Tauwab v. Barry

AMIR JAMAL TAUWAB, et al., PLAINTIFFS, v. STEVE BARRY, SHERIFF, et al., DEFENDANTS.

CASE NO. 5:13cv2036

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

August 25, 2014

JUDGE SARA LIOI

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, Amir Jamal Tauwab ("Tauwab") and The Tauwab Group, LTD ("TTGL"), commenced this action on September 13, 2013, asserting the deprivation of constitutional rights arising out of the September 11, 2013 repossession of a vehicle. The matter is before the Court upon a series of motions filed by the parties. Specifically, the Court will address the motion of defendants Steve Barry and John Peake to dismiss (Doc. No. 12), plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Doc. No. 17), plaintiffs' motion for immediate return and release of the seized vehicle (Doc. No. 20), plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. No. 29), plaintiffs' motion to voluntarily withdraw the motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Doc. No. 30), and plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. (Doc. No. 31.)

I. BACKGROUND

On or about August 1, 2013, Tauwab contacted defendant Ron Marhoffer Hyundai ("Marhoffer"), a Hyundai dealership operating in Summit County, Ohio, for thepurpose of discussing the purchase of a 2013 Hyundai Equus. (Am. Compl., Doc. No. 4 at ¶¶ 8, 12.) Tauwab was directed to Jerrod Giebel ("Giebel"), a salesperson employed by Marhoffer. (Id. at ¶ 13.) After several conversations with Giebel, over a period of "a few days," Tauwab visited Marhoffer's dealership on August 5, 2013 and consummated the sale of the vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 14.) According to plaintiffs, Tauwab purchased the 2013 Hyundai Equus for $52,089.60 and remitted the sale amount to Giebel. (Id.) Following the purchase, Giebel delivered the vehicle to Tauwab. (Id. at ¶ 15.)

On August 14, 2013, Marhoffer transferred the Ohio Certificate of Title for the vehicle to Tauwab. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Tauwab, in turn, transferred the title of the vehicle to TTGL the following day (August 15, 2013). (Id. at ¶ 18.) After title passed to TTGL, Tauwab purchased tire and wheel insurance and pin striping for the vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 20.)

On September 11, 2013, defendant John Peake, a lieutenant with the Summit County Sheriff's Department, and two unidentified Cleveland police officers, visited the offices of TTGL and demanded that Tauwab "surrender the [2013 Hyundai Equus] or be arrested." (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 21.) "Tauwab, under duress and fear of being unlawfully arrested, surrendered the [v]ehicle to Peake." (Id. at ¶ 23.)

Plaintiffs initially brought suit against Summit County and Marhoffer, as well as the following individuals: Drew Alexander—as Summit County Sheriff, Peake, and Giebel. On September 16, 2013, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, wherein defendant Steve Barry was substituted for Drew Alexander as Summit County Sheriff. (Doc. No. 4.) On October 17, 2013, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Summit County and Giebel as party defendants. (Notice, Doc. No. 16.)

In the amended complaint, contained within a single cause of action, are allegations that defendants violated plaintiffs' right to due process of law and their right to be free from "false arrest, harassment and unlawful seizure[.]" (Doc. No. 4 at ¶¶ 31-32.) Plaintiffs cite the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as the source of their constitutional claims (id.), and identify 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the vehicle by which they intend to redress the alleged constitutional violations. (Id. at ¶ 1.)

TTGL was initially represented by counsel, while Tauwab has, from the inception of the lawsuit, proceeded pro se. On April 17, 2014, the Court granted the motions of attorneys Robert Smith, III and Kerry O'Brien to withdraw as counsel for TTGL. (Doc. No. 41 [ruling on Doc. Nos. 38, 39].) The Court instructed TTGL to obtain alternative counsel, but—as of the date of this Opinion and Order—no replacement counsel has entered an appearance on behalf of TTGL. With the exception of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, all motions were fully briefed and at issue before TTGL's counsel withdrew.¹

II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

In a motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), defendants Barry and Peake seek the dismissal of Tauwab and Barry from this litigation. (Doc. No. 12.) Plaintiffs oppose the motion (Doc. No. 13), and defendants Barry and Peake have replied. (Doc. No. 34.)

A. Standard of Review

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 80 (1957). Although this pleading standard does not require great detail, the factual allegations in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citing authorities). In other words, "Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Id. at 556 n.3 (criticizing the Twombly dissent's assertion that the pleading standard of Rule 8 "does not require, or even invite, the pleading of facts").

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Although "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Rule 8 does not "unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, acourt should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679.

B. Tauwab's Standing

Barry and Peake maintain that Tauwab lacks standing to challenge any constitutional violations relating to the repossession of the 2013 Hyundai Equus. Noting that it is undisputed that Tauwab transferred title of the vehicle to TTGL and that TTGL was the title holder of the vehicle on the day it was repossessed, they insist that Tauwab "cannot personally seek damages for property he alleges was taken from another," namely, TTGL. (Doc. No. 12 at 78.)

"[I]t is a basic principle that an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 inures only to the benefit of one whose own personal constitutional rights were violated." Brown v. City of Louisville, 33 F.3d 54, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 1994) (unreported table decision) (citations omitted); see Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2000) ("In the Sixth Circuit, a section 1983 cause of action is entirely personal to the direct victim of the alleged constitutional tort.") (citations omitted). As such, a party generally lacks standing to sue for the deprivation of another's constitutional rights. Quarles v. City of East Cleveland, 202 F.3d 269, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 1999) (unreported table decision); see Hall v. Wooten, 506 F.2d 564, 566 (6th Cir. 1974) ("one may not sue for the deprivation of another's civil rights") (citation omitted). "This limitation on standing applies even to civil rights claims brought [by individuals] in the place of corporations." Quarles, 202 F.3d 269, at *3.

Tauwab insists that the transfer of title to his corporation did not divest him of standing. He looks to the actions he took, and the injuries he claims he sustained,to attempt to satisfy the standing threshold. With respect to his actions, Tauwab underscores the fact that he purchased the vehicle, itself, and purchased insurance and pin-striping for the vehicle. (Doc. No. 13 at 84 [citing Doc. No. 4 at ¶¶ 14, 19, 20].) These actions notwithstanding, it is undisputed that he transferred his ownership interest in the vehicle to TTGL, and that TTGL was the title holder of the property in question on the day it was repossessed. Having voluntarily stripped himself of any ownership interest in the vehicle, Tauwab lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the deprivation of this property.

The case cited by plaintiffs in their opposition does not counsel in favor of a contrary conclusion. In Petty v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Cnty. of Wyandotte, Kan., 168 F.R.D. 46 (D. Kan. 1996), the plaintiff had been awarded clear title to a car in a divorce, but she failed to take the necessary steps to effectuate the transfer of title. When the car was impounded for lack of valid registration, plaintiff brought suit under § 1983 challenging the deprivation of her property. The district court ruled that the divorce decree gave the plaintiff a protected property interest in the car, and, thus, afforded standing for the subsequent civil rights action. Id. at 50. Unlike the plaintiff in Petty, Tauwab does not have an enforceable interest in the 2013 Hyundai Equus to provide him with standing to bring this lawsuit on his own behalf.

Tauwab also highlights the injuries he claims he sustained as a result of defendants' conduct to establish standing. The amended complaint provides that, "[a]s a result of all of the foregoing [actions taken by defendants], the [p]laintiffs have experienced severe humiliation, emotional distress, and loss of the [v]ehicle and the costs associated therein." (Doc. No. 4 at ¶ 24.) He also claims that he "has suffered severeeconomic...