Taylor v. State

358 Ga.App. 773

856 S.E.2d 368

TAYLOR

v.The STATE.

A20A1861

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 8, 2021

Christy Elaine Draper, for Appellant.

Ryan R. Leonard, District Attorney, Brett M. Adams, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.

Markle, Judge.

Following a jury trial, Raheem Almalik Taylor was convicted of insurance fraud and making a false report of a crime. Taylor appeals from his convictions and the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial, contending that (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (a) move for a directed verdict and (b) object to the introduction of his eviction notices; (2) the trial court erred by admitting his prior convictions into evidence; and (3) his conviction should be reversed because the responding police officer perjured himself on the stand. Finding no error, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the evidence shows that, in September 2016, Taylor reported a burglary of his apartment.¹ When an officer arrived at the second-story apartment, Taylor acknowledged that he had waited approximately twelve hours after returning home to report that two televisions, a smart watch, a streaming device, and a pair of headphones were stolen. Taylor gave the officer the boxes for the allegedly stolen items so the officer could obtain their serial numbers. The officer verified that Taylor gave him the correct boxes for each specific item he had claimed was stolen. The officer noted that there were no signs of forced entry into the apartment, nor had it been ransacked, and Taylor stated that both the front door and the balcony door were locked when he returned home, just as he had left them. Taylor further reported that a liquor bottle had been moved and partially consumed, and the officer collected the bottle for processing. However, no identifiable fingerprints, saliva, or DNA could be retrieved from the bottle.

The assigned investigator entered the serial numbers from the boxes into a database to determine whether the stolen items had been pawned. The investigator received a "pawn hit," showing that Taylor had pawned one of the televisions four months before he had reported it as stolen. The investigator then conducted a secondary search using Taylor's identification information, and discovered that Taylor had also pawned a smart watch and headphones matching the general description of the ones he had reported stolen two months prior to his burglary report. Although this "pawn hit" did not list the serial numbers for these items, the investigator explained that different pawn shops have different procedures for entering information into the database.

The investigator was aware that there had been several burglaries in Taylor's apartment complex; however, they had all occurred on the ground floor with access through a back window. Additionally, the investigator discovered that Taylor had received eviction notices in May 2016 and again in the month following the reported burglary, and the investigator explained that insurance fraud will commonly occur when a party is facing the loss of a home. The investigator then contacted Taylor's insurance company, and found that he had filed claims for the items he had reported stolen, and the insurer had reimbursed him for their replacement value.

Taylor was subsequently charged with insurance fraud and making a false report of a crime. His first trial resulted in a hung jury. On retrial, Taylor was found guilty of all counts. Taylor filed a motion for new trial, raising all of the grounds he now raises on appeal. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.

1. Taylor first argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (a) move for a directed verdict because the State's evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and (b) object to the introduction of his eviction notices because they were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. We conclude he has not met his burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel.

To succeed on a claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, [Taylor] must show both that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced as a result. Under the first prong of this test, counsel's performance will be found deficient only if it was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms. And under the second prong, prejudice is demonstrated only where there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. A "reasonable probability" is defined as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Failure to satisfy either prong of the ... test is sufficient to defeat a claim of ineffective assistance, and it is not incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong. And although both the performance and prejudice components of an ineffectiveness inquiry involve mixed questions of law and fact, a trial court's factual findings made in the course of deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim will be affirmed by the reviewing court unless clearly erroneous.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Green v. State , 302 Ga. 816, 817-818 (2), 809 S.E.2d 738 (2018). Bearing these principles in mind, we address each of Taylor's claims of ineffective assistance in turn, finding no merit to either of them.

(a) Failure to move for a directed verdict.

Taylor contends that counsel should have moved for directed verdict because the evidence of his guilt was insufficient. Specifically, Taylor points to the insurance analyst's testimony on cross-examination that the insurer's investigation did not reveal any evidence of fraud prior to the payment of Taylor's insurance claim for his allegedly stolen property, and that the insurer had not filed a lawsuit seeking to recover the payment. Taylor asserts that this testimony defeated the insurance fraud count, and therefore counsel's performance was deficient for failing to seek a directed verdict. We disagree.

In this posture, our standard of review is the same as the standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.

Range v. State , 289 Ga. App. 727, 731 (4), 658 S.E.2d 245 (2008). Thus,

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and an appellant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. This Court determines whether the evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia , and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. Any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence are for the jury to resolve. As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State's case, we must uphold the jury's verdict.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Knowles v. State , 342 Ga. App. 344, 346 (1), 801 S.E.2d 582 (2017).

OCGA § 33-1-9 (a) provides that insurance fraud is committed when a person "knowingly or willfully ... [m]akes or aids in the making of any false or fraudulent statement or representation of any material fact or thing ... [i]n the filing of a claim[.]"

Pursuant to OCGA § 16-10-26, "[a] person who willfully and knowingly gives or causes a false report of a crime to be given to any law enforcement officer or agency of this state is guilty of a misdemeanor."

The evidence, as recounted above, is sufficient to support Taylor's convictions. See Knowles , 342 Ga. App. at 346-347 (1) (a), 801 S.E.2d 582 (sufficient evidence of making a false report of a crime where jury was able to view surveillance video that contradicted the defendant's report of alleged crime); Sallee v. State , 329 Ga. App. 612, 615 (1), 765 S.E.2d 758 (2014) (sufficient evidence of insurance fraud where lawyer aided client in filing false insurance claim regarding property destroyed in a fire after the client sold the property). Notably, on redirect examination, the insurance analyst explained that the insurer's investigation did not involve an examination of the condition of Taylor's apartment following the alleged burglary, and the insurer was unaware that Taylor had pawned the items on the insurance claim. The analyst further testified that it was not company policy to reopen an investigation once a claim was paid. To the extent there were any inconsistencies in the evidence, it was for the jury to determine the analyst's credibility and to resolve these inconsistencies. Snipes v. State , 309 Ga. 785, 788-789 (1), 848 S.E.2d 417 (2020).

Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain Taylor's convictions, "any motion for directed verdict would have failed, and trial counsel's failure to make such a motion thus did not constitute deficient performance." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Blount v. State , 303 Ga. 608, 613 (2) (f), 814 S.E.2d 372 (2018) ; Range , 289 Ga. App. at 731 (4), 658 S.E.2d 245 ; Owens v. State , 324 Ga. App. 198, 202 (1) (b), 749 S.E.2d 783 (2013) (where evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, a claim for ineffective assistance based on a failure to move for directed verdict fails as a matter of law).

(b) Failure to object to the admission of evidence.

Taylor next claims his counsel was deficient for failing to object to the admission of documents regarding two eviction proceedings against him because they were irrelevant and highly prejudicial.² Specifically, Taylor claims that the first eviction proceeding was irrelevant because it resulted in a consent order, and not an eviction; and the second was irrelevant because it was filed after he reported the burglary. At the new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he believed the eviction documents would be admitted as evidence of motive, and he deliberately chose not to object to them to avoid drawing further attention to them.

Reasonable trial strategy and tactics do not amount to

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