Taitt v. Islamic Republic of Iran

664 F.Supp.3d 63

Sean TAITT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-1557 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

Signed March 16, 2023

Craig Carlson, The Carlson Law Firm, Killeen, TX, Matthew D. McGill, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Re Document No.: 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of the October 12, 2000 terrorist bombing of the U.S.S. Cole ("the Cole") in Yemen, which killed or injured dozens of U.S. Navy sailors. See Compl. ¶¶ 4.2-4.7, ECF No. 1. This Court granted a motion for default judgment against Iranian and Sudanese state defendants in a prior case arising out of the same incident brought by the mother and four brothers of one of the seventeen American sailors killed in the bombing. See Flanagan v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 87 F. Supp. 3d 93 (D.D.C. 2015); Notice of Related Case, ECF No. 2. Plaintiffs in the present case are twenty-five of the forty-two American sailors who were injured in but survived the attack ("Directly Injured Plaintiffs") and thirty-three of their immediate family members ("Family Plaintiffs").¹ See Ex. BB to Pls.' Suppl. Mem. Supp. Pl.'s Mot. ("Suppl. Mem."), ECF No. 20-1; Flanagan, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 98. Plaintiffs bring claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") and solatium under section 1605A of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq., and seek compensatory and punitive damages. Compl. ¶¶ 6.1-6.8. The Complaint names the states of Iran and Sudan as Defendants, but Sudan has been dismissed so Iran is the sole remaining Defendant. See Order of Dismissal, ECF No. 13. Iran has not entered an appearance, so default was entered on July 20, 2021, see ECF No. 16, and Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Default Judgment ("Pls. Mot.") on May 12, 2022, ECF No. 19. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND²

A. Al-Qaeda³

"Al Qaeda is a worldwide terrorist network led by Osama Bin Laden," who founded the network in Afghanistan in approximately 1990 "to serve as a base for like-minded Sunni Islamic extremists." Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 495 F. Supp. 2d 541, 548 (E.D. Va. 2007). Al Qaeda has "organized, executed, or inspired acts of terrorism around the world that killed or injured thousands of innocent people, including the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States," and has supported or trained terrorists in countries including Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, Kosovo, the Philippines, Algeria, Eritrea, and, as relevant here, Yemen. Id. "Bin Ladin saw himself as called 'to follow in the footsteps of the Messenger and to communicate his message to all nations,' and to serve as the rallying point and organizer of a new kind of war to destroy America and bring the world to Islam." Flanagan, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 97-98 (citing Rux, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 548).

B. The Bombing

At approximately 8:30 a.m. on October 12, 2000, the Cole entered the Port of Aden, Yemen, to refuel. See Flanagan, 87. F. Supp. 3d at 98 (citing Rux, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 544-45). The Navy used the Port of Aden as "the primary refueling stop for American ships during their 3,000-mile journey to the Arabian Gulf from the Mediterranean Sea" since 1999. Id. As of October 2000, the Cole, an Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, had a crew of twenty-six officers and 270 enlisted personnel. See id. It "was the twenty-fifth Navy ship to stop in Aden Harbor for refueling over the previous nineteen months." Id. On the morning of the bombing,

[a]t approximately 8:49 a.m., the Cole moored starboard side to Refueling Dolphin Seven, near the mouth of the harbor. The ship began refueling at approximately 10:31 a.m. At approximately 11:10 a.m., one of the sailors standing watch over the refueling noticed a small boat heading "fast and hard" toward the Cole from the direction of the city. The boat, painted white with fire red trim, was about thirty-five feet long and six to seven feet wide and had a shallow V-hull. It looked "brand new." The boat was similar in size and shape to many other small vessels in the harbor, including the service craft that had been alongside the Cole. The boat was manned by two males, both of whom appeared to be in their early thirties. The two men slowed the boat as they approached the Cole, maneuvered it parallel to the ship and came down the port side headed aft. As they did so, the two men in the boat were smiling, and waved to the crew. Some crew members returned the greeting. Seconds later, the boat exploded.

