Tafoya v. Morrison

389 P.3d 1098

Cecilia TAFOYA and Charles Tafoya, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.Pamela MORRISON and Leon Morrison, Defendants-Appellees.

NO. 34,465

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: November 29, 2016

Certiorari Denied, January 27, 2017, No. S-1-SC-36236

Law Office of Jane B. Yohalem, Jane B. Yohalem, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellants.

Moses, Dunn, Farmer & Tuthill, P.C., Joseph L. Werntz, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees.

OPINION

SUTIN, Judge.

{1} Cecilia Tafoya and Charles Tafoya (the Tafoyas) appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment against their claims to an easement along a driveway established by Cecilia's father, Alex J. Armijo (the father), for access to the father's lot when the father split his property into two lots, kept the rear lot, and transferred the lot abutting the public street to Cecilia. The district court's rulings favored Pamela and Leon Morrison (the Morrisons), who had succeeded to ownership of the rear lot.¹

{2} A less than pleasant history of family battles in connection with the easement and the properties in general, up to at least January 2004, is contained in Redman – Tafoya v. Armijo , 2006–NMCA–011, 138 N.M. 836, 126 P.3d 1200. The battle continued after Armijo . Before us now is the rest of the story.

{3} The district court's grant of summary judgment against the Tafoyas' claims stems largely from its conclusion that most of the Tafoyas' easement claims had previously been and were finally litigated as part of an inheritance revocation case (the revocation proceeding), which will be discussed later, and thus those claims were barred. Additionally, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Morrisons on the Tafoyas' claim to a prescriptive easement as being without merit. Specifically on appeal, the Tafoyas argue that (1) res judicata does not bar them from claiming a driveway easement over the Morrisons' land, (2) collateral estoppel does not bar their claim for a driveway easement over the Morrisons' land, (3) they did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claim to an easement in the revocation proceeding, and (4) there is no basis in the law of either res judicata or collateral estoppel to bar the Tafoyas' prescriptiveeasement and easement by necessity claims against the Morrisons.

{4} We hold that the Tafoyas' claims for an express easement, implied easement, and easement by necessity were properly precluded under the doctrine of res judicata. We also hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the Tafoyas' prescriptive easement claim.

BACKGROUND

{5} The father owned property south of a public road, Camino de Las Animas, in Santa Fe, New Mexico. On August 13, 1993, the father recorded a Family Transfer Lot Split plat (the plat) showing a split of his property into Lot 1, which he retained, and Lot 2, which he specifically designated as being for "Cecilia Armijo-Redman." Lot 2 is situated north of Lot 1 and south of Camino de Las Animas. The plat shows Lot 1 situated south of Lot 2, including a 15-foot driveway that ran west of Lot 2, connecting Lot 1 to Camino de Las Animas. In the plat, Lot 2 is shown subject to a 5-foot strip of land just east of the driveway running from Camino de Las Animas to Lot 1, making the driveway functionally 20 feet wide. In fact, the plat actually indicates the father's reservation of these two land strips as a "20' private ingress/egress and utility easement" running in part across Lot 2, all to serve his Lot 1. In connection with the plat, on August 18, 1993, the father recorded a family transfer affidavit (the affidavit), affirming his desire to "convey or have conveyed" Lot 2 to Cecilia. In 1994, after the plat and affidavit were recorded, Cecilia built her house on Lot 2. Id. ¶ 4. It appears that the father was highly involved in the construction of Cecilia's house, and the contractor who built the house followed the father's instructions as to where the house was to be placed. See id.

{6} In 1995 the father executed a will. The father's will provided that "the [p]ersonal [r]epresentative shall immediately take such action as may be necessary to sell my personal residence and the land ... and proceeds received after payment of all expenses of sale be divided equally amongst my children." The will also provided that

[i]t is my express desire that the equal distribution of my proceeds of my Estate shall be done without conflict amongst my children and to [e]nsure that this occurs I decree that the land upon which [Cecilia] has built her home is her sole and separate property and shall not be considered for purposes of determining her equal share of the proceeds of my estate.

Id. ¶ 5.

