Taggart v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-5503

KENNETH TAGGART, Plaintiff, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-5503

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

June 3, 2021

PAPPERT, J.

MEMORANDUM

Rather than just make his mortgage payments like other homeowners, serial litigant Kenneth Taggart has wasted judicial resources and his opponents' time and money for more than a decade.¹ This case is the latest involving his property at 45 Heron Road, Holland, PA 18966. See Taggart v. Morgan Stanley ABS Cap. I Inc., No.16-cv-62, 2016 WL 4076818, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2016); Taggart v. Northwest Mortgage, Inc., et. al., No. 09-cv-01281; Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Taggart, No. 11-cv-04668. He raises numerous claims—arising out of a state court foreclosure proceeding—against: (1) Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley Abs Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE 2; (2) Stern & Eisenberg, P.C.; (3) Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC; (4) Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; and (5) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Taggart claims Deutsche Bank does not own the mortgage and the other Defendants violated various procedures and statutes in handling the mortgage and the foreclosure proceeding in state court. The Defendants move to dismiss all claims and the Court grants their Motions in full.

As here, Taggart's frivolity has often been aided and abetted by Joshua Thomas, a lawyer who has drawn increasing scrutiny, criticism and sanction from our Court, other district courts and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Thomas's conduct in this case earns him further sanctions.

I

On October 1, 2020, Taggart sued Defendants in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas. (Notice of Removal, ECF 1.) Defendants removed to federal court in November and, after they moved to dismiss, Taggart amended his complaint on January 11, 2021. (ECF 18, 20.)

In 2016, when Taggart was last in federal court trying to avoid making mortgage payments on the Heron Road property, Judge Smith provided a detailed account of the history of the note, mortgage and loan at issue in this case. See Taggart, 2016 WL 4076818, at *1-3. To summarize, Taggart executed a promissory note for $382,500with Decision One Mortgage on September 15, 2006. Id. at *1; see (Am. Compl. ¶ 153). He also executed a mortgage with MERS, acting as nominee for Decision One Mortgage. Id.; see (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 45, 135, 204). On May 25, 2010 MERS assigned its interest in the mortgage to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley Abs Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE 2. Id. at *2; see (Am. Compl. ¶ 157). That assignment is central to Taggart's claims. He contends the assignment was invalid because Decision One Mortgage had "ceased to exist" on May 25, 2010.² (Am. Compl. ¶ 135.) Because it purportedly no longer existed, it was not a member of MERS and MERS could not assign the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. (Id.) Thus, he claims Deutsche Bank lacks the legal capacity to enforce the mortgage. (Id.) Deutsche Bank disagrees and sought foreclosure three times in Pennsylvania state court after Taggart defaulted on his mortgage payments. See (id. at ¶ 163).

Recently, the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas granted Deutsche Bank summary judgment in the latest foreclosure proceeding, entering judgment in rem against Taggart for $835,182.13 plus interest at a rate of $81.56 per diem.³ (Deutsche Bank Letter to Court, ECF 33.) After Taggart appealed that judgment, the court issued an opinion explaining that the evidence in the foreclosure action showed MERSassigned the mortgage to Deutsche Bank in 2010 and that, following that assignment, Deutsche Bank became the mortgagee. Deutsche Bank v. Taggart, Bucks Cty. CCP, No. 2018-05654, Opinion, Dkt. No. 161.

Taggart's Amended Complaint totals 400 paragraphs and 77 pages. It lodges 29 Counts against Defendants. Stated otherwise, the Amended Complaint is a convoluted, incoherent, jumbled mess.⁴ It lacks a clear chronology or logical organization and numerous paragraphs include spelling and grammatical errors. Taggart spends much of the first 152 paragraphs and 35 pages responding to Defendants' now-moot motions to dismiss his original complaint and recounting the state court foreclosure proceeding. In fact, the Amended Complaint borrows entire paragraphs from Taggart's pleadings in the state court foreclosure action. Compare, e.g., (Am. Compl. ¶ 118) with (Deutsche Bank Mot. to Dism., Exh. 2 at 21-22, ECF 25-4). Taggart's "Preliminary Alligations [sic]" do not begin until Paragraph 153. From there, the Amended Complaint continues making confusing (and often inapposite) allegations until it begins its litany of Counts against Defendants. Paragraph 197 provides a good example of the pleading's sloppiness and incoherence:

