Taleshpour v. Apple Inc.

MAHAN TALESHPOUR, Plaintiff, v. APPLE INC., Defendant.

Case No. 5:20-cv-03122-EJD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION

March 30, 2021

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 33

Plaintiffs Mahan Taleshpour, Rory Fielding, Peter Odogwu, Wade Buscher, Gregory Knutson, Darien Hayes, Liam Stewart, Nathan Combs, and Kendall Bardin's ("Plaintiffs") brought this action against Defendant Apple Inc. ("Apple") on behalf of themselves and members of a putative class, raising twenty claims related to an alleged product defect in certain MacBook Pro laptops. Before the Court is Apple's Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 30, ("SAC")). Dkt. No. 33 ("Motion"). The Court took the Motion under submission for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion.

I. Background¹

In 2016, Apple introduced its updated 13- and 15-inch MacBook Pro models. To make these MacBook Pros thinner and sleeker than their predecessors, Apple used thin, flexible backlight ribbon cables to connect the lighting mechanism of the display screen to the displaycontroller board. Id. ¶ 17. These backlight ribbon cables wrap around the display controller board at the hinge of the laptop and are secured by a pair of spring-loaded covers. Id.

This configuration causes the backlight ribbon display cables rub against the control board when the laptop is opened and closed. Id. ¶ 19. Over time, the rubbing causes the cables to tear, which leads to various problems with the display screen. Id. For example, the tearing of the cable can cause a "stage lighting" effect, consisting of alternating patches of darkness along the bottom of the display. Id. ¶ 20. Further tearing can lead to more serious display issues, such as large blocks of color that obscure portions of the screen, and eventually, can cause the display to fail entirely. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. To varying degrees, these issues with the display screen all allegedly render the laptop unusable and unfit for its ordinary purpose. Id.

Plaintiffs allege that the backlight cables tear because they are "too short and do not provide enough slack to withstand the repetitive opening and closing of the MacBook Pros" (the "Alleged Defect"). Id. ¶ 19. Faced with complaints from numerous consumers about the stage lighting effect and the failure of the display, Apple attempted to remedy the Alleged Defect by making the backlight cables two millimeters longer in the 13- and 15- inch MacBook Pro models released in July 2018. Id. ¶¶ 28-30.

In May 2019, Apple also introduced the "MacBook Pro Display Backlight Service Program," through which Apple agreed to replace the display on all 13-inch 2016 MacBook Pro models that exhibited the stage lighting effect or a total failure of the display backlight system. Id. ¶ 31. Under the service program, Apple will refund the owner of a 13-inch 2016 MacBook Pro who paid to have the display fixed. Id. The service program covers only the 13-inch 2016 MacBook Pro; it does not cover the 15-inch MacBook Pro, or any MacBook Pro model released after 2016. Id.

Plaintiffs are all owners of 15-inch 2016 MacBook Pro or MacBook Pro models released after 2016 and allege that their laptops all suffered from the same backlight cable defect as the 13-inch version. Id. ¶¶ 33, 39, 44, 49, 54, 59, 64, 69, 74. Plaintiffs all experienced issues with their display screens, including the stage lighting effect or "vertical pink lines," which ultimatelyrendered their laptops inoperable. Id. ¶¶ 35, 37, 41, 46, 51, 52, 56, 57, 61, 62, 66, 71, 72, 76, 77. In all cases, these issues manifested after the one-year warranty provided by Apple expired. Id.

Plaintiffs bring claims for (i) violations of the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et sec. ("UCL") (Count 1), the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1761 and 1770 ("CLRA") (Count 2), and equivalent deceptive trade practice laws in Alaska, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington (Counts 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19) (collectively the "Deceptive Trade Practice Claims"); (ii) fraudulent concealment (Count 3); (iii) violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791-1794 (Count 4); and (iv) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under Alaska, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington law (Counts 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20) (collectively, the "Implied Warranty Claims"). Apple seeks to dismiss all of Plaintiffs claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. Legal Standard

A. 12(b)(1)

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they are authorized only to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution and federal laws enacted thereunder." Am. Fed'n of Tchrs. v. DeVos, 484 F. Supp. 3d 731, 741 (N.D. Cal. 2020); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 179 L. Ed. 2d 159 (2011) ("[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction"). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that it is likely (not merely speculative) that injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992).

To show an injury in fact, a plaintiff must allege that he or she suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest" that is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To establish a traceable injury, there must be "a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (simplified). Finally, it must be "likely" as opposed to merely "speculative" that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." Am. Fed'n of Tchrs., 484 F. Supp. 3d at 741 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). Plaintiffs, as the parties invoking federal jurisdiction, bear the burden of establishing the existence of Article III standing and, at the pleading stage, "must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element." Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (internal quotations omitted); see also Baker v. United States, 722 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The facts to show standing must be clearly apparent on the face of the complaint.").

To contest a plaintiff's showing of subject-matter jurisdiction, a defendant may file a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A defendant may challenge jurisdiction "facially" by arguing the complaint "on its face" lacks jurisdiction or "factually" by presenting extrinsic evidence demonstrating the lack of jurisdiction on the facts of the case. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004); Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). "In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction." Id.

In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. (citing Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., Dist. No. 205, Maricopa Cty., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003)). While a district court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings toresolve a "factual" Rule 12(b)(1) motion, "a [j]urisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is inappropriate when the jurisdictional issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits of an action." Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 n.3 (citing Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enterprises, Inc., 711 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"In a class action, this standing inquiry focuses on the class representatives." NEI Contracting & Eng'g, Inc. v. Hanson Aggregates Pac. Sw., Inc., 926 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2019). The named plaintiffs "must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975). Standing for the putative class "is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the requirements." Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007). But if none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class can establish standing to sue, the class action cannot proceed. See NEI Contracting and Engineering, Inc., 926 F.3d at 532 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974)).

B. 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with enough specificity to "give ...