{7} The father passed away in 1997, upon which Cecilia's brother, Anthony I. Armijo, was appointed personal representative of the father's estate (the estate) in a Santa Fe County District Court probate proceeding titled In the Matter of the Estate of Alex J. Armijo , D–101–PB–97–00152. Redman – Tafoya , 2006–NMCA–011, ¶¶ 4, 6, 138 N.M. 836, 126 P.3d 1200. In this Opinion, we refer to Anthony, in his capacity as personal representative of and acting for the estate, as "Armijo." Armijo began attempts to sell Lot 1, and it was discovered that Cecilia's house and a stucco wall encroached into Lot 1's 5-foot easement some 8 inches. Id. ¶¶ 4, 8. The encroachments were not noted on the plat, and a variance was not obtained by either Cecilia or the father at the time the encroachments were constructed. As pointed out in Redman – Tafoya , the house and wall encroachments and a chain link fence that had been constructed at the division between the 5-foot strip and the 15-foot strip became bones of contention between Cecilia and Armijo. Id. ¶¶ 4, 8–16.

{8} In November 1998, through Armijo, the estate as grantor formally deeded Lot 2 to Cecilia as grantee by a recorded personal representative's deed that reserved the 20-foot easement for ingress and egress for the benefit of Lot 1. The deed, however, expressly stated that the estate does "not approve of, or acquiesce in, the encroachments by [g]rantee and her improvements onto the above-described easement, and requests that the encroachments be removed."

{9} In January and July 1999, prospective purchasers made offers to purchase Lot 1 but faced requirements by the City of Santa Fe (the City) of a 20-foot-wide driveway to Lot 1, the removal of part or all of the chain link fence for fire equipment access, and possible removal of a portion of the house and wall encroachments before issuance of any building permit for development of Lot 1. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. In August 1999, Armijo tendered another personal representative's deed for Lot 2 to Cecilia. Id. ¶ 12. This deed stated that if Cecilia did not remove the chain link fence, her property would revert to the estate. Id. In November 1999, Cecilia "took the position ... that for safety reasons she would not remove the chain link fence." Id.

{10} After failing to resolve the encroachment and access issues, in November 1999, Armijo filed a quiet title complaint (Armijo's quiet title action) against Cecilia in regard to the easement and, in part, attempting to force the removal of Cecilia's chain link fence and the encroaching part of Cecilia's residence. Id. ¶ 14. Cecilia responded with claims seeking, among other relief, to disinherit her brother, Anthony, and a sister.

{11} In June 2000, a purchase contract involving the residence on Lot 1 was terminated because of an impasse between the City and Cecilia based on the chain link fence and other encroachment issues. Id. ¶ 15. In September 2000, the City began to relent, admitting that the fire department had discretion to permit an easement of less than 20 feet and further indicating that this could be implemented provided, among other things, that "the access through Lot 2 [was] improved to make the width wider, suggesting removal of [40] feet of the chain link fence[.]" Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). Cecilia again declined to alter the encroachments. Id. After months of informal discussions, in mid to late 2001, the City eventually modified its position further and indicated that it would allow a 15-foot driveway easement. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. Armijo proceeded to seek a variance from the City that would allow the driveway to be only 15 feet and that would allow Cecilia to retain her residence, stucco wall, and the chain link fence as they existed. Id. ¶ 18. Cecilia concurred in Armijo's application for a variance, and a new offer was made to purchase the residence on Lot 1, the offer was accepted, and due diligence began. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. The City approved the variance in December 2001, and when Cecilia refused to sign off on the variance even though it reflected the elimination of the 5-foot easement across her property, the City nevertheless proceeded to record the variance with Armijo's signature and without Cecilia's signature. Id. ¶ 20. According to Cecilia, she did not sign the variance plat because "[s]he wanted the [variance] to show the easement for ingress and egress she claimed was implied from [the plat] documents and the City's imposition of a requirement for a second off-street parking space at the rear of the Tafoya lot."

{12} Afterwards, in November 2002, while Armijo's quiet title action was in its final stages of trial, "Armijo executed a quitclaim deed ... to [Cecilia] for all of Lot 2 without any reservations or restrictions with respect to the encroachments or the [e]asement[,]" which included the 5-foot easement through Lot 2. Id. ¶¶ 3, 22. Armijo's quiet title action resulted in a judgment filed in January 2003 determining that issues regarding the 5-foot easement across Cecilia's property were moot by the recording of the variance plat that abandoned that easement and by Armijo's quitclaim deed to Cecilia of Lot 2. Id. ¶ 22. Of note is that in the midst of Armijo's quiet title action, in December 2001, Armijo sold Lot 1 and the residence on Lot 1 to the...