Taylor v. United States

OPINION

KUGLER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner is a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at FCI Allenwood, in White Deer, Pennsylvania. After receiving authorization from the Third Circuit, (ECF No. 15-2), he is proceeding pro se with an amended second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (hereinafter “§ 2255 Motion”). (ECF No. 5.) Respondent filed an Answer, (ECF No. 23), and Petitioner filed a Reply, (ECF No. 25). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny Petitioner's second or successive § 2255 Motion and will not issue a certificate of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from Petitioner's participation in a series of bank robberies in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. As this Court set forth in its earlier Opinion:

On August 23, 2006, Petitioner's co-defendant Steven Gantt (“Gantt”) and Walter Johnson (“Johnson”) were arrested in connection with a series of bank robberies committed in New Jersey and Pennsylvania in 2005 and 2006. After his arrest, Johnson confessed his involvement and implicated both Taylor and Gantt. Taylor was arrested on November 27, 2006. A second superseding indictment charged Gantt and Taylor with the following crimes: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act Robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), six counts of armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) 2113(d), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and six counts of using a

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firearm in connection with the corresponding bank robberies in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 824(a)(1)

A trial was held on January 22, 2008 and ended on February 11, 2008 in a mistrial after the jury announced that it was deadlocked on all counts. A retrial commenced on February 26 2008, and on March 19, 2008, the jury returned guilty verdicts as to both defendants on all counts of the second superseding indictment. Petitioner was sentenced to 1380 months in prison. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Third Circuit, which affirmed this Court's judgment on May 10, 2010. United States v. Taylor, 379 Fed. App'x. 240, 245 (3d Cir. 2010).

Taylor v. United States, No. 11-5367, 2015 WL 8781292, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2015).

In September of 2011, Petitioner filed his first § 2255 motion, “alleging ineffective assistance of his trial and appellate counsels, and also that he is entitled to a new trial because the Government failed to turn over exculpatory evidence.” Id. This Court denied that § 2255 motion in December of 2015 and did not issue a certificate of appealability. Id.; (Taylor v. United States, Civ. No. 11-5367, ECF Nos. 23-25.) Petitioner applied for a certificate of appealability from the Third Circuit, and that Court denied the application. (Taylor v. United States, Civ. No. 11-5367, ECF No. 37.)

In June of 2016, Petitioner filed his initial second or successive § 2255 motion in this case, and the operative § 2255 Motion in July of 2016. (ECF Nos. 1, 5.) In May of 2019, this Court transferred Petitioner's § 2255 Motion to the Third Circuit, as an application for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. (ECF No. 14.)

In August of 2019, the Third Circuit granted Petitioner's request to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) and its progeny. (ECF No. 15-2.) In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Although Petitioner's relevant convictions fell under § 924(c)(3), rather than §

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924(e)(2)(B)(ii), Petitioner argued that Johnson should apply because both statutes have nearly identical residual clauses. After Petitioner's 2016 and 2019 filings, however, the Supreme Court decided one of the issues in this case, in Petitioner's favor, ruling in United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), that the “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was void for vagueness.

Accordingly, in the instant § 2255 Motion, Petitioner contends that his six § 924(c) convictions are no longer valid because his six convictions for armed bank robbery in violation of §§ 2113(a) and (d) cannot serve as § 924(c) predicates as they do not constitute crimes of violence after Davis.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a motion to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence of a person in federal custody, entitles a prisoner to relief if “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). When considering a § 2255 motion, a district court “must accept the truth of the movant's factual allegations unless they are clearly frivolous on the basis of the existing record.” United States v. Tolliver, 800 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2015). A district court must sua sponte hold a hearing on the motion “‘if the files and records do not show conclusively that [the movant] was not entitled to relief.'” Id. (quoting Solis v. United States, 252 F.3d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 2001)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, the Court must first assess whether it has jurisdiction over this case because this is a second or successive § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a), 2255(h).

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Although the Third Circuit granted Petitioner's request to file this second or successive § 2255 motion, this Court must still determine whether his claims meet the requirements of § 2244. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4) (“A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section.”).

Applying that standard here, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction because Petitioner's “claims rely on the rule announced in Davis and it is plausible on the face of” the § 2255 Motion that the Court sentenced Petitioner under the now void residual clause. Herrera-Genao v. United States, No. 16-3786, 2020 WL 2520281, at *3-4 (D.N.J. May 18, 2020). As a result, the Court may address the merits of Petitioner's claims. In re Matthews, 934 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Whether the Petitioners' crimes fall under the elements clause or the challenged residual clause is itself a merits inquiry.”).

B. Merits

Turning then to the merits, Petitioner argues that his six § 924(c) convictions are no longer valid because his six convictions for armed bank robbery in violation of §§ 2113(a) and (d) cannot serve as § 924(c) predicates as they do not constitute crimes of violence after Davis.

Generally, § 924(c) prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, the statute defined a “crime of violence” as a felony that:

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.

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18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). In Davis, the Supreme Court held that the “residual clause, ” § 924(c)(3)(B), was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Davis, 139 S.Ct. at 2336. The “elements clause, ” § 924(c)(3)(A), however, remains valid. United States v. Walker, 990 F.3d 316, 324 (3d Cir. 2021).

“Accordingly, an offense is now a ‘crime of violence' within the meaning of the statute only if it meets the definition contained in the elements clause, § 924(c)(3)(A).” Id. Once again, the elements clause defines a crime of violence as “an offense that is a felony and - has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). Additionally, the Supreme Court held that courts should use the categorical approach “when deciding whether a conviction is a crime of violence under the elements clause.” Walker, 990 F.3d at 324 (citing Davis, 139 S.Ct. at 2328). To apply the categorical approach in the present case, this Court “must ask whether the minimum conduct punishable” as armed bank robbery under §§ 2113(a) and (d) qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c). See id.

1. Armed Bank Robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d)

In United States v. Johnson, 899 F.3d 191, 204 (3d Cir. 2018), the Third Circuit answered that question in the affirmative. First, the Third Circuit observed that § 2113(d) provides penalties for a person who “in committing . . . any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device.” Id. at 203-04. Then, the Court reasoned that “assault[ing] someone or putting a life in jeopardy . . . by the use of a dangerous weapon, ” satisfies the elements clause because it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” Id. at 204 (alteration in original) (quoting § 924(c)(3)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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In other words, the Court concluded that one “cannot assault a person, or jeopardize his or her life with a dangerous weapon, unless one uses, attempts to use, or threatens physical force.” Id. Accordingly, the Third Circuit concluded that armed bank robbery under § 2113(d) is categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c). Id. As a result...