Talley v. Dickson Cnty. Jail

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SHANE ANTONIO TALLEY #144257, Plaintiff, v. DICKSON COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:23-cv-00808

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

November 1, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELI RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Shane Antonio Talley, an inmate at the Dickson County Jail (“Jail”), brought this case in the Western District of Kentucky by filing a pro se civil rights complaint regarding the Jail's religious accommodations and conditions of confinement. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. (Doc. No. 3.) The Western District of Kentucky transferred the case to this judicial district (Doc. No. 4) and the case is now before the Court for initial review, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). As explained below, certain claims may proceed for further development against Chaplain Thomas Todd in his official capacity. Plaintiff should consult the accompanying Order for instructions.

I. Removal of Other Inmates as Plaintiffs and Warning to Talley

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Talley listed two other inmates as plaintiffs on the Complaint (Cartell McKeever and Patrick Thompson). (Doc. No. 1 at 1-2). But there is nothing in the record reflecting that those inmates authorized Talley to do so, and they did not sign the Complaint, as required for pro se parties in federal court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a). The docket, accordingly, will be updated to reflect that Talley is the only plaintiff in this case. No filing fee or “strike” under the PLRA will be assessed against McKeever or Thompson.

Talley is warned that, as a non-lawyer, he cannot represent other people in federal court. See Olagues v. Timken, 908 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 2018). If Talley continues to attempt to represent other people in this or any other case, he may be subject to sanctions, including a filing restriction. See Hyland v. Stevens, 37 Fed.Appx. 770, 771 (6th Cir. 2002).

II. Application to Proceed as a Pauper

An inmate may bring a civil suit without prepaying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff filed an application to proceed as a pauper on a form approved by the Western District of Kentucky (Doc. No. 3), but the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has a separate case in this Court in which he recently filed an application to proceed as a pauper on a form approved by this District. See Talley v. Dickson County Jail, No. 3:23-cv-00983, Doc. No. 5 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 3, 2023). This later application is accompanied by the required documentation, see id., Doc. No. 5 at 3-6; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), and it reflects that Plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the full filing fee in advance. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request to proceed as a pauper will be granted, and he will be assessed the $350.00 filing fee in the accompanying Order. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

III. Initial Review

The Court must review the Complaint and dismiss any part that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court must also hold this pro se pleading to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

A. Alleged Facts

The Complaint names (or purports to name) as Defendants: (1) “Dickson County Jail”; (2) “Dickson County Sheriffs [sic] Office Department”; (3) “Tri-Star Medical @ Medical Staff”; and (4) Chaplain Thomas Todd. (Doc. No. 1 at 1-3.) The following summary of allegations is based on a liberal construction of the Complaint and is taken as true for the purpose of this initial review.

Sunni Muslim inmates at the Jail are not allowed to have religious gatherings, including prayers called “Juh'mah” and “Ta'leen,” although “other inmates” can attend “church” once a month. (Id. at 4.) The Jail deprives Muslim inmates of prayer rugs and Qurans, but provides other inmates with Bibles. (Id.) And the Jail serves inmates observing Ramadan two meals, which does not supply the necessary daily calories, while other inmates receive three meals. (Id.)

There is “black mold” in the Jail's “bath/shower area,” there are mice running throughout the Jail, and there are “brown recluse spiders everywhere.” (Id.) Inmates bitten by spiders receive “no help.” (Id.) The Jail also does not provide towels, hygiene supplies, or cleaning supplies. (Id.) And the Jail serves “uncooked food” and food with feces and cockroaches in it. (Id.)

On Plaintiff's second day at the Jail, he underwent a TB skin test administered by medical staff employed by Tri-Star Medical. (Id.) He did not receive the results of this test, and he was placed “with positive test inmates along with HIV victims and Hepatitis victims,” which was also a mix of “felons” and “misdemeanor[] inmates.” (Id.) Medical staff also gives inmates the “wrong meds,” which causes “major life or death trauma.” (Id.) And medical staff “will not check on you if you don't have money on [the] books.” (Id.)

B. Legal Standard

To complete the required initial review, the Court applies the same standard as under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470- 71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court therefore accepts “all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, [and] ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)). An assumption of truth does not extend to legal conclusions or “‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).

C. Analysis

Plaintiff filed this case on a form for complaints brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Section 1983 allows individuals to bring civil claims based on violations of “the Constitution or federal laws by those acting under color of state law.” Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 576 (6th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff's allegations regarding religious accommodations at the Jail also implicate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). RLUIPA “applies to prisons that receive federal funds and prohibits state and local governments from placing ‘a substantial burden' on the ‘religious exercise' of any inmate unless they establish that the burden furthers a ‘compelling governmental interest' and does so in the ‘least restrictive' way.” Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). As explained below, Plaintiff may pursue certain Section 1983 claims for monetary damages against Chaplain Thomas Todd in his official capacity, but he cannot pursue relief under RLUIPA.

2. Section 1983

Plaintiff brings this case against all Defendants in their individual and official capacities. (Doc. No. 1 at 2-3.) “[A]n individual-capacity claim seeks to hold an official personally liable for the wrong alleged,” while “[a]n official-capacity claim against a person is essentially a claim against the” entity the person represents. Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Essex v. Cnty. of Livingston, 518 Fed.Appx. 351, 354 (6th Cir. 2013)).

Regardless of capacity, however, Plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim against the first three ostensible Defendants: (1) “Dickson County Jail”; (2) “Dickson County Sheriffs Office Department”; and (3) “Tri-Star Medical @ Medical Staff.”

For the first named Defendant, the Jail is a building, not a legal entity subject to suit under Section 1983. See McIntosh v. Camp Brighton, No. 14-CV-11327, 2014 WL 1584173, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2014) (collecting cases establishing that a prison facility “is not a ‘person' or legal entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). Likewise, for the second named Defendant, “police departments and sheriff's departments are not proper parties to a § 1983 suit.” See Mathes v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., No. 3:10-cv-0496, 2010 WL 3341889, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010) (collecting cases).

Given Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court could construe Plaintiff's references to the Jail and the Sheriff's Office as an attempt to impose liability directly on Dickson County. A county is a potentially proper defendant to a Section 1983 claim. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). In this case, however, such a construction is unnecessary. An official capacity claim against a person, to restate, is equivalent to a claim against the entity that the person represents. See Peatross, 818 F.3d at 241. And Plaintiff is already bringing official-capacity claims against the fourth Defendant, a person who represents Dickson County. (Doc. No. 1 at 2 (Defendant Todd).) Any claims against Dickson County will be addressed through this proper Defendant. Any effort to address claims against Dickson County through the improper Defendants, therefore, would be redundant. See J.H. v. Williamson Cnty., Tenn., 951 F.3d 709, 723 n.4 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Foster v. Michigan, 573 Fed.Appx. 377, 390 (6th Cir. 2014).

The third named Defendant, “Tri-Star Medical @ Medical Staff,” could be reasonably construed as an attempt to sue either all staff working for Tri-Star Medical as a group or Tri-Star Medical itself. If Plaintiff intends the former, however, a group of employees “is not a ‘person' for the purpose of Section 1983.” Taylor v. Emps. at Sumner Cnty. Jail, No. 3:19-cv-00401, 2019 WL 4860628, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 2, 2019) (citing Hix v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 196 Fed.Appx. 350, 356 (6th Cir. 200...