Taylor v. Ctr. Indep. Sch. Dist.

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TINA TAYLOR, ON BEHALF OF T.J., A MINOR, Plaintiff, v. CENTER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; AMANDA CLARK, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRINCIPAL OF CENTER HIGH SCHOOL AND IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY; JILL COX, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ASSOCIATE PRINCIPAL OF CENTER HIGH SCHOOL AND IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY; GAYLA MILLER, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ASSOCIATE PRINCIPAL OF CENTER HIGH SCHOOL AND IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY; AND PETE LOW IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPCITY AS AN OFFICER WITH CENTER ISD AND IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Defendants.

No. 9:23-CV-00152-MJT

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Lufkin Division

July 25, 2024

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Zack Hawthorn United States Magistrate Judge

This case is assigned to the Honorable Michael J. Truncale, United States District Judge. On May 30, 2024, Judge Truncale referred three motions to dismiss to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for consideration and disposition:

(1) Defendant Center Independent School District (“CISD”)'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 18);

(2) Defendants Jill Cox, Pete Low, and Gayla Miller's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 19); and

(3) Defendant Amanda Clark's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 20).

Plaintiff Tina Taylor filed this lawsuit on behalf of T.J., her minor son, against CISD and several Center High School (“CHS”) administrators. Taylor's claims arise from T.J.'s placement in a Disciplinary Alternative Education Program (“DAEP”) by CHS administrators following an alleged assault that T.J. committed against a fellow student. Taylor asserts procedural and substantive due process claims under the U.S. Constitution and Texas Constitution against Principal Amanda Clark, Assistant Principals Jill Cox and Gayla Miller, and CISD Chief of Police Pete Low (collectively, “the individual defendants”). Taylor also alleges a Monell municipal liability claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against CISD.

After careful review of the filings and applicable law, the undersigned recommends granting all three motions to dismiss. First, Defendants CISD and Low are entitled to governmental immunity from Taylor's state law claims. Second, the individual defendants are all entitled to qualified immunity. Third, Taylor fails to allege sufficient facts showing that the individual defendants violated T.J.'s constitutional rights. Finally, because Taylor fails to allege a violation of T.J.'s constitutional rights, she fails to state a Monell claim against CISD.

I. Factual Background

Taylor brings claims on behalf of T.J., her minor son, who is a current student at CHS in Center, Texas. Doc. No. 13 at 2 ⁋ 2. T.J. was a freshman student at the time of the underlying incident. Id. at 3,⁋ 9. Taylor's claims against the individual defendants and CISD arise from disciplinary measures the individual defendants took against T.J. for an alleged assault that T.J committed against a female student at CHS. Id. ⁋12.

The parties strongly dispute whether T.J.'s actions constituted an “assault” under the Texas Penal Code. According to the facts alleged in Taylor's Complaint, the alleged assault involved T.J. lightly touching his friend's leg below the knee in a friendly, innocuous manner. Id. at 4, ⁋ 15. Taylor further contends that the incident occurred while T.J. and the girl were talking in the school gym where dozens of other students were present, and that no person could reasonably perceive the touch as an assault under Texas law. Id. On the other hand, the individual defendants contend that T.J.'s offense warranted DAEP placement because “slapping a female student's inner thigh” constitutes an assault under § 22.01(a) of the Texas Penal Code. Id., ⁋⁋12, 24. Taylor maintains the individual defendants' contentions are not true. Id., ⁋ 24.

On August 27, 2021, the individual defendants suspended T.J. from school for three days as discipline for the alleged assault. Id. at 3, ⁋ 9. A few days later, on September 1, 2021, all four individual defendants met with Taylor and T.J. Id., ⁋11. During the meeting, the individual defendants told Taylor and T.J. that T.J. was being ordered to a disciplinary alternative education program (DAEP) for a period of 60 days without possibility of early release. Id., ⁋ 12. The individual defendants stated that the type of assault that T.J. allegedly committed required mandatory DAEP placement. Id., ⁋ 13. The individual defendants told Taylor that they based their decision on witness statements and a video of the incident. Id., ⁋ 16.

