Taylor v. Harrison Cnty.

1

BRIAN TAYLOR, PLAINTIFF v. HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, HARRISON COUNTY TAX ASSESSOR PAULA LADNER, and PAULA LADNER INDIVIDUALLY DEFENDANTS

CIVIL No. 1:20cv319-HSO-RHWR

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Southern Division

March 8, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, HARRISON COUNTY TAX ASSESSOR PAULA LADNER, AND PAULA LADNER INDIVIDUALLY'S MOTION [34] FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

BEFORE THE COURT are Defendants Harrison County Mississippi, Harrison County Tax Assessor Paula Ladner, and Paula Ladner Individually's Motion [34] for Summary Judgment. The Motion is fully briefed. Having considered the Motion on its merits, the related pleadings, the record, and relevant legal authority, the Court is of the opinion that Defendants' Motion [34] for Summary Judgment should be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

In 1999, Plaintiff Brian Taylor (“Mr. Taylor” or “Plaintiff”) was in an automobile accident and suffered a traumatic brain injury. Ex. [37-1] at 15-16. As a result, he suffers from medical issues related to this injury, including PTSD, anxiety, depression, and ADHD. Id. at 10.

The undisputed summary judgment evidence reflects that Mr. Taylor began working for the Harrison County, Mississippi, Tax Assessor in 2007 as a Field Appraiser, which involved visiting properties throughout the County to assess their value for tax purposes. Id. at 37. Office policy required that Field Appraisers, such as Mr. Taylor, drive their personal vehicles to the office, clock in, and then take a County vehicle to the properties where they were working. Id. at 43, 90. Lunch breaks and two 15-minute breaks were automatically deducted in the time-keeping system, so it was not necessary for Mr. Taylor to return to the office to clock out for breaks. Id. at 90.

Mr. Taylor worked in this position from 2007 until 2019 under then-Harrison County Tax Assessor Tal Flurry. Id. at 21. Defendants Harrison County, Mississippi, Harrison County Tax Assessor Paula Ladner and Paula Ladner individually (collectively, “Defendants”) assert that in the summer of 2019, “employees began to notice the Plaintiff, Brian Taylor, was not turning in his work.” Mem. [35] at 8. Defendants have produced evidence of seven different instances when either Defendant Paula Ladner (“Ms. Ladner”), who was then the chief administrative officer for the Harrison County Tax Assessor's Office, or Mr. Robert Stinziano, the chief appraiser, noticed that Mr. Taylor was arriving late to work, sleeping, or otherwise not completing his job assignments. Ex. [34-8] at 1-8. Mr. Taylor has not contradicted this evidence.

When queried about his behavior in August 2019, Mr. Taylor told Ms. Ladner and Mr. Stinziano that his doctor was changing his medications, which caused fatigue and caused him to fall asleep at work; he claims that he reiterated this to Ms. Ladner again in January 2020. Ex. [37-1] at 27; Ex [34-6] at 38-39. Ms. Ladner was aware of Mr. Taylor's vehicle collision in 1999 and knew that his doctor was adjusting his medication for anxiety, id. at 37-38, but did not recall any specifics of his injuries from the accident, id. at 73.

In 2019, Mr. Flurry decided not to run for re-election, and Ms. Ladner ran for the position, was elected, and was sworn in on January 6, 2020. Mem. [35] at 8. After Ms. Ladner was sworn in as the Tax Assessor, Ex. [34-6] at 11, on January 7, 2020, she and Mr. Stinziano met with Mr. Taylor to tell him that he would no longer be working as a Field Appraiser, but would instead be working in the office, id. at 9. This decision was partially to monitor Mr. Taylor's performance more closely, and partially to help with office tasks, such as answering phone calls, during a busy time of the year. Ex. [34-7] at 52.