The explosion occurred between approximately 11:15 and 11:18 a.m., just as some of the crew was sitting down for lunch. The blast ripped a thirty-two-by thirty-six-foot hole in the port side.... Smoke, dust, and fuel vapors filled the air. The main engine room, auxiliary machine room, and the dry provisions storeroom were flooded. Several chambers, including the Crew and Chief Petty Officer's Galley, were structurally destroyed. The blast and its after-effects killed seventeen Navy sailors, all of them American citizens. Forty-two others were injured, some of them sustaining serious burns to their faces, hands and arms, as well as lacerations and fractures.

Id. "The Cole plot was an Al Qaeda operation supervised directly by Bin Laden." Rux, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 552.

C. Sudan

While Sudan has been dismissed as a Defendant, the Court briefly summarizes relevant facts concerning its relationship with Al-Qaeda and Iran and its participation in the bombing of the Cole, as they provide relevant context for understanding Iran's role in the bombing. "In 1989, General Omar Bashir assumed the presidency of Sudan in a military coup that overthrew the elected government and converted Sudan into an Islamic Arab state." Flanagan, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 98-99. Hassan al Turabi, head of the Sudanese political party the National Islamic Front ("NIF"), orchestrated the coup, after which he was in power until late 1999. Id. at 99. Bin Laden lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, during which time he "agreed to help Turabi in the regime's ongoing war against African Christian separatists in southern Sudan, and also to invest his wealth in the country's infrastructure." Id. "In exchange, Sudan provided Bin Laden's group with a sanctuary within which it could freely meet, organize, and train militants for future operations." Id. The United States designated Sudan as a state sponsor or terrorism in 1993, but rescinded the designation effective December 14, 2020. See Rescission of Determination Regarding Sudan, 85 Fed. Reg. 82565 (Dec. 18, 2020); see also Pls.' Unopposed Mot. for Vol. Dismissal of Defendant Republic of Sudan at 3, ECF No. 12. "Al-Qaeda's time in Sudan from 1991 through 1996 was invaluable to the development of the terrorist organization," and even after it "was expelled from Sudan in 1996, Sudan continue[d] to be a safe harbor ... allowing the organization to plan more freely." Flanagan, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 100-01 (quotation omitted).

D. Iran

Starting in the early 1990s, Iran and Sudan and Al-Qaeda began to coordinate "against their common enemies, the United States and Israel." Flanagan, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 103 (quotation and citations omitted). "Although Iranians are Shias, they nevertheless supported the terrorist activities of Bin Laden, a Suni, because of their mutual hatred of 'the infidels in the United States.'" Id. (citation omitted).⁴ This "tripartite front" allowed Al-Qaeda "the opportunity to build ties with Iranian officials, Hizballah, and other terrorist organizations dedicated to attacking United States personnel, military targets, and citizens in the Middle East." Id. "[T]he parties agreed that 'experience from Hizballah and Iran should be transferred to new nations/extremist groups who lack this expertise ... [in order to] allow [Al-Qaeda] members to gain the necessary experience in terrorist operations.'" Id. (citation omitted). The United States designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984, see U.S. Dep't of State, Determination Pursuant to Section 69(i) of the Export Administration Act of 1979—Iran, 49 Fed. Reg. 2836 (Jan. 23, 1984), and the designation remains in place today, see U.S. Dep't of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/ (last visited March 16, 2023).

Iran often used "both its own people and facilities as well as those of its close ally Hizballah" to support terrorist operations, including Al-Qaeda. Flanagan, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 103-04 (internal quotation omitted). "Iranian '[s]upport for militant and terrorist groups [was] almost always done via Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a parallel military force that [was] tasked with protecting Iran's revolution at home and spreading it abroad, among other duties.'" Id. (citation omitted). Iran "used its intelligence services extensively to facilitate and conduct terrorist attacks," and intelligence officers "used the diplomatic pouch for conveyance of weapons and finances for terrorist groups." Id. (internal quotations omitted). MOIS "facilitated the movement of [Al-Qaeda] operatives in Iran and provided them with documents, identification cards, and passports," and negotiated the release of its operatives. Id. Iran has provided training and "large sums of money" to Al-Jihad, "an Islamic terrorist group controlled by Bin Laden," and "intense secret contacts have taken place between top Iranian intelligence officers, Bin Laden, and Al-Zawaheri," one of Al Jihad's leaders. Id. at 105 (citation omitted). Furthermore, "Iran directly trained Al-Qaeda operatives," and also supported Hizballah, "which in turn provided training for Al-Qaeda." Id. at 106. Finally, "Iran has long provided material...