Taylor v. State

699 S.W.3d 33

Dylan Eugene TAYLOR, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee

No. 07-23-00402-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Amarillo.

September 3, 2024

On Appeal from the 274th District Court, Hays County, Texas, Trial Court No. CR-20-5525-C, Honorable Don R. Burgess, Presiding

Amanda Wilhelm, San Antonio, for Appellee.

Vikash M. Bhakta, for Appellant.

Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

OPINION¹

Brian Quinn, Chef Justice

Dylan Eugene Taylor appealed his conviction for being a felon who possessed a firearm. Three issues pend for review. He argues that 1) the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress the inventory search of his vehicle; 2) the evidence was insufficient to prove he actually possessed the weapon found in the vehicle, and 3) a mistrial should have been granted due to a purported Brady violation. We reverse the cause and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Background

In late November 2020, a woman named Asia called police requesting assistance in dealing with her ex-boyfriend, appellant. Police responded and encountered appellant inside his car. The vehicle was parked illegally by a stop sign and at a location which permitted appellant to spy on Asia.

Being told that appellant was the subject of one or more outstanding arrest warrants, the officers removed him from the car, placed him in handcuffs, walked him to a nearby police vehicle, sat him within it, and began investigating both Asia’s complaint and the actual existence of the arrest warrants. Upon determining that warrants were outstanding, the officer placed him under arrest and decided to impound his vehicle. As part of the impoundment process, one officer began an inventory search of the car and discovered a firearm in its center console. He contacted dispatch to determine if appellant was a felon, which status dispatch confirmed. That resulted in his prosecution and ultimate conviction by a jury for the aforementioned offense.

Issue Two—Sufficiency of the Evidence

Because it grants the greatest relief available if sustained, we begin our review by considering Issue Two. Benavidez v. State, 323 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that we first consider attacks founded upon the sufficiency of the evidence because they grant the greatest relief available if sustained). Through it, appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to prove he possessed the firearm. We overrule the issue.

The standard of review is well-established and described in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Ross v. State, 133 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We apply it here.

[1, 2] To establish the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon, the State must prove that the accused 1) exercised care, control, or custody over the firearm; 2) was conscious of his connection to the firearm; and 3) knowingly possessed it. Auvenshine v. State, Nos. 07-15-00253-CR, 07-15-00254-CR, 2016 WL 1294629, at *—, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 3392, at *9 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 31, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Furthermore, "possession" means the exercise of actual care, custody, control, or management. Id.; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39). And, it is a voluntary act when the accused knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control. Auvenshine, 2016 WL 1294629, at *—, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 3392, at *9.

[3–5] Next, if the firearm is neither on the person of the accused nor in his exclusive possession, the evidence must otherwise link him to the item. Id. at *— – —, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 3392, at *9-10. Such may include proof that 1) the firearm was in plain view; 2) the accused owned the vehicle in which the firearm was found; 3) appellant was in close proximity and had ready access to the weapon; 4) his conduct and demeanor indicated a consciousness of guilt; 5) he had a special connection or relationship to the firearm; 6) the weapon was found in an enclosed place; 7) occupants in the vehicle gave conflicting statements about relevant matters; 8) the accused exercised control over the vehicle containing the firearm; 9) he possessed other contraband; and 10) he uttered incriminating statements tying him to the weapon. Id. What is of import is not the number of links shown but rather the logical force arising from those shown. Id. Their logical force must illustrate that the connection between the accused and the firearm was more than fortuitous. Id. at *—, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 3392, at *11. And, that the accused may not "own" the weapon does not alone require acquittal for the test is possession, not ownership. Clay v. State., No. 13-04-583-CR, 2006 WL 2439793, at *—, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7505, at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 24, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

[6] Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we find the following evidence. First, appellant owned the vehicle in which the weapon was found. Second, the officers discovered him in that vehicle and mere inches from the center console within which lay the handgun. Third, the console was unlocked, rendering the weapon readily available to him. Fourth, appellant sat alone in the car at night spying upon his ex-girlfriend. Fifth, his ex-girlfriend informed the police appellant periodically carried a gun. Sixth, though appellant denied the presence of a weapon in the car when asked by the police if one was within it, he directed the police to roll up its windows, lock the vehicle, and give him its keys prior to being escorted to the nearby patrol unit. Together, these circumstances allow a rational jury to reasonably deduce, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant knowingly exercised care, custody, control, or management, i.e., possessed, the firearm.

Issue One—Motion to Suppress

[7] Via his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, i.e., the firearm, discovered during the purported inventory search of the vehicle. We sustain the issue.

The standard of review is that discussed in State v. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We apply it here.

[8] Next, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Stations v. State, No. 02-18-00002-CR, 2019 WL 1716412, at *— – —, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 3166, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 18, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). A police officer’s inventory of the contents of an automobile is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if conducted pursuant to a lawful impoundment of the vehicle. Id.

[9, 10] That is, to qualify as a valid inventory search, the latter must be conducted in good faith and pursuant to a reasonable, standardized police procedure "designed to accomplish the ‘caretaking’ function." Calhoun v. State, No. 03-16-00691-CR, 2017 WL 2333224, at *2, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4835, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Austin May 26, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Moreover, the burden lies with the State to demonstrate the existence of an inventory policy and the officer’s compliance with it. Id. at *—, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4835, at *6. Indeed, our Court of Criminal Appeals stressed the need for compliance when saying "[t]o be lawful, an inventory search must not deviate from police department policy." Moberg v. State, 810 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (emphasis added). That said, we turn to the circumstances at bar.

The record contains evidence of 1) an official policy adopted by the Kyle Police Department concerning inventory searches and 2) an officer representing his search conformed with it. Yet, the latter is belied by undisputed testimony in the form of the officer’s own admissions and a video of the search.

Per the policy, 1) "[i]nventories may be conducted without a warrant or probable cause … [b]efore towing the vehicle for violations, safety reasons, or other purposes as defined by law"; 2) an "inventory report shall be completed whenever an officer assumes responsibility for towing a vehicle and shall complete an inventory at the location where the vehicle was seized unless reasons of safety or practicality require the inventory to take place later"; 3) "[b]efore the vehicle is removed, officers shall obtain the signature of the tow truck driver on the inventory report and provide the tow driver a duplicate copy of the report"; 4) the "owner or operator … shall be asked to remove, if possible, all valuables from the vehicle prior to impoundment" and if they "cannot be removed, they shall be inventoried before the vehicle is removed, and the owner/operator shall be requested to verify the completeness of the inventory by signature"; 5) the inventory’s scope "includes all open and closed containers and compartments and any locked containers or compartments as long as the officer has a key" but "[l]ocked or sealed items shall not be forcibly entered if doing so will damage them"; 6) "[l]ocked items that are not searched will be noted on the Impound report"; 7) "the inventory extends to all areas of the vehicle in which personal property or hazardous materials may reasonably be found"; 8) "trunks or glove compartments shall not be opened by force if a key is unavailable"; 9) evidence of a crime or contraband "discovered during an inventory shall be handled per evidence procedures"; and 10) a "motor vehicle inventory is an administrative procedure designed to protect vehicles and their contents while in departmental custody" and "to protect the owner’s property and to protect the department against claims and possible dangers."

As depicted in the foregoing policy, the officers were obligated to ask appellant "to remove, if possible, all valuables from the vehicle prior to impoundment." They did not do so, here. It...