Taylor v. Metoyer

299 Ga. 345

788 S.E.2d 376

Taylor

v.Metoyer.

S16A0070

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: July 5, 2016

Michael Alexander Oldham, Assistant Attorney General, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Appellant.

Sanford Allen Wallack, Wallack Law, P.C., for Appellee.

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

In May 1999, a jury convicted Shaun Metoyer of numerous counts of armed robbery and related offenses, after which he was sentenced to consecutive life sentences. The Court of Appeals affirmed Metoyer's convictions and sentences. See Metoyer v. State , 282 Ga.App. 810, 640 S.E.2d 345 (2006). Metoyer subsequently filed a habeas petition in which he argued, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The habeas court agreed with Metoyer and granted his petition; the warden now appeals. We agree that Metoyer received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and affirm the judgment of the habeas court.¹

1. Because resolution of the issues before us is fact dependent, a summary of Metoyer's trial, appeal, and habeas proceedings is necessary.

In April 1998, a series of armed robberies took place in Richmond County, Georgia. Metoyer , 282 Ga.App. at 810, 640 S.E.2d 345. “In each of the four separate incidents, two males exited a vehicle, approached the victims, pointed guns at them, demanded money, and took the victims' purses and/or wallets and other personal items.” Id. Later that month, law enforcement stopped a car matching the description of one used in the robberies; inside the car were Toine Daniels and Nicholas Nichols. Both men were subsequently transported to the sheriff's office and interviewed. Metoyer was implicated by Nichols. Meanwhile, Daniels identified Ricardo Cartledge as the “leader” of the robberies and directed authorities to Cartledge's residence. At the residence, law enforcement observed a second car that had been described as being used in the robberies. A search of both the vehicle and the residence revealed items connected with the crime spree.

Daniels and Nichols each reached an agreement with the State and pled guilty to their involvement in the robberies. Both plea agreements reflect that the State anticipated future cooperation at trial from both men and that, following that cooperation, the State would not oppose sentence remolding. At trial, however, both men repeatedly denied that they had received “a special deal” or “special treatment” in exchange for their testimony. Notably, these statements were specifically elicited by the prosecution and went largely unchallenged. As to the details of the offenses, “Daniels gave specific [testimony] about Metoyer's involvement in an armed robbery that occurred on April 21, 1998,” while Nichols testified that “Metoyer participated in three robberies that occurred on April 22, 1998.” Metoyer , 282 Ga.App. at 811, 640 S.E.2d 345. The trial transcript reflects that there was no physical evidence against Metoyer and that, while two robbery victims identified him as an assailant, neither victim was certain about their identification.

Following Metoyer's conviction, trial counsel, Luther McDaniel, filed a motion for new trial arguing, inter alia, that the State's evidence had been insufficient. The motion was later amended by Metoyer's first appellate counsel, Ronald Garnett, to include a claim that trial counsel was ineffective. At a July 2003 hearing on the motion, Metoyer testified in support of the ineffectiveness claim. Namely, Metoyer testified that McDaniel had failed to: speak or meet with him until the morning of trial; failed to investigate Metoyer's report that, in their respective Jackson–Denno² hearings, both Nichols and Daniels had asserted that their statements to law enforcement were untrue; and, investigate and present a possible alibi witness, Lenora Hazel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Garnett a 10–day window to secure an affidavit from Hazel. Two-and-a-half years later, a second hearing was held on the motion for new trial. During that hearing, Metoyer's second appellate counsel, Barbara Claridge, presented Hazel as a witness. However, as the trial court later indicated in its order denying the motion for new trial, Hazel could only account for Metoyer's whereabouts on the days following the robberies in question. Trial counsel was never called as a witness.

On direct appeal, Claridge argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions and that McDaniel was ineffective in the following ways: by failing to investigate and present an alibi defense; and by failing to secure the Jackson–Denno transcripts; and, by meeting with Metoyer only once before trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Metoyer's convictions and that the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were meritless or waived. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that Hazel could not have provided an alibi for Metoyer; the appellate court also concluded that there was no evidence overcoming the presumption that trial counsel's decision not to use Hazel as a witness was strategic. With respect to the claim that trial counsel should have secured the Jackson–Denno transcripts, the Court of Appeals concluded that the argument was waived because it was not supported by argument or citation of authority; the Court of Appeals also concluded that, because the transcripts were not included in the record, there was no meaningful way to determine whether the transcripts could have been used as impeachment evidence. Finally, regarding the claim that Metoyer and McDaniel met only once before trial, the Court of Appeals concluded that Metoyer had failed to establish that the single meeting amounted to deficient performance and prejudice. Metoyer , 282 Ga.App. at 814–815, 640 S.E.2d 345.

Metoyer timely filed a petition for habeas corpus in which he claimed, inter alia, that appellate counsel raised frivolous or unsupported claims on appeal and failed to raise other, more meritorious claims, such as trial counsel's failure to cross-examine Nichols and Daniels on their respective agreements with the State. The habeas court heard testimony from Metoyer, Claridge, and McDaniel. Metoyer reiterated his testimony from the first motion for new trial hearing and clarified that he was familiar with the arguments made at the Jackson–Denno hearings because he was present when the hearings were conducted. McDaniel could provide very few details regarding his representation of Metoyer at trial, and he generally testified as to his usual practice with respect to his representation of criminal defendants. Claridge testified that, while neither she nor Garnett was able to locate McDaniel, she was unaware that her failure to call him as a witness at the motion for new trial hearing would be detrimental to an ineffectiveness claim. Claridge also testified that, while she knew that she did not have a copy of the Jackson–Denno transcripts—and was aware that she could have filed a motion to have those transcripts produced—she made no effort to secure them. In addition to testimony, the habeas court received as evidence the record and transcript from Metoyer's trial, an incomplete portion of the disputed Jackson–Denno transcripts, and documents reflecting the plea agreements of Nichols and Daniels.

In its detailed, 50–page order, the habeas court sided with Metoyer on the issue of appellate counsel's ineffectiveness. The habeas court found that it was obvious that Hazel could not provide an alibi for Metoyer on the dates relevant to the charges and, thus, that Claridge performed deficiently by asserting a claim of ineffectiveness based on the purported alibi testimony. Regarding the Jackson–Denno transcripts, the habeas court concluded they were available, would have provided impeachment material, could have been procured by both McDaniel and Claridge, and that the failure of trial and appellate counsel to procure the transcripts was not based on reasonable strategy. The habeas court reasoned that Claridge performed...