A.T. v. Dist. of Columbia

A.T., et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-1086 (CKK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

May 18, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs A.T., a student eligible for special education services in the District of Columbia, and her parents, Dawn Carpenter and Edward Trepacz (collectively "Plaintiffs")¹ filed a complaint seeking judicial review of a Hearing Officer's Determination ("HOD 1") following an administrative due process hearing under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 1. The parties briefed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding HOD 1,² but before theCourt considered those motions, this case was placed in abeyance pursuant to the parties' [27] Consent Motion to Place the Case in Abeyance, to await the Supreme Court's ruling in Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. District RE-1, 580 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017). Subsequent to the issuance of the Endrew F. decision, the parties supplemented their briefing, and this Court issued its [33] Memorandum Opinion and Order, whereby the case was remanded to the [original] Hearing Officer:

to determine whether further factual development and other proceedings are warranted in light of Endrew F., and for any such proceedings to be held. If the Hearing Officer determines that no additional factual development or alterations to his conclusions of law are necessary in light of Endrew F., he shall so specify in a reasoned supplemental decision that, if there is further litigation in this matter, shall be subject to the Court's review. In particular, the Hearing Officer should explain the extent to which, if any, his decision is altered by the Supreme Court's instruction that "[t]o meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances." Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.

Memorandum Opinion and Order, ECF No. 33, at 5.

After the Hearing Officer held a second administrative due process hearing and issued a second Hearing Officer Decision ("HOD 2"), the parties filed their [44] Joint Status Report indicating that "the only remaining substantive issue for the Court to decide is whether defendant must reimburse plaintiffs for the tuition and related costs incurred in enrolling the student in the nonpublic program for the 2015-16 school year." Joint Status Report, ECF No. 44. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment relating to that issue, and those motions are ripefor review by this Court.

Presently before this Court are Plaintiffs' [46] Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant District of Columbia's [49] Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.³ Upon consideration of the parties' pleadings,⁴ the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court shall DENY Plaintiffs' [46] Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANT Defendant's [49] Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Framework

The IDEA was enacted to "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education ["FAPE"] that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." M.G. v. Dist. of Columbia, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)), see also Boose v. Dist. of Columbia, 786 F. 3d 1054, 1056 (D.C. Cir.2015). Once a child is identified as disabled, the school district must convene a meeting of a multi-disciplinary team to develop an individualized education program ("IEP") for the student. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(2)(A).

The IEP "is the centerpiece of the statute's education delivery system for disabled children[.]" Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994 (citation omitted). An IEP must include a variety of information, including the child's current levels of academic achievement and functional performance, measurable annual goals, how the child's progress towards the goals will be measured, and the special education and related services to be provided to the child. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(I). The IEP must be formulated in accordance with statutory requirements that "emphasize collaboration among parents and educators" and "require careful consideration of the child's individual circumstance." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B); see also § 1415(b)(1) (the IDEA guarantees parents of disabled children the opportunity to participate in the evaluation and educational placement process). To meet the substantive requirements of the IDEA to provide a FAPE for an eligible child, "the child's IEP sets out an educational program that is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999 (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Once the IEP is developed, the school system must provide an appropriate educational placement that comports with the IEP. Alston v. Dist. of Columbia, 439 F. Supp. 2d 86, 90 (D.D.C. 2006). "If no suitable public school is available, the school system must pay the costs of sending the child to an appropriate private school." Dist. of Columbia v. Vinyard, 901 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80-81 (D.D.C. 2012) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Reid ex rel. Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). However, parents who "unilaterally" place a child with a disability in a private school, without consent of the school system, "do so at their own financial risk." FlorenceCty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) (quoting School Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1996)). To qualify for tuition reimbursement under the IDEA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the school district failed to provide a FAPE, (2) the plaintiff's private placement was suitable, and (3) the equities warrant reimbursement for some or all of the cost of the child's private education. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 247 (2009).

B. Factual Background

A.T. (herein referred to as "A.T." or the "Student") was born significantly premature, resulting in some brain abnormalities. Administrative Record ("AR") at 30, 790.⁵ She is a student who has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder and Learning Disabilities, and she has particular issues in the higher level skill areas. AR at 7. More specifically, A.T.'s processing speed and work output are slow; she has some pragmatic language issues, difficulties with multi-step directions, and her oral formulation is labored and sometime imprecise. Id. At the age of five, A.T. suffered a traumatic brain injury after contracting the viral infection meningoencephalitis, and she lost her ability to walk, talk, eat, and maintain most body functions. AR at 7, 30, 594-95. She has since regained most of her functioning, though she has a language disability and some minor motor problems as a result. AR at 7, 792-96.

For school year 2014-2015, A.T. attended Kingsbury Day School, a non-public school, where she made good progress on math skills, speech and language production and understanding. AR at 8. On June 10, 2015, District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS") convened a meeting to develop an IEP for A.T. for School Year 2015-2016. AR at 131. Prior to that meeting, A.T.'s parents were sent a draft IEP, AR at 9, which they marked up with changes proposed by their educational consultant, Dr. Laura Solomon. AR at 114. DCPS agreed to make the requested changes to the present levels, goals and accommodations sections of the IEP. AR at 154, 156. The IEP provided for 25.5 hours of specialized instruction per week and approximately two hours of related service, amounting to 27.5 hours per week, which included occupational, physical and speech/language therapy services. AR at 24, 177. The IEP contained goals in math, reading, writing, speech and language, as well as cognitive, health/physical, and motor skills/physical development. AR at 10. DCPS did not discuss any potential placements during the IEP meeting, but instead informed A.T.'s parents that they would receive a location of services letter in the days following the meeting. AR at 819-21.

DCPS selected Jefferson Middle School ("Jefferson") as a location of services that could implement the IEP and sent a letter to the Plaintiffs, on June 22, 2015, notifying them that A.T. would be placed at Jefferson during School Year 2015-2016. AR at 157. A.T.'s mother and Dr. Solomon were able to visit the proposed program at Jefferson - the BOOST program - on July 8, 2015. AR at 162, 320, 821-2. They had some concerns about the appropriateness of Jefferson for A.T., which included: the behavioral patterns of some students in the BOOST program; the size of the building in terms of A.T.'s ability to navigate without becoming fatigued; the reading instruction methodology; the lack of science and Spanish classes; the quick speaking pace of teachers, which might be difficult for A.T. due to her slower language processing; and thedifference in maximum hours of special education in the IEP (27.5 hours) and at Jefferson (26.25 hours). AR at 326-27, 358-59. On July 9, 2015, A.T.'s IEP was amended to include access to a key lock and early dismissal. AR at 11. On August 5, 2015, Plaintiffs notified DCPS that A.T. would be attending the Chelsea School ("Chelsea") during School Year 2015-2016. Chelsea is a nonpublic, full-time special education school in Hyattsville, Maryland, serving middle and high school students with language-based learning disabilities and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. AR at 712. A.T. never attended Jefferson; instead, she attended Chelsea during School Year 2015-2016. AR at 13.

On February 10, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an administrative due...