Taylor alleges that the individual defendants deprived her and T.J. of fair process and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the allegations lodged against T.J. during the meeting. Id., ⁋⁋ 15-18. Specifically, Taylor contends that she was not allowed to view the witness statements or video of the incident and could not question any witnesses. Id., ⁋ 16. Additionally, the individual defendants refused to provide a verbal explanation or description of the alleged assault. Id., ⁋ 17. Following this meeting, T.J. was removed from campus and placed in DAEP. Id., ⁋19. The individual defendants subsequently forwarded criminal assault charges against T.J. to the municipal court. Id. As a result of the DAEP placement, T.J. was unable to participate in the CHS football team, of which he had been an active member. Id.

On September 20, 2021, Taylor met with Defendant Clark. Id. at 5, ⁋ 20. At this meeting, Taylor asked to view T.J.'s full investigation file, including the witness statements and video of the incident. Id. Clark refused to show Taylor the file. Id. Clark also refused to change both T.J.'s DAEP placement and the information regarding the assault in his disciplinary file. Id.

Thereafter, on September 30, 2021, Taylor filed a Level One administrative complaint with CHS, requesting T.J.'s immediate release from DAEP and a correction of T.J.'s disciplinary file to remove the assault charge. Id., ⁋ 21. On October 4, 2021, Clark again met with Taylor, this time to discuss the Level One complaint. Id., ⁋ 22. Two weeks later, on October 19, 2021, Clark issued a decision on Taylor's Level One complaint (“the Level One Decision”), in which she refused to provide Taylor with access to the witness statements or video, release T.J. from DAEP, or remove the assault finding from T.J.'s disciplinary record. Id. Taylor contends that the Level One Decision, which was issued six weeks after T.J.'s placement in DAEP, was the first time that the individual defendants provided any substantive description of the assault allegation against T.J. Id., ⁋ 24.

The Level One Decision states that T.J. committed an assault under Texas Penal Code §§ 22.01(a)(2) or (3). Id. at 6, ⁋ 26. Taylor maintains that this classification of the assault indicates the individual defendants' changing rationale for T.J.'s DAEP placement. Id. At first, during the initial meeting, the individual defendants told Taylor that the assault T.J. committed required mandatory DAEP placement. Id. at 3, ⁋ 13. However, Taylor alleges that the type of assault described in the Level One Decision allows for discretionary, not mandatory, DAEP placement. Id. at 6, ⁋ 26.

Additionally, Taylor alleges that the municipal court reviewed the charges against T.J. and placed him on deferred adjudication, such that the charges would be dismissed after six months of good behavior. Id. at 5, ⁋ 20. Taylor alleges that because the court refused to prosecute the assault charges, CHS is required to provide a formal review of T.J.'s DAEP placement. Id. at 6, ⁋ 26. Defendant Clark's Level One Decision disclaims CHS's obligation to review the DAEP placement. Id., ⁋ 27. Nonetheless, Clark conducted an independent review of the charge against T.J. anyway and concluded that T.J.'s placement in DAEP was proper because he had committed an assault in violation of § 22.01(a)(3). Id.

Taylor also contends that the Level One Decision contains a false representation of T.J.'s statement about the alleged assault. Id. at 7, ⁋ 29. According to Taylor, the Level One Decision states that T.J. admitted to slapping a female student's inner thigh. Id. However, Taylor contends that T.J.'s actual statement was “I slapped [the female student's] leg as a joke I didn't know she was going to take it that way.” Id. Taylor maintains that T.J. never admitted to specifically touching the student's inner thigh. Id.

Finally, Taylor contends that while CHS turned over ten witness statements with the Level 1 Decision, the school interviewed eighteen students in its investigation of the incident. Id., f 30. The school has provided no information about the missing eight statements. Id.

II. Procedural History

Taylor filed her First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 13) on December 12, 2023. Thereafter, on January 22, 2024, Defendants CISD and Cox, Miller, and Low filed their Motions to Dismiss. Doc. Nos. 18, 19. On January 23, 2024, Defendant Clark filed her Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 20. Taylor filed her Response (Doc. No. 23) on February 6, 2024, and the Defendants filed their Replies (Doc. Nos. 24, 25) on February 13, 2024.

III. Legal Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges the subject-matter jurisdiction of a federal district court. See FED R CIV. P. 12(b)(1). The court “must presume that a suit lies outside [its] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Gonzalez v. Limon, 926 F.3d 186, 188 (5th Cir. 2019). “A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the...