Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia

187 F.Supp.3d 46

Tiffani Taylor, as Parent/Guardian of D.T., Plaintiff,

v.District of Columbia, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15-685 (RBW/AK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed April 25, 2016

Charles Anthony Moran, Moran & Associates, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Laura George, Veronica A. Porter, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ALAN KAY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case was referred to the undersigned, on October 27, 2015, for a Report and Recommendation. (10/27/15 Minute Order.) Pending before the undersigned is Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees ("Motion") [7] and Memorandum in Support thereof ("Memorandum") [7-1]; Defendant's Opposition to Motion ("Opposition") [9]; and Plaintiff's Reply to the Opposition ("Reply") [10]. Plaintiff Tiffani Taylor ("Plaintiff") requests from Defendant District of Columbia ("Defendant" or "the District") a total of $102,536.60 in attorneys' fees and costs¹ incurred in connection with an administrative proceeding brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (Memorandum at 11.)² The underlying administrative case involved two separate administrative complaints—Administrative Complaints Case #2014-0233 and #2014-0192—which were combined into one administrative hearing. (Hearing Officer Determination, Case #2014-0233 [7-3] ("HOD 1") and Hearing Officer Determination, Case #2014-0192 [7-4] ("HOD 2").) Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff is a fully prevailing party in Case number #2014-0233 because she was awarded the full relief sought.³ (Opposition at 2.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is a partially prevailing party with regard to Case #2014-0192 because she only prevailed on half of the issues presented therein. (Opposition at 2, 14–15.) Defendant generally contests the hourly billing rate utilized by the Plaintiff's counsel (Opposition at 4-14); counsel's claimed reimbursement rate for the performance of "clerical tasks," (Opposition at 15-16); the award of any fees relating to certain "vague entries," (Opposition at 16-17); and the rate charged for copies (Opposition at 17). Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition, and Reply, and for reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion [7] be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Tiffani Taylor is the mother of D.T. (hereinafter referred to as "D.T." or "the student"), a minor child who is a student with a disability. (Memorandum at 1.) Defendant District of Columbia is a municipal corporation that operates the District of Columbia Public Schools System ("DCPS"). (Complaint [1] ¶ 7.)⁴ The District receives federal funds pursuant to the IDEA and it is obliged to comply with the IDEA, which guarantees all children with disabilities a free appropriate public education ("FAPE"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) ; 20 U.S.C. § 1411. In general, FAPE "is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21[.]" 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).

By way of background, at the time of the administrative proceeding, D.T. was a seventeen-year-old child "with a disability pursuant to IDEA, with a disability classification of multiple disabilities including other health impairment ("OHI") for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") and emotional disturbance ("ED")." (HOD 1 at 2; HOD 2 at 4.) Prior to the administrative hearing, the student was attending School A, "a self-contained full-time special education program housed in a DCPS high school." (HOD 1 at 4.)

In Administrative Complaint Case #2014-0233, the Hearing Officer considered whether DCPS denied D.T. a FAPE by: 1) failing to conclude at the April 3, 2014 Manifestation Determination Review ("MDR") that the student's behavior on March 31, 2014, that led to his forty-five-day suspension, was a manifestation of his disability; and (2) failing to conclude at the May 16, 2014 MDR that the student's behavior on May 14, 2014, that led to his nine-day suspension, was a manifestation of his disability. (HOD 1 at 4.)

The Hearing Officer concluded that D.T.'s March 31, 2014 behavior of engaging in physical aggression was a manifestation of his ED disability and that he was inappropriately suspended from school. (HOD 1 at 11.) On March 31, 2014, according to D.T., he was in the cafeteria during lunchtime when another student spat on him. (HOD 1 at 6.) D.T. left the cafeteria because he was embarrassed, but was directed back to the cafeteria by a school aide. (Id. ) When D.T. returned to the cafeteria, he "found the student who had spit on him and put him in a cho[ke]hold while the student was hit by another student." (Id. ) The Hearing Officer found that DCPS failed to "refute the logical conclusion that D.T.'s behavior of engaging in physical aggression was not a behavior that was being targeted by his IEP and BIP." (HOD 1 at 11.) The Hearing Officer concluded that D.T.'s "behavior of engaging in physical aggression even though it did not directly follow in time [with] him being spit [on], was nonetheless a manifestation of his disability." (Id. )

