Talley v. Christiana Care Health Sys.

LYNN E. TALLEY, D.O., Plaintiff, v. CHRISTIANA CARE HEALTH SYSTEM, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-926-CJB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

October 9, 2019

Michele D. Allen, ALLEN & ASSOCIATES, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Plaintiff.

Joanna J. Cline and James H. S. Levine, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, Wilmington, DE; Barbara T. Sicalides, Barak A. Bassman, and Megan Morley, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

October 9, 2019

Wilmington, Delaware

BURKE, United States Magistrate Judge

In the operative Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") in this employment litigation matter, Plaintiff Lynn E. Talley, D.O. ("Plaintiff") now asserts claims for breach of contract (Count I), defamation (Count II), interference with prospective economic advantage (Count III), tortious interference with contractual relations (Count IV), and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count V) against remaining Defendant Christiana Care Health System ("Defendant" or "Christiana Care"). Presently before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all Counts, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (the "Motion"). (D.I. 126) For the reasons set out below, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In this Section, the Court will only provide a broad outline of the background facts relevant to this litigation. The specific facts that are relevant to the individual causes of action at issue in this Motion will be further set out in Section III below.

Plaintiff is a board-certified physician in the field of obstetrics and gynecology ("OB/GYN"). (D.I. 67 at ¶¶ 2, 15) She is a resident of Pennsylvania and previously had a private practice in Newark, Delaware. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 10) Defendant Christiana Care Health System is a private, non-profit corporation headquartered in Newark, Delaware that runs a teaching hospital at issue in this litigation (the hospital will also be referred to herein as "Christiana Care"). (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 34)

Plaintiff was a member of the Medical-Dental Staff at Christiana Care from 1982 until her termination on July 15, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 16). She was granted privileges to practice medicine at Christiana Care in accordance with Christiana Care's Medical-Dental Staff Bylaws("Bylaws") and Medical-Dental Staff Credentials Manual ("Credentials Manual"). (Id. at ¶ 17; D.I. 127, exs. 1-2) Specific provisions of these two documents will be described below in Section III regarding the discussion of Plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff was involved in a number of incidents involving patients that are relevant to this litigation and to the Motion. The first such incident involved a patient whose initials are L.B.; as a result of this incident, Plaintiff's privileges to practice at Christiana Care were suspended on March 24, 2016, a suspension that lasted until April 23, 2016. (D.I. 67 at ¶¶ 47, 69) During the time period in which Plaintiff's privileges were suspended, Plaintiff had pending an application to renew her privileges to practice at the hospital. (Id. at ¶ 77) Ultimately, on May 9, 2016, Christiana Care's Board of Directors ("Board") approved a conditional four-month renewal of Plaintiff's privileges; this renewal was subject to certain conditions, one of which was that Plaintiff could engage in no subsequent "behavioral or clinical issues that are found by the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology Peer Review Committee ['OB/GYN Peer Review Committee'] to constitute 'at-risk' or 'reckless' behavior." (D.I. 127, ex. 26; see also id., exs. 21-25)

Shortly after the conditional renewal, Plaintiff was involved in two more incidents involving patients whose initials are W.C. and T.D. (D.I. 127 at 8-9; D.I. 142 at 8-9) These incidents were reviewed by the OB/GYN Peer Review Committee on July 12, 2016, and that committee, by consensus decision, found Plaintiff's conduct in each case to amount to "At-Risk" behavior. (D.I. 127, ex. 28) Therefore, effective July 15, 2016, Defendant revoked Plaintiff's privileges at the hospital. (Id., ex. 35)

B. Procedural Background

On July 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed her original Complaint against Defendant Christiana Care and against two individuals: Dr. Matthew Hoffman and Dr. Kenneth Silverstein (the "Individual Defendants"). (D.I. 1) Two days later, the case was referred to the Court for handling through case-dispositive motions. The following month, the parties jointly consented to the Court's jurisdiction to conduct all proceedings in the case. (D.I. 11)

Plaintiff subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), (D.I. 17), and Defendants countered with a motion to dismiss original Counts I-VIII (the "first motion to dismiss"), (D.I. 22). In a Memorandum Opinion and accompanying Order issued on October 11, 2018, (D.I. 61; D.I. 62), the Court granted the first motion to dismiss with prejudice as to all Defendants with regard to original Count I, which alleged a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. In a separate Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on October 17, 2018, (D.I. 63; D.I. 64), the Court addressed the remaining counts challenged in the first motion to dismiss. The Court dismissed with prejudice original Counts III and VIII (procedural due process claims) as to all Defendants, dismissed without prejudice original Count V (intentional infliction of emotional distress) as to all Defendants, dismissed without prejudice original Count VI (interference with prospective economic advantage) and original Count VII (tortious interference with contractual relations) as to the Individual Defendants, and denied the motion regarding original Counts II (breach of contract), IV (defamation), VI and VII as to Defendant Christiana Care. (D.I. 63; D.I. 64)

On November 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed the SAC. (D.I. 67) On December 3, 2018, the Individual Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Count III (interference with prospective economic advantage) and Count IV (tortious interference with contractual relations) of the SAC against them (the "second motion to dismiss"). (D.I. 70) The Court granted the second motionto dismiss with prejudice on February 19, 2019, leaving no further claims against Dr. Hoffman and Dr. Silverstein. (D.I. 100; D.I. 101) On March 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration as to the Court's decision, (D.I. 106), which the Court later denied, (D.I. 135).

Defendant Christiana Care filed the instant Motion on June 14, 2019. (D.I. 126) The Motion was fully briefed as of July 30, 2019. (D.I. 151) At the parties' request, (D.I. 153; D.I. 155), the Court heard argument on the Motion on August 27, 2019. (D.I. 165 (hereinafter "Tr."))

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.10 (1986). If the moving party has sufficiently demonstrated the absence of such a dispute, the nonmovant must then "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 587 (internal quotation marks, citation and emphasis omitted). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing in this regard, then the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). During this process, the Court will "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).

However, in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586-87. The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summaryjudgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). Facts that could alter the outcome are "material," and a factual dispute is "genuine," only where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. "If the evidence is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted).

A party asserting that a fact cannot be—or, alternatively, asserting that a fact is—genuinely disputed must support the assertion either by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B).

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, Defendant's Motion puts at issue each of the remaining Counts. Below, the Court concludes that summary judgment is appropriate as to all Counts, since there are no genuine disputes as to any material fact and Defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law with regard to each of the claims.¹ The Court will discuss each Count below in turn.

A. Breach of Contract (Count I)

With Count I, Plaintiff argues that Defendant breached its contractual obligations because Defendant "failed to follow the procedures set forth in the Credentials Manual in connection with Plaintiff's conditional renewal and subsequent...