir. 1994) (Rule 14 allows a defendant (as a third-party plaintiff) to bring a third-party defendant into the case when the third-party defendant is liable to the defendant on all or part of the plaintiff's claim againstthe defendant); Kohn v. Sch. Dist. of City of Harrisburg, No.11-109, 2012 WL 1598096 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2012) (Rule 14 is only procedural and does not itself create a right to indemnity or contribution).

In this instance, Hempfield relies on statutory contribution arising under Pennsylvania law, as well as common law indemnity. The right to indemnity may arise when a person not actively at fault has been compelled by a legal obligation to pay damages that have been caused by the tortious conduct of another. Id. at 270 (quoting Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 77 A.2d 368, 370 (Pa. 1951)). Contribution in Pennsylvania is governed by the Pennsylvania Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8324. A right to contribution arises only among joint tortfeasors. Id. In Lasprogata v. Qualls, 397 A.2d 803, 805 n. 4 (Pa. Super. 1979), the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted...