Tassinari v. Salvation Army Nat'l Corp.

610 F.Supp.3d 343

Mark TASSINARI, Richard Espinosa, Randy Owens, and Jonathan Anderson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.The SALVATION ARMY NATIONAL CORPORATION; the Salvation Army, a New York Corporation, Defendants.

Civil No. 21-10806-LTS

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Signed June 22, 2022

Amy F. Robertson, Pro Hac Vice, Fox & Robertson, Denver, CO, Lucy B. Bansal, Pro Hac Vice, Benjamin D. Elga, Janet M. Herold, Mariyam Hussain, Justice Catalyst Law, Inc., New York, NY, Martha M. Lafferty, Pro Hac Vice, Lafferty Law Firm, Inc., Nashville, TN, Christine M. Salazar, Matthew John Murray, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, Maria del Pilar Gonzalez Morales, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff Mark Tassinari.

Christine M. Salazar, Matthew John Murray, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, Janet M. Herold, Mariyam Hussain, Justice Catalyst Law, New York, NY, Maria del Pilar Gonzalez Morales, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Los Angeles, CA, Martha M. Lafferty, Lafferty Law Firm, Inc., Nashville, TN, for Plaintiffs Richard Espinosa, Randy Owens, Jonathan Anderson.

Christine B. Hawes, Pro Hac Vice, Thomas P. Gies, Pro Hac Vice, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC, Kevin M. Hensley, Barton Gilman, LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

SOROKIN, United States District Judge

This lawsuit challenges a policy prohibiting the use of medication-assisted treatment ("MAT") for opioid-use disorder ("OUD") in Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Centers ("ARCs"). The Plaintiffs, all of whom suffer from OUD and took part in ARC programming, bring suit against The Salvation Army National Corporation and The Salvation Army, a New York Corporation contending that the MAT policy discriminates against them based on disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), and the Rehabilitation Act.¹

The Salvation Army ("TSA") is an "international movement related to evangelical Christianity." Doc. No. 30 ¶ 134.² It is comprised of five related 501(c)(3) organizations that represent the national headquarters and TSA's regional territories: National (The Salvation Army National Corporation), Eastern (The Salvation Army, a New York Corporation), Southern (The Salvation Army, a Georgia Corporation), Western (The Salvation Army, a California Corporation), and Central (The Salvation Army, an Illinois Corporation). Id. ¶¶ 136-37. The New York Corporation, one of the two Defendants in this case, operates in twelve U.S. states: Connecticut, Delaware, Northeast Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff Espinosa enrolled in Eastern Territory ARC programming in Providence, Rhode Island, id. ¶ 90, and Plaintiff Tassinari enrolled in ARC programming in Boston, Massachusetts, id. ¶ 60.³ Plaintiffs Owens and Anderson participated in ARC programming in Louisiana and Missouri, respectively. Id. ¶¶ 103, 118.

Each of the Plaintiffs allege that the MAT policy interfered with their ability to use doctor-prescribed MAT during their participation in ARC programming, causing them harm and suffering. The Defendants filed the present Motions to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Doc. Nos. 37, 39. The Motions raise six arguments in support of dismissal, which the Court addresses in turn. After careful consideration, the Court ALLOWS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Defendants’ Motions.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION (DOC. NO. 37)

A. First Amendment

The Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ claims because the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses bar courts from adjudicating religious issues. See Doc. No. 38 at 8-13. According to the Defendants, the MAT policy stems from TSA's religious belief against the use of alcohol and other intoxicants and, as a result, "the Court cannot resolve this case without getting embroiled in questions of religious doctrine and belief." Id. at 8-9, 13.

"Federal courts are obliged to resolve questions pertaining to subject-matter jurisdiction before addressing the merits of a case." Acosta-Ramirez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 712 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2013). A court may dismiss a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) when it "lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Kavanagh v. Zwilling, 997 F. Supp. 2d 241, 247 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 578 F. App'x 24 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) ).

The Defendants’ argument is grounded in a line of Supreme Court cases holding that courts must refrain from adjudicating cases that require a "searching ... inquiry into church polity" or the resolution of religious disputes. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U. S. of Am. & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 723, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) ; see also Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969) ; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952) ; Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871). These cases stand for the proposition that "civil courts may not entertain claims that in effect require religious determinations that are ecclesiastical, regardless of the nature of the underlying dispute." Ram v. Lal, 906 F. Supp. 2d 59, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

Though the First Amendment imposes restraints on a court's ability to adjudicate religious disputes, it "does not prevent courts from deciding secular civil disputes involving religious institutions when and for the reason that they require reference to religious matters." Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Cath. Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 431 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) ). It falls to the Defendants to "point to a disputed religious issue which the jury or the district judge in [the] case [would be] asked to resolve." Id. This the Defendants have not done.

The Defendants rely on several cases in which courts have abstained from adjudicating religious disputes on First Amendment grounds. These cases are inapposite because they required courts to weigh in on religious views, apply church doctrine, or settle property disputes between competing religious groups. See, e.g., Moon v. Moon, 833 F. App'x 876, 879 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 2757, 210 L.Ed.2d 905 (2021) ("[W]e hold that, based on the allegations in the complaint, there are no neutral principles by which we can adjudicate these claims without deciding the religious question of who the rightful successor to the late Rev. Sun Moon is."); Kavanagh, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 254 ("In this case, Defendants have pointed to a disputed religious issue that the Court or the jury would be asked to resolve in connection with the libel per se claim—namely, the truth or falsity of the Catholic Church's characterization of its own law and doctrine. The First Amendment bars this Court from addressing that issue."); Presbyterian Church in U.S., 393 U.S. at 450, 89 S.Ct. 601 ("[T]he departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion—the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a role."); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 120-21, 73 S.Ct. 143 (holding that a statute granting control of a property owned by the Russian Orthodox Church to a group seeking to sever ties with the Russian Mother Church violated the Free Exercise Clause); Watson, 80 U.S. at 735 (holding that courts may not decide purely ecclesiastical questions in a case involving a property dispute between a Presbyterian organization and local churches of the organization). Here, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to apply neutral federal laws to the MAT policy. In doing so, the Court need not wade into an ecclesiastical dispute, evaluate religious doctrine, or determine the validity of TSA's religious beliefs. See Hartwig v. Albertus Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200, 217 (D. Conn. 2000) (finding that the First Amendment did not bar the court from hearing a case that required it to determine whether a Catholic College's religious reason for firing the plaintiff was pretextual because the "the resolution of these counts will not require the Court to inquire into competing interpretations of church law or policy").

The Defendants have not contended that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment exempt this policy from the application of the federal laws at issue in this lawsuit. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012) (holding that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment create a "ministerial exception" to employment discrimination statutes for hiring decisions related to a church's ministers). At this stage, the only question before the Court is whether it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the Plaintiffs’ claims. Resolution of the application question is not now ripe. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to adjudicate, or at least further adjudicate, the Plaintiffs’ claims.

B. Personal Jurisdiction

Next, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish personal jurisdiction. See Doc. No. 38 at 13-18. More specifically, the Defendants contend that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the National Corporation with respect to all of the Plaintiffs’ claims and lacks personal jurisdiction over the New York Corporation with respect to the claims brought by Plaintiffs Espinosa, Owens, and Anderson. The...