Taylor v. City of Shreveport, CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-2227

FRED TAYLOR, ET AL. v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-2227

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA SHREVEPORT DIVISION

August 24, 2016

JUDGE ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a motion entitled "Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion To Dismiss," filed by the Defendants. Record Document 39. The Plaintiffs, who are all officers of the Shreveport Police Department ("SPD"), allege that SPD's sick-leave policy violates the Rehabilitation Act, Louisiana disability discrimination law, and the right to privacy under the Louisiana Constitution. The Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claims because the sick-leave policy is job-related and consistent with business necessity. The Defendants also argue that the state law claims should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons announced below, the Court denies the Defendants' motion with respect to the Rehabilitation Act claims, grants the motion with respect to the Louisiana disability discrimination claims, and denies the motion with respect to the Louisiana constitutional claims.

I. Factual & Procedural Background

The Plaintiffs initially alleged that several aspects of SPD's sick-leave policy, which is memorialized in a general order entitled "SPD 301.06," and related conduct by SPD officers violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act, and Louisiana law. The Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and dismissed the Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims for want of jurisdiction. Record Document 24. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of all of the Plaintiffs' federal claims except their claim that SPD 301.06's inquiry into whether an officer suffers from a "chronic condition" violates the Rehabilitation Act. Taylor v. City of Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 286-87 (5th Cir. 2015). The Fifth Circuit held that SPD 301.06's chronic-condition inquiry gives rise to a prima facie claim of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 286. The court further determined that while it was premature for it to evaluate whether the Defendants could rebut the Plaintiffs' prima facie case, "[o]n remand, the City will have the burden to show that this [chronic-condition] aspect of the SPD-3 Form requirement is 'job-related and consistent with business necessity.'" Id. (citation omitted). With a federal claim before the Court again, the Fifth Circuit also vacated dismissal of the state law claims, allowing the Court on remand to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. Id. at 289.

SPD 301.06 provides that sick leave must be documented after an officer uses any two days of undocumented sick leave in a calendar year.¹ Record Document 42-2, pp. 7-8. When an officer uses documented sick leave, a healthcare provider must complete a certificate indicating, among other things, if the "condition [that caused the officer'sabsence] is chronic and whether intermittent absences related to the condition may be possible." Record Document 42-2, p. 8. The healthcare provider also must indicate the diagnosis, treatment, and ability of the officer to return to work. Record Document 42-2, p. 8. In practice, the healthcare provider only completes the chronic-condition component of the sick-leave certificate if the officer is able to return to work. Record Document 39-1, p. 2. A form that the healthcare provider may, but need not, use to complete the certificate also asks whether there are "infectious or contagious concerns" relating to the officer's absence.² Record Document 42-2, p. 12.

The officer must furnish the sick-leave certificate to his timekeeper or supervisor "as soon as possible when leaving the medical appointment," but apparently no later than upon his return to work, to "permit the timekeeper/supervisor to make staffing adjustments and maintain accurate attendance records." Record Document 42-2, p. 8. The supervisor or timekeeper then must forward the certificate to SPD's human resources office, where SPD 301.06 instructs SPD to exclusively maintain sick-leave certificates or any copies thereof. Record Document 42-2, p. 8. If the certificate indicates that the officer's condition is chronic, then further certification of the officer's chronic condition is required. RecordDocument 42-2, p. 8. Once that certificate is on file with human resources, the officer may document absences related to the condition by completing a sick-leave certificate directly without involving a healthcare provider. Id. An officer may also voluntarily complete a chronic-condition certificate. Record Document 42-4, pp. 2-3.

According to Defendant Duane Huddelston, Deputy Chief of SPD, the purpose of inquiring into an officer's chronic condition after documented sick leave is four-fold. Record Document 39-1. First, the policy helps SPD determine whether an officer is able to perform the essential functions of his job. Record Document 39-1, p. 4. Second, the policy ensures the safety of other officers. Record Document 39-1, p. 4. Third, the policy "assists the Department in scheduling officers in order to provide adequate police coverage." Record Document 39-1, p. 3. Fourth, the policy allows SPD "to determine if an additional medical examination is necessary before allowing an officer to return to work." Record Document 39-1, p. 4.

The Plaintiffs also allege that in practice, SPD does not properly maintain sick-leave certificates, allowing for the casual disclosure of officers' medical information to other officers and, in rare instances, persons beyond SPD. Record Document 42-4, pp. 3-5. Specifically, Michael Carter ("Carter"), an SPD officer and former Plaintiff, attests that superiors leave other officers' sick-leave certificates on their desks or other places in plain sight. Record Document 42-4, pp. 3-4. Although Carter indicates that exposure of the sick-leave certificates is usually unintentional, he alleges that in one instance an officer deliberately posted medical information regarding another officer on Facebook. Record Document 42-4, pp. 4-5. Plaintiff Jessica Walker ("Walker") also alleges that while she wastaking sick leave, Lt. Rita James discussed her medical condition with other officers on multiple occasions to insinuate that Walker had fabricated the condition causing her absence. Record Document 16, p. 9; Record Document 19, p. 1.

The Defendants now move to dismiss all of the Plaintiffs' claims. They argue that the Court should issue summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claims because they have shown as a matter of law that the inquiry falls within the business-necessity exception established by statute. The Defendants also urge the Court to dismiss both of the Plaintiffs' state law claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). There they argue that the Plaintiffs' claims under Louisiana's disability discrimination statute fail because the Plaintiffs have not plead that they are disabled persons. And they argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead a claim of invasion of privacy under the Louisiana Constitution because they have not alleged that their medical information was published to a third party.

II. Standard

Summary judgment is proper pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). Rule 56(c) "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. If the party moving for summary judgment fails to satisfy its initial burden ofdemonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). If the motion is properly made, however, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmovant to go "beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Wallace v. Texas Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). While the nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a scintilla of evidence, Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047, all factual controversies must be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 2005).

To survive a challenge under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Courts are required to accept the plaintiff's "well-pleaded" facts as true and construe the complaint in a light favorable to that plaintiff. In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, courts are not required to accept the veracity of legal conclusions framed as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (reasoning that under Rule 8, it is not sufficient to merely recite a cause of action's elements with supporting conclusory statements). Overall, determining when a complaint states a plausible claim is a context-specific task, requiring courts to rely on judicial experience and common sense to assess when a complaint crosses the line from conceivable to plausible. Id. at...