Taylor v. United States Dep't of Justice Exec. Office for United States Attorneys

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JOSHUA MARK TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-927 (JMC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

March 31, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JIA M COBB U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Pro se Plaintiff Joshua Mark Taylor brought this action against the United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) for failing to provide records in response to his request for information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552.^[1]The Parties have both moved for summary judgment. ECF 12; ECF 19. At issue is whether Taylor's waiver of his FOIA rights as part of his plea agreement in a criminal proceeding is an enforceable agreement. The Court finds that it is. Accordingly, EOUSA's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Taylor's Cross-Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Criminal Proceedings and Waiver Provision

In 2014, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of West Virginia issued a five-count indictment charging Taylor with the production, receipt, distribution, and possession of child pornography, as well as the use of a facility and means of interstate commerce to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity. ECF 12-3. Those charges alleged that Taylor engaged in sexual acts with a twelve-year-old student while he was employed as a middle school teacher in Fayette County, West Virginia.^[2] ECF 12-2 at 24. On April 28, 2015, Taylor executed a plea agreement, pleading guilty to Count Two of the indictment: receipt of child pornography. Id. at 14-23. The remaining counts were dismissed. Id. at 15. In the accompanying stipulation of facts, Taylor admitted to “engag[ing] in sexual intercourse and oral intercourse with [a 12-year-old female] when she was in [his] care or supervisory control,” knowingly sending and receiving “very sexually graphic text messages . . . to persuade and entice the minor to engage in sexual activity,” and using his cell phone to distribute “the sexually explicit image of the minor.” ECF 12-2 at 24-25.

Taylor's plea agreement included several other terms and conditions, including the following:

WAIVER OF FOIA AND PRIVACY RIGHT. Mr. Taylor knowingly and voluntarily waives all rights, whether asserted directly or by a representative, to request or receive from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case, including without any limitation any records that may be sought under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, or the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, following final disposition.

Id. at 21. In addition, Taylor waived his right to collaterally challenge his conviction and sentence (including under 28 U.S.C. § 2255), except for “a post-conviction collateral attack or direct appeal based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 21. Through his initials on each page of the agreement and his signature on the last page, Taylor acknowledged that he had “read and carefully discussed every part” of the agreement with his attorney, understood the terms of the agreement, and voluntarily agreed to those terms. Id. at 23.

On June 23, 2015, Taylor appeared for a plea hearing before U.S. District Court Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. See generally ECF 12-4. Prior to accepting Taylor's guilty plea, Judge Copenhaver engaged in a lengthy examination of Taylor to ensure that he understood the terms and conditions of his plea agreement. Id. That examination included the following exchange:

Q. The next paragraph notes that you forever waive your right to receive or request from any department or agency of the United States any records pertaining to the investigation or prosecution of this case. Do you understand that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. This states that you specifically waive that right with respect to the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1974, but you're waiving it on every other ground as well. Do you understand that also?

A. Yes, sir.

Id. at 26. On October 2, 2015, Judge Copenhaver sentenced Taylor to a prison term of fifteen years followed by twenty years of supervised release. ECF 12-5 at 3, 4.

B. FOIA Request

Nearly two years later, on August 24, 2017, EOUSA received Taylor's FOIA request for “all discovery, files, and documents that pertain to legal cases, both past and present, in which I am named.” ECF 12-2 at 4, 6.^[3]The request was addressed to the “Prosecutor Fed Courthouse” in Charleston, West Virginia, and included handwritten references to “criminal action 2:14 00240” and Taylor's post-conviction proceeding, “civil action 2:17 01424.” Id.; ECF 12-1 ¶ 26. After Taylor perfected his request, EOUSA sent him an acknowledgment letter and began to search in the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of West Virginia. ECF 12-2 at 4.

On July 12, 2018, EOUSA sent Taylor a letter informing him that his FOIA request had been processed, and that EOUSA would make available to Taylor “all records required to be released, or considered appropriate for release as a matter of discretion.” Id. at 12. The only documents disclosed were Taylor's executed plea agreements in both the federal and state criminal cases. Id. at 14-29. Taylor appealed that final action to the Department of Justice Office of Information Policy (OIP). Id. at 30. On September 28, 2018, OIP affirmed, determining that the terms of Taylor's plea agreement filed in his federal case constituted a valid waiver of Taylor's right “to make any FOIA request or receive any records concerning [his] criminal case.” Id. at 31.

EOUSA moved for summary judgment. ECF 12. The Court issued an order advising Taylor of his obligations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, and the consequences of failing to meet those obligations. ECF 14 (citing Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Taylor opposed EOUSA's Motion, ECF 17-1, and filed his own Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 19. EOUSA opposed Taylor's Cross-Motion, ECF 21. Finally, Taylor was granted leave to file what the Court construes as his Sur-Reply. ECF 22; see also ECF 35.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

FOIA cases are typically decided at summary judgment. See Laverpool v. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 315 F.Supp.3d 388, 390 (D.D.C. 2018). A court will grant a summary judgment motion when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In FOIA cases, it is the defending agency's burden to prove it has complied with its obligations under the statute. U.S. Dep't of Just. v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 n.3 (1989). To satisfy that burden, the “agency must prove that each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced, is unidentifiable[,] or is wholly exempt from the Act's inspection requirements.” Weisberg v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 627 F.2d 365, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court may accept as true any uncontested factual assertions in the moving party's affidavits or attachments, provided that that the nonmoving party (and in particular a pro se nonmoving party) has “fair notice of the requirements of the summary judgment rule” and the “consequences of failing to respond” to a summary judgment motion, as well as a “reasonable opportunity to submit” their own evidence in response. Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

III. ANALYSIS

“In general, criminal defendants may waive both constitutional and statutory rights, provided they do so voluntarily and with knowledge of the nature and consequences of the waiver.” Price v. U.S. Dep't of Just. Att'y Off., 865 F.3d 676, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2017). However, “like any other contract,” such waivers are “unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed under the circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement.” Id. at 683. To enforce a FOIA waiver in a criminal plea, the Government must demonstrate that there is a “legitimate criminaljustice interest” served by the waiver. Barnes v. FBI, 35 F.4th 828, 830 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

Here, Taylor argues that the waiver of his FOIA rights is unenforceable for two reasons. First, Taylor argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to the waiver. ECF 17-1 at 35. Second, he argues that the agency has not articulated a legitimate criminal-justice interest for the waiver that outweighs the public's interest in disclosure. Id. at 7-9. The Court considers-and ultimately rejects-each argument in turn.

A. Taylor's waiver of his FOIA rights was knowing and voluntary.

Taylor argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his FOIA rights because he did not fully understand the content and consequences of the waiver. According to Taylor, because he lacked legal training, ECF 17-1 at 2, was incarcerated without access to a law library, Id. at 3, and was represented by inexperienced counsel, Id., he did not understand that he was waiving his right to anything more than the transcript of the plea hearing itself, Id. at 5. He further argues that, because he did not yet suspect that his counsel was ineffective, he “could not understand how waiving FOIA would impact him.” Id. at 7. The Court is unpersuaded by either argument.

In considering the enforceability of a waiver in a plea agreement, “[t]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances-even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences” of the waiver. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (emphasis in original). In evaluating whether a...