Tatel v. Mt. Leb. Sch. Dist.

675 F.Supp.3d 551

Carmilla TATEL, Stacy Dunn and Gretchen Melton, individually andas parents and natural guardians of their children, Plaintiffs, v. MT. LEBANON SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-837

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

Signed May 31, 2023

David J. Berardinelli, DeForest Koscelnik Yokitis Skinner & Berardinelli, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Christopher L. Voltz, Matthew M. Hoffman, Tucker Arensberg, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.

OPINION

Joy Flowers Conti, Senior United States District Judge

I. Introduction

This case involves the extent of parents' constitutional rights when a public school permits a teacher to inculcate the teacher's beliefs about transgender topics in first-grade students over the objections of their parents. As noted in this court's October 27, 2022 opinion (the "first motion to dismiss opinion") (ECF No. 38), this case is not about treating all students with kindness, tolerance and respect. Here, the parents allege that their children's first-grade teacher pursued her own transgender agenda outside the curriculum, which included: (1) instructing the children in her first-grade class that their parents might be wrong about their children's gender; (2) telling a student that the child could dress like a different gender and be like the teacher's transgender child (who was also in first grade in a different school); (3) telling a student that she, the teacher, would never lie (implying that the parents may lie about their child's gender identity); and (4) instructing students not to tell their parents about the transgender discussions. The teacher allegedly targeted the children's own gender identity and their parents' beliefs about the gender identity of their own children. When the parents complained, the school district supported the teacher and allegedly adopted a policy (the "de facto policy") that the teacher's conduct could continue in the future without notice to the parents or the opportunity to opt their children out of that kind of agenda (despite providing broad parental notice and opt out rights for other topics). At this stage of the case, these averments must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Lasche v. New Jersey, No. 20-2325, 2022 WL 604025, at *3-4 (3d Cir. Mar. 1, 2022) (discussing applicable standard for resolving a motion to dismiss in vacating dismissal of foster parents' First Amendment claim that the state retaliated against them for sharing their religious beliefs about same-sex marriage with their foster child).

The defendants do not challenge the averments about the existence of the de facto policy. Instead, citing Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008), a decision from the First Circuit Court of Appeals, they argue that in a public school, parents have no constitutional right to notice or to opt their children out of any kind of instruction, regardless of the content of that instruction, the age of the children, or whether the instruction is part of the published school curriculum. See ECF No. 42 at 8 ("Parents have no constitutional right to exempt their children from classroom lessons, including those on transgender issues"). In other words, the defendants argue that parents simply have no constitutional right to notice or to object to any information a public school may present to their children.

The defendants' argument is contrary to Third Circuit Court of Appeals precedent, which recognizes that a public school's actions may conflict with parents' fundamental constitutional rights and when conflicts occur on matters of the greatest importance, the parents' rights prevail unless the public school can demonstrate a compelling interest for its actions. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. Of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) ("C.N.")¹; Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 305 (3d Cir. 2000). The court adheres to its original decision that the parents' constitutional rights at issue here (forming the identity of their young children) are matters of the greatest importance and takes this opportunity to further explain and clarify its analysis.²

II. Procedural History

On October 27, 2022, the court issued the initial motion to dismiss opinion, which after a thorough analysis of each claim and each defendant, granted in part and denied in part defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint (the "Complaint") and the individual defendants' motion for qualified immunity. As the court explained, the alleged conduct went far beyond instructing students that someone who differs from that student must be treated with kindness, tolerance and respect. Here, the school district allegedly supports the teacher's ability to pursue her own agenda, outside the curriculum, to inculcate the teacher's beliefs about transgender topics in first-grade students over the objections of their parents and contrary to the beliefs of their parents.

A motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 54(b) (ECF No. 41) and a motion to amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) (ECF No. 44), with briefs in support, were filed by the remaining defendants: Mt. Lebanon School District (the "District"), Megan Williams ("Williams"), Dr. Timothy Steinhauer ("Steinhauer"), Dr. Marybeth Irvin ("Irvin"), Brett Bielewicz ("Bielewicz"), and Jacob W. Wyland ("Wyland") (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiffs Carmilla Tatel, Stacy Dunn and Gretchen Melton (collectively, "Plaintiffs" or the "Parents") filed a response in opposition to the motions (ECF No. 51) and the motions are ripe for disposition.

III. Standard for reconsideration

A. Interlocutory orders - Rule 54(b)

District courts possess discretion to reconsider interlocutory orders under Rule 54(b). Gay v. A.O. Smith Corp., No. 2:19-CV-1311, 2022 WL 2829887, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2022) (citing Foster v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 2012 WL 2402895, at *4 n.1 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2012)). A court may reconsider an interlocutory order even if the movant cannot show one of the particular grounds permitting reconsideration of final orders. Id. The movant, however, must establish good cause for the court to revisit its prior decision. Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, courts should only grant motions for reconsideration in extraordinary circumstances. Id. "The extraordinary circumstances permitting reconsideration of prior decisions [under Rule 54(b)] align neatly with the three grounds justifying reconsideration under Rule 59(e)." Id.

B. Qualified immunity - Rule 59(e)

A district court's denial of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage is considered to be a "final decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672-75, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The scope of a motion for reconsideration of a final decision under Rule 59(e) is extremely limited. Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011). The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is "to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Max's Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). A motion for reconsideration must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in the law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or fact or prevent manifest injustice. N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). A motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask a district court to rethink a decision it has already rightly or wrongly made. Williams v. Pittsburgh, 32 F. Supp.2d 236, 238 (W.D. Pa. 1998). Motions for reconsideration should not be used to relitigate issues already resolved by the court and should not be used to advance additional arguments which could have been made by the movant before judgment. Reich v. Compton, 834 F. Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 57 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1995).

The pending motions will be addressed together and each remaining claim will be discussed.

IV. Discussion

A. Summary of the parties' arguments

Defendants' motions are intertwined. Defendants do not point to new evidence or an intervening change of law. Instead, they posit clear errors of law. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not assert cognizable constitutional rights and the Complaint should be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The individual Defendants argue, in the alternative, they are entitled to qualified immunity. The first step of a qualified immunity analysis, i.e., whether Plaintiffs articulated cognizable constitutional rights, is similar to the motion to dismiss analysis. The individual Defendants assert at the second step of the qualified immunity analysis that because the constitutional rights at issue are not clearly established, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs maintain that the court's analysis of their constitutional rights and its denial of qualified immunity to the remaining individual Defendants in the initial motion to dismiss opinion were correct.

Defendants seek dismissal of the entire Complaint with prejudice as a matter of law. In other words, Defendants contend that parents have no constitutional rights with respect to any of the conduct alleged in the Complaint. Plaintiffs vigorously disagree.

B. Factual allegations in the Complaint

In their arguments, Defendants minimize the factual allegations in the Complaint and failed to consider all those allegations (and the reasonable inferences therefrom) in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as required at this stage of the case. Lasche, 2022 WL 604025 at *3-4. Defendants do not address the full scope of the factual allegations in the Complaint, but narrowly construe Plaintiffs' claims as "premised on Williams' classroom instruction on gender identity issues." (ECF No. 42 at 8-9). Defendants assert the Complaint contains "extraneous...