Tafoya v. City of Hanford

CHRISTOPHER TAFOYA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HANFORD, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-00010-LJO-SAB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

January 21, 2020

SCREENING ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

(ECF No. 1)

THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Christopher Tafoya ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Currently before the Court for screening is Plaintiff's complaint, filed on January 3, 2020. (ECF No. 1.)

I.SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that "fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or that "seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" is not sufficient, and "facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II.COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) "Hanford Police Department Chief Parker Server"; (2) the City of Hanford; (3) American Ambulance; (4) "Kings County Sheriff Department Sheriff Mike Robinson"; and (5) Kings County (identified and docketed as "County of Kings"). Plaintiff indicates he is suing each defendant in their individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights.

To explain how the defendants acted under color of state or local law for purposes of Section 1983, Plaintiff alleges that: (1) Hanford Police Department officers wrongfully arrested him and used excessive force; (2) that American Ambulance personnel failed to provide medicalcare; (3) the King's County Sheriffs used excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment; (4) there was wrongful use of civil proceedings, as on January 4, 2017, Plaintiff was charged, and the charge was dismissed in Plaintiff's favor on July 26, 2019; (5) Hanford Police Department Chief Parker Server failed to properly train police officers when dealing with a vehicular accident and an injured person; and (6) Kings County Sheriff Department Sheriff "David Robinson"¹ failed to properly train sheriffs about providing medical care for those in custody. (Compl. 6-7.)

The events occurred on January 4, 2017, at approximately 9:15 a.m., in front of an IHOP restaurant located in Hanford, California. (Compl. 6.) Plaintiff lost consciousness and was incoherent after being involved in a car accident. "[T]he Hanford Police Department ripped" Plaintiff out of his truck with "excessive force and arrested [Plaintiff] without reason." (Compl. 6.) American Ambulance arrived at the scene "but failed to provide medical care knowing [Plaintiff] was injured from the car accident" and could not move. (Id.) When Plaintiff arrived at the jail, "the officer" checked for drugs again, slammed Plaintiff against the car, and punched him. (Id.) In the jail, Plaintiff states sheriffs took him in a room, punched him, and ripped his clothes off forcing him to get naked. (Compl. 8.) The sheriffs bent Plaintiff over and told him to "cough motherfucker." (Id.) Hanford Police Department officers threatened him and put their hands on their guns as if they were going to shoot Plaintiff in the jail. (Id.) Plaintiff's blood was drawn and the results were negative. (Id.) Plaintiff was released about ten hours after the incident occurred and was taken to the hospital. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that "Hanford Police officers" falsified the report corresponding to the accident and the criminal report. (Compl. 9.)

Plaintiff claims his arms, legs, and central nervous system are injured; that he sustained psychological injuries and seizures; that he is being seen by a neurologist and psychologist for ongoing treatment; that he is attending physical therapy and receiving other treatment for the injuries; that he was referred to a pain management specialist to treat him for severe headachesand body spasms; and that he is suffering from emotional distress and was diagnosed with PTSD because of the incident and defamation of character. (Compl. 8.) Plaintiff requests monetary damages in the amount of one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000.00). (Id.)

III.DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

The Court first notifies Plaintiff that the majority of his claims appear to be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Federal law determines when a claim accrues, and "[u]nder federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that is the basis of the cause of action." Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Because section 1983 contains no specific statute of limitations, federal courts should apply the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004); Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 954; Fink, 192 F.3d at 914. California's statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1.

Plaintiff did not file this action until January 3, 2020. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims appear to almost entirely stem from the incidents that occurred on January 4, 2017, and thus it appears Plaintiff must have filed his complaint on or before January 5, 2019, in order to have complied with the applicable statute of limitations for these claims. The only possible claims deviating from the incident date appears to be a claim for "wrongful use of civil proceedings" which is based on an apparent dismissal of charges on July 26, 2019, and Plaintiff's averment to a defamation claim, which may be related to the charges that were not dismissed until July 26, 2019.

Failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations may be grounds for dismissal at the screening stage if it apparent from the face of the complaint that plaintiff cannot "prevail, as a matter of law, on the equitable tolling issue." See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993); Kelly v. Islam, No. 1:18-CV-00018-JDP, 2018 WL 2670661, at *2(E.D. Cal. June 1, 2018); El-Shaddai v. Stainer, No. CV 14-9313 GHK(JC), 2016 WL 7261230, at *21 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2016). In actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitations, courts should also borrow all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period found in state law. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. This applies to both statutory and equitable tolling. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) ("For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state's law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal law.")

Section 352.1 of the California Code of Civil procedure allows for the tolling of the statute of limitations during a period of "disability" while the plaintiff is in state prison, and the tolling may not exceed two years. Incarceration can toll the statute of limitations for a maximum of two years, unless the inmate-plaintiff is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1 (tolling applies to prisoners sentenced to "a term less than for life"); Brooks v. Mercy Hosp., 1 Cal.App.5th 1, 6-7 (2016) (tolling provision construed "to mean that only those sentenced to life without the possibility of parole should be excluded from the tolling provision.") However, section 352.1 does not apply to an individual who is in pretrial custody in a county jail at the time his claims accrued because he is not "imprisoned on a criminal charge" within the meaning of section 352.1. Austin v. Medicis, 21 Cal.App.5th 577, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), reh'g denied (Apr. 11, 2018), review denied (June 13, 2018); see also Groce v. Claudat, 603 F. App'x 581, 582 (9th Cir. 2015) (§ 352.1 inapplicable where plaintiff "was not incarcerated when his claims accrued"); Shaw v. Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, 343 F.Supp.3d 919, 924 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (discussing holding in Austin and finding the...