Talbot v. Ainuu

1

JOHNATHAN TALBOT, Plaintiff, v. MANOAH AINUU, and THE NORTH FACE APPAREL CORP., a Delaware Company, Defendants.

No. CV-23-66-BU-BMM

United States District Court, D. Montana, Butte Division

March 1, 2024

ORDER

Brian Morris, Chief District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Johnathan Talbot (“Talbot”) filed this action against Defendants Manoah Ainuu (“Ainuu”) and The North Face Apparel Corporation (“TNF”). (Doc. 1.) Talbot asserts claims for defamation and tortious interference against both Ainuu and TNF. (Id. at 35-48.) TNF and Ainuu filed motions to dismiss the claims against them for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 25; Doc 27.) Talbot opposes the motions. (Doc. 34.) The Court held a hearing on the motion on February 1, 2024. (Doc. 37.)

BACKGROUND

Talbot is a resident of Washington who worked for Outdoor Research LLC (“Outdoor Research”), a competitor of TNF. (Doc. 1, ¶ 8.) Ainuu resides in Bozeman, Montana and works as a professional mountain climber. (Id. ¶ 9.) Ainuu serves as a sponsored athlete for TNF and promotes TNF's brand and products on his social media. (Doc. 26 at 13-14.) TNF promotes diversity in the outdoor industry and has taken on initiatives to increase equity in outdoor recreation. (Doc. 1-7.)

Talbot's employer, Outdoor Research, sent Talbot to Bozeman, Montana to conduct a focus group. (Doc. 1, ¶ 54.) Talbot encountered Ainuu outside a bar in downtown Bozeman and engaged in conversation on the evening of June 20, 2023. (Id., ¶¶ 55, 57.) The accounts of the conversation differ, but Ainuu became upset with Talbot at some point and called him “racist and entitled.” (Id., ¶ 58.) The argument carried into a nearby bar where the allegations again diverge. Talbot contends that he tried to speak to Ainuu to understand his allegations of racism. (Doc. 26 at 15.) Ainuu asserted later in social media posts that Talbot squared up to him, got in Ainuu's face and seemed to be challenging Ainuu to a fight. (Id.)

Ainuu posted a video to Instagram and seven written statements about the incident. (Id. at 16.) These statements alleged that Talbot made racist remarks and tried to fight Ainuu. (Doc. 1-9 at 1-3.) Ainuu called for Outdoor Research to take action and make Talbot face consequences for his statements and conduct. (Id.) Dave Burleson, a Global Senior Athlete Coordinator for TNF, shared the statements on his personal social media account. (Doc. 26 at 16.) Social media users began commenting on Outdoor Research's social media page, tagging the social media page, and demanding that Outdoor Research take action against Talbot. (Doc. 1-11.)

Outdoor Research placed Talbot on administrative leave on June 23, 2023, and indicated its intent to terminate Talbot's employment on June 29, 2023. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 74, 77.) Outdoor Research noted that Talbot “showed poor judgment, in [his] actions in Bozeman, both prior to and during [the] incident at the bar” as the reason for Talbot's termination. (Id., ¶ 77.) Ainuu made a series of posts again on July 4, 2023, that targeted Outdoor Research for their failure to reprimand Talbot. Talbot's termination became effective on July 14, 2023. (Id., ¶ 78.) Talbot filed this action on October 2, 2023, alleging libel and tortious interference against Ainuu. (Id., ¶¶ 8398.) Talbot's complaint also alleges libel and tortious interference against TNF under a theory of respondeat superior. (Id., ¶¶ 99-121.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires claimants to include in their complaint “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2). See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal proves appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hospital Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). A court may dismiss a complaint “based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).

A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim proves plausible on its face when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. The plausibility standard does not require probability, but “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. The Court must “take[] as true and construe[] in the light most favorable to plaintiffs” all factual allegations set forth in the complaint. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

TNF argues that Talbot's claims against TNF fail because TNF did not publish any of the challenged statements and because the challenged statements represent matters of opinion that cannot support a claim for defamation. (Doc. 26 at 18.) TNF also notes that punitive damages prove unavailable under the applicable law. (Id.) Ainuu contends that Talbot's claims against him fail because his statements represented subjective opinions that are not “provably false.” (Doc. 28 at 4-12.) Both Ainuu and TNF contend that the tortious interference claims duplicate Talbot's defamation claims and must be dismissed given the subjective, opinion-like nature of Ainuu's statements. (Id. at 12-15.) The Court will address these arguments in turn, but the Court first must determine which state's law applies to the claims.

I. Whether Montana law or Washington law applies.

A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction applies the choice of law rules of the forum state. Aqua-Marine Constructors v. Banks, 110 F.3d 663, 670 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court exercises jurisdiction over this case by virtue of diversity of citizenship among the parties. (Doc. 1, ¶ 12.) Montana represents the forum state. Accordingly, the Court must apply Montana's choice of law rules. Montana uses the approach from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to resolve disputes over which state's substantive law applies to a particular action. Buckles v. BH Flowtest, Inc., 476 P.3d 422, 424 (Mont. 2020).

The Court first must determine “whether the forum state has a statutory directive concerning choice of law applicable to the underlying cause of action.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). If no statutory directive exists, the Court considers the principles set forth in § 6(2) of the Restatement along with the specific considerations identified by the Restatement for the alleged claim. Id. Talbot contends that a statutory directive exists that requires the Court to submit the choice of law question to the jury. Talbot notes that Montana's Constitution contains a provision that provides the following: “[i]n all suits and prosecutions for libel or slander the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the facts.” Mont. Const. Art. II, § 7.

The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as “plac[ing] the heart of any determination regarding defamatory libel directly within the province of the jury.” Lee v. Traxler, 384 P.3d 82, 86 (Mont. 2016). The Montana Supreme Court recognized that “‘there is no absolute prohibition against granting summary judgment in libel cases.'” Id. (quoting Hale v. City of Billings, 986 P.2d 413, 417 (Mont. 1999) (internal quotation omitted). The Montana Supreme Court cautioned, however, that “due to the unique nature of cases involving libel, a district court should take particular care when evaluating such motions.” Lee, 384 P.3d at 86 (citing Hale, 986 P.2d at 417).

The Court disagrees with Talbot's contention that Mont. Const. Art. II § 7 provides a directive as to what law to apply to a defamation claim. The constitutional provision delineates the role of the jury and the court in a defamation case. The Montana Supreme Court has clarified, however, that “the function of the court and jury is not greatly different in the trial of libel from what it is in other cases.” Kurth v. Great Falls Tribune Co., 804 P.2d 393, 395 (Mont. 1991). The Montana Supreme Court has determined that most questions of law remain in the province of the Court despite Mont. Const. Art. II § 7: “it is for the court and not the jury to pass upon demurrers to the complaint; upon the admissibility of the evidence; upon motions for nonsuit; upon motions for a directed verdict; upon motions for a new trial and upon motions to set aside verdicts or vacate judgments.” Id. The Court finds no directive in Montana law as to which law should be applied to defamation cases. The Court will apply the principles set forth in § 6(2) of the Restatement along with the specific considerations identified by the Restatement for defamation.

Section 6(2) of the Restatement provides the following factors that prove relevant to the choice of law:

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in determination of a particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations,

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,

(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and

(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

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