The Hearing Officer concluded that D.T.'s May 14, 2014 behavior of engaging in physical aggression was also a manifestation of his ED disability and that D.T. had been inappropriately suspended from school. (HOD 1 at 11.) D.T. indicated that, prior to the incident, he became upset with a female student when she greeted everyone except for him. (HOD 1 at 8.) D.T. calmed down and after some time passed, asked to be allowed to leave to use the restroom. (Id. ) A school staff member refused D.T.'s request because he believed that D.T.'s true intention was to go after the female student who had ignored him earlier. (Id. ) D.T. pushed past the school staff member after being repeatedly denied access to the restroom. (Id. at 8.) D.T. and Plaintiff provided credible evidence that D.T. was angered by the repeated denial of access to the restroom by school staff members. (Id. ) Again, the Hearing Officer found that DCPS failed to produce evidence that "refute[d] the logical conclusion that [D.T.'s] behavior of engaging in verbal and physical aggression was not a behavior that was being targeted by his IEP and his BIP." (Id. at 11.)

In Administrative Complaint Case #2014-0233, the Hearing Officer ordered DCPS to provide compensatory education for the time that D.T. was inappropriately suspended and provided with no appropriate placement. (Id at 13.) The compensatory education award consisted of thirty hours of independent tutoring and fifteen hours of independent counseling or mentoring. (HOD 1 at 13.) "Despite Petitioner's failure to propose appropriate compensatory services [,] [the Hearing Officer] conclude[d] that to award the student no compensation for the missed services would be inequitable and ... the student should be awarded at least nominal services as compensation." (HOD 1 at 12-13.)

In Administrative Complaint Case #2014-0192, the Hearing Officer considered four issues; namely, whether DCPS denied D.T. a FAPE by failing to provide: (1) timely and accurate evaluations/re-evaluations for D.T.'s areas of suspected disabilities; (2) an appropriate IEP because D.T.'s IEP did not prescribe (a) a full time IEP for ED, other health impaired and learning disability, (b) related services that will provide therapeutic transport, counseling ... and therapeutic recreation, and (c) wraparound services; (3) an appropriate placement and location of services; and (4) D.T.'s educational records to his parents, including his cumulative special education file noting suspensions and incident reports. (HOD 2 at 3.) These four issues are addressed in turn.

First, Plaintiff claimed that DCPS failed to provide timely and accurate evaluations or reevaluations for D.T. (Id. at 11.) However, D.T.'s November 6, 2013 IEP contained references to recent evaluations, which were reviewed by a DCPS psychologist and then by an IEP team. (Id. ) The IEP team made appropriate adjustments to D.T.'s IEP. (Id. ) Accordingly, the Hearing Officer concluded that Plaintiff did not meet her burden of proof that DCPS failed to re-evaluate D.T. (Id. )

Second, Plaintiff alleged that from September 2012 to March 2013, DCPS failed to provide D.T. with an appropriate IEP at School A. (HOD 2 at 11.) When D.T. attended School A, he was erroneously placed in a general education program with an IEP that prescribed thirteen hours of specialized instruction inside general education. (HOD 2 at 4, 12.) By February 2013, D.T. had not made any progress on his math goals and his reading goals had yet to be implemented. (HOD 2 at 4.) On March 19, 2013, to improve D.T.'s progress, D.T.'s IEP was amended to provide 25 hours of services per week outside general education and placement in a self-contained full-time special education program at School A. (HOD 2 at 5.) Accordingly, the Hearing Officer found that D.T.'s IEP from September 2012 to March 2013 was inappropriate. (HOD 2 at 11.)

The Hearing Officer was not, however, convinced that D.T. would benefit from "wraparound" services in his IEP compared to a living in a stable home environment with adequate supervision.⁵ (HOD 2 at 12.) Great weight was given to D.T.'s probation officer's testimony due to the probation officer's years of experience with D.T. in monitoring his compliance. (Id. ) Thus, the Hearing Officer concluded that D.T.'s IEP was not inappropriate because it lacked therapeutic transport to school, outside counseling, therapeutic recreation, or "wrap-around" services. (Id. )

Third, Plaintiff asserted that placement in School A denied him a FAPE because School A was an inappropriate location of services. (HOD 2 at 12.) Although School A provided a full-time special education program for students with emotional and behavioral concerns, the student's education consultant indicated that:

the

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