Taumby v. U.S., 89-1516

Page 1362

902 F.2d 1362

58 USLW 2703

James R. TAUMBY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 89-1516.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 10, 1989.

Decided May 14, 1990.

James K. Blickhan, Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.

Richard E. Monroe, Springfield, Mo., for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

James R. Taumby appeals from a district court ¹ order dismissing his complaint filed pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2671-2680 (1982). The court concluded that Taumby's claim was barred by the limitations period provided in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(b) (1982), because he failed to file suit in district court within six months of the day that the Federal Bureau of Prisons denied his administrative claim. Taumby argues on appeal that the district court erred by: (1) finding that his claim was barred; (2) denying his motion for extension of time; and (3) denying his motion for relief from its order. We affirm the district court.

Taumby, while incarcerated at the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, received medical treatment for chronic head and back pain over a ten-day period beginning February 14, 1985. On February 28, 1985, Taumby was transferred from the Springfield facility, and on June 21, 1985, he was released from federal custody.

On February 2, 1987, Taumby submitted a claim for $1,000,000 to the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Department of Justice, alleging that the care he received at the Springfield facility, given by a physician in the course and scope of his employment with the United States Government, caused him permanent eye injury and constituted medical malpractice. This claim was received by the Department of Justice on February 9, 1987, by the Federal Bureau of Prisons on February 10, 1987, and by the Federal Bureau of Prison Administration in Kansas City, Missouri, on April 9, 1987.

On April 23, 1987, Taumby received a letter from the Federal Bureau of Prisons informing him that his administrative claim had been received April 9, 1987, and that, under the FTCA, the agency had until October 9, 1987, to make an administrative determination of the claim. On October 13, 1987, the Federal Bureau of Prisons denied Taumby's claim, but failed to properly notify Taumby as required by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(b). ² See also 28 C.F.R. Sec. 14.9 (1989).

On October 11, 1988, Taumby filed suit in district court under the FTCA. He claimed that the Federal Bureau of Prisons had failed to make a final disposition of his claim within six months and that such a failure was deemed a final denial of his administrative claim. (Record at 14). In his suit, he again alleged that negligent medical treatment by the prison physician had resulted in a permanent eye injury.

On January 9, 1989, the Government filed a motion to dismiss Taumby's complaint as barred by the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(b). The Government argued that the claim had been denied on October 13, 1987, and that Taumby's failure to bring suit against the United States within six months of that denial barred his action.

Taumby requested an extension of time to respond to the motion on January 19, 1989. On January 26, 1989, the court denied the extension and granted the Government's motion to dismiss on grounds that Taumby's complaint was not timely under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(b) and therefore the court was without proper jurisdiction to consider it. Taumby then filed a motion for relief from the court's order, which was denied. This appeal followed.

I.

We review de novo a district court's decision on subject matter jurisdiction. Giannini v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 847 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir.1988); Hilliard v. United States Postal Serv., 814 F.2d 325, 326 (6th Cir.1987); Clayton v. Republic Airlines, 716 F.2d 729, 730 (9th Cir.1983).

The central question in this case is whether Taumby's suit is timely under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(b) and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a).

Under section 2401, ³ FTCA claimants are required to: (1) commence actions against the United States within six years after the right of action first accrues; (2) first present their claims, in writing, to the appropriate federal agency within two years after the claim accrues; and (3) file suits within six months of the formal denial of their claims by the agency. Failure to abide by these requirements will result in a claim being time-barred by section 2401. Under section 2675(a), ⁴ claimants are barred from filing suit against the United States until their claims are formally denied by the appropriate federal agency, but are allowed, at their discretion, to treat an agency's failure to act on a claim for six months as a final denial, thus enabling them to file suit without a formal agency disposition.

Taumby argues that, under a plain reading of section 2675(a), if an agency fails to act within six months after an administrative claim is filed, the claimant can consider his claim denied at any time after that initial six-month period. The Government contends that Taumby had only a "reasonable time" after the six-month period for agency action had expired in which to treat the failure to deny the claim as a constructive denial.

Our objective "in interpreting a federal statute is to achieve the intent of Congress." Linquist v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 884, 888 (8th Cir.1987). Any statutory analysis must begin with a review of the language used by Congress. See United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 462, 467, 107 L.Ed.2d 462 (1989). "While as a general matter our interpretation must be governed by the statute's plain meaning, it is also a 'well-established canon of statutory construction that a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute * * * * ' " Darling v. Bowen, 878 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir.1989) (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2025, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) ), cert. denied sub nom. --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1782, 108 L.Ed.2d 783 (1990). To ascertain whether Taumby's "plain meaning" interpretation is consistent with the purpose of section 2675(a), we now turn to the general policies behind the FTCA and its statute of limitations provision, and to the legislative history of section 2675(a).

A.

The FTCA provides for "a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, making the Federal Government liable to the same extent as a private party for certain torts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment." United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1971, 1975, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976). In United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979), the Supreme Court considered the scope of the waiver in the FTCA and stated that "the Act waives the immunity of the United States and ... we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended. Neither, however, should we assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended." Id. at 117-18, 100 S.Ct. at 357 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we strictly construe section 2675(a). Cf. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-91, 61 S.Ct. 767, 771-72, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941); Monark Boat Co. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1322, 1326 (8th Cir.1983).

The Court noted in Kubrick that statutes of limitations "are statutes of repose; and although affording plaintiffs what the legislature deems a reasonable time to present their claims, they protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence." 444 U.S. at 117, 100 S.Ct. at 357. The Court also specifically considered section 2401(b) and stated that it was "the balance struck by Congress in the context of tort claims against the Government ... [and that the Court was] not free to construe it so as to defeat its obvious purpose, which is to encourage the prompt presentation of claims." Id. (emphasis added). With these factors in mind, we now consider the legislative history of section 2675(a).

B.

The legislative history of the 1966 amendments to section 2675(a) reveals that the overall objective of permitting agencies six months to consider a claim was to keep claims that could be settled from clogging the court system. See S.Rep. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2515, 2516 [hereinafter Senate Rep.]; H.R.Rep. No. 1532, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) [hereinafter House Rep.]; Improvement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Litigation: Hearings on H.R. 13650, H.R. 13651, H.R. 13652, and H.R. 14182 Before the Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 16 (1966) [hereinafter Hearings]. This goal was furthered in two ways. The first part of section 2675(a) requires an aggrieved party to file a claim with the agency responsible for his injuries; while the second part gives a claimant the option, if six months after filing a claim the agency failed to make a formal final disposition, to consider the claim constructively denied and to file suit.

The legislative history of the second part of section 2675(a) discusses the option it creates in the conjunctive: to consider the claim denied and to file suit. From this history we can see that this option is not simply an opportunity to consider failure to act as denial of one's claim. Instead, it has two parts, which, when combined, serve to accomplish the overall goal of the section: the prompt resolution of claims.

The Senate Committee on the Judiciary considered section 2675(a), and in its report stated that:

[I]f the agency fails to act in 6 months, the claimant may at his option elect to regard this inaction as a final denial and proceed to file suit. It is...