T.L.P. v. Pa. State Police of Pa.

249 A.3d 1

T.L.P., Jr., Petitioner

v.PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent

No. 591 M.D. 2019

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued February 8, 2021

Decided March 16, 2021

Brian McNeil, Appellate Public Defender, York, for Petitioner.

Nicole Boland, Deputy Attorney General, Harrisburg, for Respondent.

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge, HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge (P.), HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE BROBSON

Petitioner T.L.P., Jr. (Petitioner) filed a petition for review (Petition) in this Court's original jurisdiction against the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), seeking a writ of mandamus compelling PSP to comply with an order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County (Common Pleas), dated September 28, 2017, discharging Petitioner from his responsibility to register as a sex offender under Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),¹ 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.10 -.41, which has since been replaced by SORNA II, and under Megan's Law II (Registration Discharge Order). In the alternative, Petitioner is seeking declaratory and/or injunctive relief prohibiting PSP from requiring him to register as a sex offender under SORNA II. Presently before the Court for disposition is Petitioner's application for summary relief (Application). For the reasons set forth below, we grant Petitioner's Application.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 25, 2000, Petitioner was convicted of indecent assault under Section 3126(a)(7) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 3126(a)(7), and corruption of minors under Section 6301 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6301. (Pet. ¶ 4.) Megan's Law II, the iteration of Pennsylvania's sex offender registration law in effect at the time of Petitioner's conviction, required Petitioner to register with PSP as a sex offender for a period of 10 years. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9795.1 (expired 2012). In May 2001, following his release from confinement, Petitioner began his period of registration with PSP. (Pet. ¶¶ 9-10.)

SORNA went into effect on December 20, 2012. SORNA required an individual, like Petitioner, who was convicted of the offense of indecent assault under Section 3126(a)(7) of the Crimes Code to register as a sex offender with PSP for his/her lifetime. See 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.14(d)(8) and 9799.15(a)(3). In 2016, Petitioner was convicted under Section 4915.1 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 4915.1, because he failed to comply with SORNA's sex offender registration requirements. (Pet. ¶ 7 and App. A.) Subsequent thereto, on July 19, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Muniz , declared SORNA unconstitutional, holding that the retroactive application of SORNA's registration requirements, which the Supreme Court determined were punitive in nature, violated the ex post facto clauses of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. Muniz , 164 A.3d at 1208-23. On August 2, 2017, in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Muniz , Petitioner filed a motion under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)² with Common Pleas, seeking to vacate his conviction for failure to comply with SORNA's registration requirements. (Pet. ¶ 9 and App. A.) In support thereof, Petitioner alleged that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Muniz , SORNA could not be retroactively applied to him, and, without SORNA, he was subject only to a 10-year period of registration, which would have expired on September 11, 2014,³ before Petitioner had been accused of failing to comply with his sex offender registration requirements. (Pet. ¶ 9 and App. A.) The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) did not oppose Petitioner's PCRA motion, and, by order dated September 13, 2017, Common Pleas vacated Petitioner's conviction/sentence for failure to comply with SORNA's registration requirements. (Pet. at App. B.) Shortly thereafter, on September 27, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion with Common Pleas, seeking to vacate his sex offender registration requirements, arguing again that his 10-year period of registration had expired on September 11, 2014, and, as a result, he was no longer required to register as a sex offender with PSP under Megan's Law II. (Pet. ¶ 11 and App. C.) In response thereto, on September 28, 2017, Common Pleas issued the Registration Discharge Order, which provided, in relevant part: "[PSP] is hereby notified that Petitioner's [r]egistration requirements have been satisfied and Petitioner is hereby discharged from any further responsibility to register under Megan's Law." (Pet. ¶ 12 and App. D.)