Employees who worked in the office were required to clock in no earlier than 7:30 a.m. and clock out no later than 5:30 p.m., with working hours beginning at 8:00 a.m. and ending at 5:00 p.m. Ex. [34-5] at 9. Office policy also required that all employees clock out for lunch or when leaving work for personal reasons. Id. Defendants assert, and Mr. Taylor has not disputed with competent evidence, that when he began working in the office, he would not clock in or clock out appropriately; for example, he would take lunch breaks without clocking out. Ex. [34-6] at 56. Ms. Ladner reminded Mr. Taylor about the importance of clocking in and out appropriately several times over the ten days he worked in the office. Id. at 60.

It is undisputed that, on January 17, 2020, Mr. Taylor clocked in late at 8:05 am, but instead of beginning his work duties, he immediately left the office without clocking out. Id. at 58. He was later found in his car in the employee parking garage. Id. In response to this incident, Ms. Ladner terminated Mr. Taylor's employment. Ex. [34-5] at 85.

B. Procedural history

Mr. Taylor filed suit in this Court against Defendants, alleging that he was terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Mississippi state law. Compl. [1] at 1.

Defendants have filed the present Motion [34] for Summary Judgment arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided by a jury, Mot. [34] at 1, because Mr. Taylor was terminated for his own misconduct, and not because of his disability, Mem. [35] at 1. In his Response, Mr. Taylor concedes his Title VII and state-law claims, but maintains that his rights under the ADA and FMLA were violated. Mem. [38] at 2. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor's Title VII and state-law claims will be dismissed.

Mr. Taylor claims that his rights under the ADA were violated when Ms. Ladner fired him on the basis of his disability and failed to make reasonable accommodations for him. Compl. [1] at 5. He asserts that his medication that helps him manage his disability makes him fatigued, and that Ms. Ladner was aware of this. Mr. Taylor contends that because Ms. Ladner knew this, she should have worked with him to reach a reasonable accommodation, rather than terminating his employment. Mem. [38] at 13.

Mr. Taylor further asserts that his rights under the FMLA were violated when Ms. Ladner failed to advise him of his FMLA rights, which he claims she had a duty to do. Id. at 15. He argues that even though he never expressly mentioned the FMLA, Ms. Ladner's awareness of his medical history placed her under a duty to inquire “as to the nature of Mr. Taylor's absences and provide him notice of eligibility and rights and responsibilities under the FMLA.” Id. at 16.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). If the movant satisfies this burden, the nonmovant must present evidence beyond the pleadings that demonstrates “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). To rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must show, with “significant probative evidence, ” that there exists a genuine issue of material fact for resolution at trial. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000).

In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court views all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. RSR Corp. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 858 (5th Cir. 2010). However, conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions are not enough for a nonmovant to survive a motion for summary judgment. Wallace v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996). If the nonmoving party does not present sufficient evidence to establish an essential element of his claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

B. Mr. Taylor's ADA claims

1. ADA disparate treatment claim

Mr. Taylor asserts that he was terminated because of his disability. Compl. [1] at 5. He alleges that the employee handbook he was provided called for progressive disciplinary action for employees who violate office policies, but that Ms. Ladner instead proceeded immediately to termination. Id.

“A plaintiff may establish a claim of disability discrimination by presenting direct evidence of discrimination. Alternatively, the indirect method of proof set for Title VII actions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green may also be utilized.” Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995). Because Mr. Taylor has not presented any direct evidence of disability discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas framework applies. See Id. Under this framework, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing of discrimination by establishing that: “(1) [he] suffers from a disability; (2) [he] is qualified for the job; (3) [he] was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) [he] was replaced by a non-disabled person or was treated less favorably than non-disabled employees.” Milton v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Just., 707 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Daigle, 70 F.3d at 396).

In his brief, Mr. Taylor maintains that he can satisfy all four prongs because Ms. Ladner did not provide a written reason for terminating him, in violation of office policy, and because Ms. Ladner “gave three different reasons for terminating his employment between the Mississippi Department of Employment Security and her deposition testimony, ” which he claims “raises a...