TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum

151 F.Supp.3d 419

117 U.S.P.Q.2d 1452

TCA Television Corp., Hi Neighbor, and Diana Abbott Colton, Plaintiffs,

v.Kevin McCollum, the Ensemble Studio Theatre, Inc., Manhattan Class Company, Inc., Robert Askins, Hand to God LLC, and Does and ABC Companies 1-10, Defendants.

15 Civ. 4325 (GBD)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed December 17, 2015

Brandie Jill Lustbader, Marc Joseph Rachman, Davis & Gilbert LLP, New York, NY, Edward A. Ruttenberg, Louis Peter Petrich, Leopold, Petrich & Smith, A Professional Corporation, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Mark Joseph Lawless, Mark J. Lawless, Esq., New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

GEORGE B. DANIELS, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs, TCA Television Corporation, Hi Neighbor, and Diana Abbott Colton, filed this action against Defendants, Kevin McCollum, The Ensemble Studio Theatre, Inc., Manhattan Class Company, Inc., Robert Askins, Hand to God LLC, and Does and ABC Companies 1-10, under 17 U.S.C. § 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 and New York common law copyright.

This action arises out of Defendants' use of dialogue from the iconic comedy routine, Who's On First? (“the Routine”), in their critically-acclaimed Broadway dark comedy, Hand to God, as well as in the play's promotional video. (See Am. Compl., (ECF No. 3), ¶ 1.)

In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs, the heirs of Abbott and Costello, allege that they own valid copyrights in Who's on First?, and that despite requests to Defendants to cease and desist their unauthorized use of material from the Routine in Hand to God, Defendants continue to “willfully capitalize on Abbott & Costello's world-famous reputation and Plaintiffs' copyrighted works.” (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) Plaintiffs seek damages, restitution, disgorgement, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. (See id. ¶¶ A-F.)

Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia , that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege a continuous chain of title in the Routine, that the Routine has passed into the public domain, and that they have made fair use of the Routine. (Am. Mot. to Dismiss, (ECF No. 55); Defendant's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Mem.”), (ECF No. 51), at 1.)¹

Because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged a claim for federal or New York common law copyright infringement, Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is GRANTED.

I. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”’ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). The plaintiff must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”; stating a facially plausible claim requires pleading facts that enable the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Thus, the factual allegations pleaded “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

A district court must first review the plaintiffs complaint to identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The court then considers whether the plaintiffs remaining well-pleaded factual allegations, assumed to be true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. In deciding the 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. See N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir.2013).

“In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court may refer ‘to documents attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in it by reference, to matters of which judicial notice may be taken, or to documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.”’ Fishbein v. Miranda , 670 F.Supp.2d 264, 271 (S.D.N.Y.2009), aff'd sub nom. Silverman v. Teamsters Local 210 Affiliated Health & Ins. Fund, 761 F.3d 277 (2d Cir.2014) (quoting Brass v. Am. Film Tech., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir.1993) ); see also Hayes v. Coughlin, No. 87 Civ. 7401, 1991 WL 220963, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1991) (“Papers outside a complaint may be incorporated by reference into the complaint when such papers are referred to within the body of the complaint.”). “[U]nder Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts may take judicial notice of facts that are ‘capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”’ Island Software & Computer Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. , 413 F.3d 257, 261 (2d Cir.2005) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) ). The Second Circuit has held that federal copyright registrations, “as published in the Copyright Office's registry,” are among the facts of which a district court may take judicial notice. Id.

II. Plaintiffs' Federal Copyright Infringement Claims

To state a claim for copyright infringement, Plaintiffs “must allege (1) ‘ownership of a valid copyright,’ and (2) ‘copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”’ Perrin & Nissen Ltd. v. SAS Grp. Inc., No. 06 CIV. 13089 (MGC), 2009 WL 855693, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009) (citing Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991) ). To withstand Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs must “plead[ ] factual content” for each element of the claim asserted such that “the court [can] draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. However, “[n]either Twombly nor Iqbal requires a plaintiff in a copyright infringement action to plead specific evidence or extra facts beyond what is needed to make the claim plausible.” Ritani, LLC v. Aghjayan, 880 F.Supp.2d 425, 440 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because the Routine and the films that published it, One Night and The Naughty Nineties, were created before January 1, 1978, they are subject to the 1909 Act.² See 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(2) ; Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 633–34 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir.1995) ). Under the 1909 Act, state common law copyright provided protection until first publication. See Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 632–33 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 2, 10, 12, 19, 21, 24 (repealed); Shoptalk, 168 F.3d at 590 ). Thereafter the work was entitled to an initial twenty-eight-year term of statutory copyright, provided that adequate statutory notice was given at publication, or appropriate registration and deposit were made. See id. In the absence of adequate statutory notice at publication, a work was injected into the public domain. See id. If adequate statutory notice was given, then application for renewal made during the last year of the initial term extended the copyright for a renewal term of twenty-eight additional years. See id.

A. Existence and Ownership of a Valid Copyright

As a threshold matter, a federal infringement claim requires that Plaintiffs allege they possessed a valid copyright at the time of the alleged infringement. See Perrin, 2009 WL 855693, at *4. Plaintiffs allege that Abbott and Costello first performed the Routine on March 24, 1938, as a live radio broadcast for The Kate Smith Hour. (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) However, in November 1940, the duo signed a “work-for-hire” agreement with Universal Pictures Company, Inc. (“UPC”) that assigned to Universal ”all the rights to the duo's performances of Who's On First in One Night and The Naughty Nineties. ”³ (See Am. Compl. ¶ 43.) Plaintiffs thus allege that upon execution of the November 1940 Agreement, ”Abbott and Costello expressly granted UPC the right to use [the Routine] in the 1940 Motion Picture[, One Night in the Tropics (“One Night” ),] and also assigned their rights in the version that appeared in that motion picture.” (Opp'n at 6; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-44.) According to Plaintiffs, One Night was the first publication of the Routine relevant to copyright registration under the 1909 Copyright Act. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 42.) In 1945, Abbott and Costello then expanded the One Night version of the routine in another UPC film, The Naughty Nineties. (See id.)

Plaintiffs further allege that as the assignees of the rights to the Routine, UPC registered One Night in 1940⁴ and The Naughty Nineties in 1945⁵ with the United States Copyright Office, and then timely renewed those two copyrights. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-45, Exs. 1-2; Opp'n at 12-17.) According to Plaintiffs, the 1970 Copyright Act and Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c), 302, 303, 304(c)(2), extended the protection afforded to the Routine as performed in the two movies another ninety-five years until 2035 and 2040, respectively. (See Am. Comp. ¶¶ 47-48.)

Continuing along the chain of title, Plaintiffs allege that on March 12, 1984, Universal Pictures (“Universal”),⁶ quitclaimed “all rights, title, and interest, under copyright or otherwise, in and to the Who's on First performance scenes in both One Night and The Naughty Nineties ... ” to Abbott & Costello Enterprises (“ACE”), a general partnership formed by the duo's heirs. (Id. ¶ 50.) The quitclaim assignment, which Plaintiffs maintain made ACE the sole owner of the two copyrights at issue, can be found in Copyright Office Volume 3437 at page 851. (See id. ¶ 51; Ex. 3 at 2-3.) Upon ACE's...