In 2018, in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Muniz , the General Assembly enacted SORNA II. SORNA II, arguably in an effort to address the ex post facto concerns raised in Muniz , divided Pennsylvania's sex offender registration scheme into two subchapters: (1) Subchapter H, which is based upon SORNA and applies to those individuals who commit a sexual offense on or after December 20, 2012, and are thereafter convicted for such offense; and (2) Subchapter I, which applies to those individuals who committed a sexual offense on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, whose period of registration with PSP has not yet expired. See 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.11 and 9799.52. Under SORNA II, an individual who, like Petitioner, is convicted of the offense of indecent assault under Section 3126(a)(7) of the Crimes Code is again required to register as a sex offender with PSP for a period of 10 years. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.55. Following the enactment of SORNA II, PSP informed Petitioner that his obligation to register as a sex offender had been reactivated. (Pet. ¶ 14.)

On October 18, 2019, Petitioner filed his Petition with this Court, setting forth two causes of action and seeking a writ of mandamus or, in the alternative, declaratory and/or injunctive relief preventing PSP from requiring Petitioner to register as a sex offender under SORNA II. In Count I of his Petition, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling PSP to comply with the Registration Discharge Order and refrain from imposing SORNA II's registration requirements on him. Alternatively, in Count II of his Petition, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to an injunctive order and/or declaration preventing PSP from requiring him to register as a sex offender under SORNA II because, by its terms, SORNA II does not apply to him, and, even if it did, it is punitive in nature and cannot be applied retroactively. On May 1, 2020, after the pleadings were closed, Petitioner filed his Application, seeking summary relief on only the first two grounds of his Petition—i.e. , PSP's noncompliance with the Registration Discharge Order and the inapplicability of SORNA II to Petitioner given that his registration requirements were satisfied/terminated prior to the enactment of SORNA II.⁴ The parties have filed their briefs in support of and in opposition to the Application, and the matter is now ripe for disposition.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard for Summary Relief

"At any time after the filing of a petition for review in an appellate or original jurisdiction matter, the court may on application enter judgment if the right of the applicant thereto is clear." Pa. R.A.P. 1532(b). "Summary relief under [Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure] 1532(b) is similar to the relief envisioned by the rules of civil procedure governing summary judgment." Brittain v. Beard , 601 Pa. 409, 974 A.2d 479, 484 (2009). This Court "must determine, based on the undisputed facts, whether ‘either party has a clear right to the relief requested.’ " Summit Sch., Inc. v. Dep't of Educ. , 108 A.3d 192, 195 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting Bell Atl.-Pa., Inc. v. Tpk. Comm'n , 703 A.2d 589, 590 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), aff'd , 552 Pa. 41, 713 A.2d 96 (1998) ). "An application for summary relief may be granted if a party's right to judgment is clear and no material issues of fact are in dispute." Leach v. Turzai , 118 A.3d 1271, 1277 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (en banc), aff'd , 636 Pa. 81, 141 A.3d 426 (2016). "[I]n ruling on a motion for summary relief, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and [this C]ourt may enter judgment only if: (1) there are no genuine issues of material fact; and (2) the right to relief is clear as a matter of law." Flagg v. Int'l Union, Sec., Police, Fire Pros. of Am., Local 506 , 146 A.3d 300, 305 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Petitioner, as the moving party, has the burden of proving the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact. Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co. , 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466, 468-69 (1979). "A material fact is one that directly affects the outcome of the case." Dep't of Env't Prot. v. Delta Chems., Inc ., 721 A.2d 411, 416 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (en banc). "The facts which directly affect the outcome of the case are gleaned from considering the substantive law underlying the cause of action." Id.

B. Count I – Writ of Mandamus to Compel PSP to Comply with the Registration Discharge Order

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling PSP to comply with the Registration Discharge Order, because the undisputed material facts establish that the Registration Discharge Order is a valid court order that terminated his sex offender registration requirements, PSP has a clear duty to comply with the Registration Discharge Order, and, given the fact that a valid court order is already in place, there is no other adequate legal remedy available to him apart from mandamus relief. Petitioner further contends that, despite PSP's apparent conclusions to the contrary, the Registration Discharge Order is not just limited to Petitioner's registration requirements under SORNA. Rather, the Registration Discharge Order also applies to Petitioner's registration requirements under SORNA II because: (1) "the basis for [the] relief advanced in [his] motion [seeking to vacate his sex...