Taylor v. Commonwealth

ROBERT A. TAYLOR APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

2017-SC-000442-MR

Supreme Court of Kentucky

APRIL 18, 2019

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE

NO. 15-CR-002649

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

Appellant, Robert A. Taylor, Jr., was convicted by a Jefferson Circuit Court jury of three counts of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance while in possession of a firearm, one count of second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance while in possession of a firearm, one count of third-degree trafficking in a controlled substance while in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In accordance with the jury's recommendation, Taylor received a total sentence of fifty years' imprisonment.

Taylor now appeals to this Court as a matter of right, Ky. Const. §110(2)(b), alleging three claims of error: (1) the trial court erred in denying Taylor's motion to suppress the stop and search of his car, (2) the trial court erred in denying Taylor's motion to suppress certain statements he made to police, and (3) the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Detectives Stewart and Schraut of the Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD) were conducting a surveillance on an area with a high level of crime and drug trafficking. The officers were stationed at Phyllis Court, a dead-end street in a residential area with a large apartment complex. Stewart testified that during this surveillance, he and Schraut observed Taylor and his vehicle in this area around midnight. Stewart testified that he observed Taylor exit his car and enter a blue Chevrolet Trailblazer. After a few seconds, Taylor exited the Chevrolet Trailblazer and got back into his vehicle. Stewart testified that, in his experience, he believed that Taylor's interaction with the Chevrolet Trailblazer was an apparent hand-to-hand drug transaction.

Following that occurrence, Stewart witnessed a male get into Taylor's vehicle. Taylor drove off, returning a short time later. Once Taylor returned, the male exited the vehicle and went into the apartment complex area. Stewart also stated he observed that Taylor's car was from Harlan County.

Stewart testified that upon witnessing these events, he and Schraut approached Taylor's vehicle, initiating a stop. Stewart pulled his vehicle directly behind Taylor's car, while Schraut pulled in front of Taylor's car. Upon approaching Taylor's vehicle, the officers could see a handgun in between the driver's seat and the center console directly adjacent to Taylor's right leg. Schraut said "gun" and the officers ordered Taylor out of the vehicle. Stewart testified that he asked Taylor if he was a convicted felon, to which Taylor responded in the affirmative. Stewart handcuffed Taylor and got thepassenger, Randee Phillips, out of the vehicle. Stewart arrested Taylor once the officers confirmed Taylor's status as a convicted felon.

Stewart then searched Taylor's vehicle while Taylor remained handcuffed outside. Stewart testified that Taylor did not consent to the search, but Taylor was a convicted felon and the officers had already found a gun in the car. The officers initially searched the front of the vehicle where the gun was located, which revealed a box in the vehicle containing a stolen 9mm semi-automatic handgun. The search revealed another box containing narcotics and drug paraphernalia. Stewart testified that these boxes were in the front passenger's-side floorboard of the vehicle. After recovering the narcotics, the officers performed a search of the rest of the car.

Taylor moved the trial court to suppress the evidence recovered in this search, arguing that it was the fruit of an unconstitutional stop and search. Specifically, he argued that the police officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion that Taylor was involved in criminal activity, and, therefore had no right to search his vehicle and the two boxes located therein. The trial court held a hearing and denied Taylor's suppression motion in a written order.

LMPD Detective Spaulding arrived at the scene after the stop was initiated and searched Phillips, the passenger in Taylor's car. Spaulding found methamphetamine on Phillips's person during the search. Stewart testified that he asked Spaulding if Phillips had anything on her person. Stewart indicated that when he made this inquiry of his fellow officer, Taylor responded, stating that anything Phillips had belonged to him.

Taylor filed a motion to suppress his statement, arguing that he had not received his Miranda warnings at the time that he made the statement in response to Stewart's inquiry. Further, Taylor argued at trial that he was not presented with nor did he sign a waiver of rights form prior to making the statement. The trial court conducted a hearing and ultimately denied the motion.

After the trial court denied Taylor's various motions, the case was eventually tried and submitted to the jury. Following the jury's guilty verdict, Taylor moved the trial court for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. Taylor requested an evidentiary hearing concerning new evidence discovered post-trial. At this evidentiary hearing, Clay Kennedy, an attorney from the Louisville Metro Public Defender's office, testified. He stated that he was in the courthouse elevator with Detective Stewart and Taylor's trial counsel while the two discussed Taylor's trial, which had just ended. According to Kennedy, Stewart said there was a discussion the night of Taylor's arrest in which Stewart offered to make Taylor's case "go away" if Taylor was willing to "work" as a confidential informant. Kennedy stated that Stewart claimed Taylor responded that he did not want to go to jail that night. However, when Taylor discovered he would have to go to jail until the deal could be formalized, Taylor declined the offer.

The trial court denied Taylor's motion and proceeded with the sentencing phase. In accordance with the jury's recommendations, the trial court sentenced Taylor to: fifty years' imprisonment for first-degree trafficking in acontrolled substance (heroin), subsequent offense, while in possession of a firearm; fifty years' imprisonment for first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance (methamphetamine), subsequent offense, while in possession of a firearm; fifty years' imprisonment for first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance (oxycodone), subsequent offense, while in possession of a firearm; twenty years' imprisonment for second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance (buprenorphine-naloxone), subsequent offense, while in possession of a firearm; ten years' imprisonment for third-degree trafficking in a controlled substance (alprazolam), subsequent offense, while in possession of a firearm; and ten years' imprisonment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The sentences were to be served concurrently for a total sentence of fifty years' imprisonment.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Suppress

When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, our analysis is two-fold. Williams v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Ky. 2011). First, "[w]e review the trial court's factual findings for clear error, and deem conclusive the trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence." Id. at 68. We review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Id.

1. Stop

Taylor argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence revealed in the stop and search of his vehicle. We will first determine whether the stop was constitutional. Taylor contends that the stopwas unconstitutional because the detectives did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. We disagree.

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment) and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution provide safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, in spite of these safeguards, a police officer may constitutionally conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). A reasonable suspicion is more than an unparticularized suspicion or "hunch." Id. at 27.

Therefore, for the stop to be constitutional, at the time the detectives stopped Taylor, they had to have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective and articulable facts, that Taylor was engaged in criminal activity. Id. To determine whether an officer had such reasonable suspicion, this Court must look at the totality of circumstances surrounding the detention. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). Taylor contends that the totality of the circumstances did not provide the officers with a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Taylor was committing a crime.

In the case at hand, Stewart testified that he and Schraut were conducting surveillance on a high-crime area located at Phyllis Court, which is a dead-end street utilized as the primary access to an apartment...