Taylor v. Univ. Health Servs.

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ROBERT M. TAYLOR, III, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNIVERSITY HEALTH SERVICES, INC. and PIEDMONT HEALTHCARE, INC., Defendants.

No. CV 124-019

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division

August 29, 2024

ORDER

HONORABLE J. RANDAL HALL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion to remand. (Doc. 6.) For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant University Health Services Inc. ("UHS"). (Doc. 1-1, at 5.) Each Plaintiff claims an agreement with UHS (the "Agreement") that upon reaching age sixty-five, UHS would furnish them a free Medicare supplemental insurance policy for the rest of their lives (the "Alleged Benefit") if they: (1) were employed by UHS prior to January 1, 2005; (2) had thirty or more years of continuous service; and (3) worked until they reached retirement age.^[1] (Id. at 6-7.) According to Plaintiffs, UHS referred to the Alleged Benefit as a "hidden paycheck," designed to retain employees, and the written documents describing the Alleged Benefit were provided to each Plaintiff as part of UHS's retirement benefit booklet. (Id.)

Plaintiffs claim that in March 2022 Defendant Piedmont Healthcare, Inc. ("Piedmont") "took over the operations of [UHS]" and assumed certain obligations, including its contractual obligation to provide Plaintiffs the Alleged Benefit. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiffs brought suit because, although they are Qualifying Individuals who meet the Eligibility Criteria under the Agreement and are thus entitled to the Alleged Benefit, Defendants have not upheld their end of the bargain. (Id. at 7-8.) However, Plaintiffs' allegations about how Defendants have not honored the Agreement have changed from the first time Defendants removed this case to now.

When Defendants first removed, Plaintiffs' original complaint alleged Defendants were providing Plaintiffs the Alleged Benefit "voluntarily," not because they were under any contractual obligation to do so. (Id.) Plaintiffs alleged this created "uncertainty" about whether Defendants would continue to provide the Alleged Benefit in the future, so they brought this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment requiring Defendants to "honor the terms and provisions" of their agreement. (Id. at 8-9.)

Attached to Plaintiffs' original complaint, however, was a letter from Piedmont to certain Qualifying Individuals, "following up on prior communications about the [Alleged Benefit]." (Id. at 24.) In the letter, Piedmont states it continues to offer Qualifying Individuals the Alleged Benefit and does not plan to change course. (Id.) Based on this, the Court held Plaintiffs had not suffered an injury-in-fact and thus lacked Article III standing. Taylor v. Univ. Health Servs., Inc, (hereinafter, Taylor I), No. CV 123-047, Doc. 36, at 6 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 19, 2023). Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the Superior Court of Richmond County. Id. at 8.

Upon returning to state court, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, in part, that Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims there as well. (Doc. 1, ¶ 4; Doc. 1-2, at 4866.) However, in response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs argued they suffered a cognizable injury. (Doc. 1-2, at 71.) Specifically, Plaintiffs provided:

The benefits that were agreed to be provided were Medicare Supplemental Benefits for traditional Medicare [ (the "United Healthcare Plan")] and the Defendants, rather than live up to that obligation, have sought to, and have told individuals that they had to sign up for Medicare Advantage Plans [(the "Aetna Plan")] at a savings to the Defendants, but a cost to the Plaintiffs by making them join networks or have a PPO type of insurance.

(Id.) In other words, Plaintiffs assert Defendants breached their Agreement because they "tried to avoid their contractual obligations by converting these individuals to a product that is not as good as what [UHS] agreed to provide for them." (Id. at 75.)^[2] Based on the New Allegation, Defendants removed again on February 16, 2024. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand on February 29, 2024, which Defendants oppose. (Docs. 6, 13.)

Given the Court's holding in Taylor I, the Court held a status conference on May 16, 2024 to determine whether Plaintiffs had standing. (Docs. 29, 30.) Based on Plaintiffs' counsel's representations, the Court concluded at least one Plaintiff has Article III standing and took Plaintiffs' motion to remand under advisement. (Doc. 30, at 6-7, 10; Doc. 1-1, at 9 (seeking only declaratory relief)); Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 434 (2017) ("[W]hen there are multiple plaintiffs [, a]t least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief requested in the complaint.").

Furthermore, at the status conference, Plaintiffs' counsel orally moved for leave to amend to join additional party plaintiffs. (Doc. 30, at 10-11.) The Court granted the motion and ordered Plaintiffs' counsel to file an amended complaint within forty-five days. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiffs timely filed an amended complaint on June 18, 2024. (Doc. 32.)^[3]

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Accordingly, a defendant may only remove an action from state court if the federal court would possess original jurisdiction over the subject matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Federal district courts have jurisdiction over all civil actions: (1) "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"; and (2) "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. On a motion to remand, the removing party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). Removal jurisdiction is construed narrowly with all doubts resolved in favor of remand. Mann v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 505 Fed.Appx. 854, 856 (11th Cir. 2013). In evaluating a motion to remand, the Court makes its "determinations based on the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal; but the court may consider affidavits and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties." Crowe v. Coleman,. 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs move the Court to remand this case for two reasons: (1) Defendants' second removal was untimely; and (2) the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over their claim. (Doc. 6.) The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Timeliness of Removal

Plaintiffs argue the Court should remand the case because Defendants' removal was untimely. (Doc. 6, ¶¶ 8-11; Doc. 6-1, at 2-3; Doc. 18, at 4; Doc. 25, at 1-3.) Plaintiffs contend: (1) the January 24, 2024 affidavit of Plaintiff Robert M. Taylor, III (the "Taylor Affidavit") cannot provide a basis for removal because it is not a pleading; and (2) the Taylor Affidavit is not "other paper" that can be used to show changed circumstances under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (3) because the New Allegation it describes has been a part of this case all along, so Defendants cannot rely on it to support removal now since they did not do so the first time.^[4](Doc. 6, ¶ 8; Doc. 6-1, at 2-3.) Defendants argue: (1) the fact the Taylor Affidavit is not a pleading is inapposite; and (2) the New Allegation did not appear until after the Court remanded the case to state court, so the Taylor Affidavit and Plaintiffs' brief in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss in state court can demonstrate changed circumstances under the removal statute. (Doc. 13, at 5-10.) The Court agrees with Defendants on both counts and finds their second removal proper and timely.

28 U.S.C. § 1446 provides as follows:

Except [as governed by a subsection not applicable in this case], if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Plaintiffs first argument - the Taylor Affidavit cannot support removal because it is not a pleading - is foreclosed by § 1446's text, as it plainly contemplates removal being supported by a "motion, order, or other paper" as well as "an amended pleading." Id. Moreover, courts within this Circuit have found removal proper when supported by many different types of documents. See, e. g., Bramlett v. YRC, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-3870, 2016 WL 9330340, at *2 (N.D.Ga. Dec. 7, 2016) (finding a settlement demand supported a second removal); Sibilia v. Makita Corp., 782 F.Supp.2d 1329, 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (holding the plaintiff's amended responses to requests for admission constituted "other paper" supporting a second removal); Sudduth v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, No. 07-0436, 2007 WL 2460758, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 27, 2007) (concluding a deposition constituted "other paper" supporting a second removal). Thus, the fact the Taylor Affidavit is not a pleading is not dispositive of whether it can be used to support Defendants' second removal.

Plaintiffs also argue Defendants' second removal was untimely because neither the Taylor Affidavit nor Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' motion to dismiss is "other paper" that can be used to show changed circumstances under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b) (3), since the New Allegation has been a...