Bucks County is the proper venue to bring this action to quiet title as the properties are located in Montgomery County. Pennsylvania Code, Rule'1062' [sic], requires that an 'Action to Quiet Title' be brought in the county in which the property interests lie. The property subject to the 'Quiet Title' action lies in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 197.) The Amended Complaint contains countless other rambling,conclusory and vague claims. The Court might overlook such silliness from inexperienced pro se litigants. It expects far more from counseled pleadings.

Despite the Amended Complaint's shortcomings, its essence is fairly clear. Taggart's claims against Deutsche Bank stem from its foreclosure actions in state court. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2); see (id. at ¶ 8). His claims against Stern & Eisenberg and MERS arise out of the same foreclosure actions. (Id.) He drags Wells Fargo into the mix by claiming Deutsche Bank used it as a servicer to collect in the foreclosure actions. See (id. at ¶ 164). In short, Taggart asks the Court to conclude that no Defendant has a valid interest in the Heron Road property and that Defendants violated several laws in trying to enforce the mortgage and collect from him. In Counts 1 through 5, Taggart asserts quiet title claims against each Defendant. Counts 6 through 10 are slander of title claims. Count 11 is a breach of contract claim against Deutsche Bank. In Counts 12 through 14 and 28 and 29, Taggart claims SLS, Deutsche Bank and Stern & Eisenberg failed to comply with foreclosure protections. Count 15 adds an Unfair Trade Practices Act claim against Stern & Eisenberg. Counts 16 through 18 assert various claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act against Deutsche Bank, SLS and Stern & Eisenberg. In Counts 19 to 24, Taggart claims Defendants violated the Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Finally, Taggart asserts fraud claims against Deutsche Bank, SLS and Stern & Eisenberg in Counts 25 through 27.

On January 29, 2021, Wells Fargo moved to dismiss all claims against it for failure to state a claim. (ECF 24.) Taggart responded one week after his deadline to do so and Wells Fargo replied five days later. (ECF 26.) Deutsche Bank, SLS, MERS andStern & Eisenberg moved to dismiss the claims against them on February 4, 2021. (ECF 25.) Nineteen days later, Taggart moved for an extension of time to respond and to exceed the Court's page limitation in his filing. (ECF 27.) The Court denied that motion, (ECF 29), and Taggart responded, again untimely, on February 25. (ECF 31.)⁵ Deutsche Bank and the others replied on March 4. (ECF 32.) On March 16, Deutsche Bank, SLS, MERS and Stern & Eisenberg informed the Court that the state court had entered summary judgment against Taggart in the foreclosure proceeding. (ECF 33.) The Court ordered the parties to file letter briefs explaining the impact that ruling had on Taggart's claims in this case. (ECF 34.) Deutsche Bank, SLS, MERS and Stern & Eisenberg argue the state court judgment and collateral estoppel preclude relief on Counts 1 through 3, 5 through 8, 11 through 14 and 25 through 29. (ECF 35.) Wells Fargo contends the state court judgment precludes relief on all claims against it. (ECF 36.) Taggart, invoking another tired tactic, argues the state court judgment has no preclusive effect because it is based on fraud and he could not have brought the claims he raises now in the state court proceeding. (ECF 36.)

After the parties submitted those letter briefs, Taggart moved for injunctive relief and a hearing on his quiet title claims. (ECF 39.) He insists that if the Court does not act quickly on these claims, he risks losing his home to a foreclosure sale based on the judgment against him in state court. The motion is therefore best characterized as an attempt to appeal the state court foreclosure judgment. In any event, the Court denies the motion because Taggart does not show a likelihood of success on the meritsor a genuine risk of irreparable harm.

II

A

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The "mere possibility of misconduct" is not enough. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). However, a court need not accept as true inferences drawn by the plaintiff that are unsupported by facts. See Cal. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004).

"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell, 550...