Teal v. Russell Cnty. Circuit Court

JOSHUA TEAL, #305 729, Plaintiff, v. RUSSELL COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-93-WKW [WO]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA EASTERN DIVISION

March 23, 2020

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Joshua Teal ["Teal"] is an inmate incarcerated at the Donaldson Correctional Facility in Bessemer, Alabama. He brings this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Russell County Circuit Court, the Russell County District Attorney's Office, the Phenix City Police Department, and Judge David Johnson. Teal alleges that he was arrested, indicted, convicted, and sentenced under the wrong social security number and that the evidence used to convict him of first degree domestic violence was insufficient. Teal seeks damages and requests "[his] charges [be] drop[p]ed," that he be released from imprisonment, and all records regarding his criminal charges be expunged. Doc. 1 at 2-4.

Upon review, the court concludes dismissal of this case prior to service of process is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).¹

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Teal is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court reviews his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).² Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court must dismiss a complaint proceeding in forma pauperis if it determines that an action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant immune from such relief. A claim is frivolous when it "has little or no chance of success," that is, when it appears "from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are clearly baseless or that the legal theories are indisputably meritless." Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). A claim is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, among other things, the defendants are immune from suit, id. at 327, the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist, id., or an affirmative defense would defeat the claim, such as the statute of limitations, Clark v. Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990). Courts are accorded "not only the authority to dismiss [as frivolous] a claim based on indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

A complaint may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding,467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). A review on this ground is governed by the same standards as dismissals for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim to relief that is plausible, the plaintiff must plead factual content that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The allegations should present a "'plain statement' possess[ing] enough heft to 'show that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When a successful affirmative defense, such as a statute of limitations, appears on the face of a complaint, dismissal for failure to state a claim is also warranted. Jones, 549 U.S. at 215.

Pro se pleadings "are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys" and are liberally construed. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). However, they "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And a court does not have "license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action." GJR Investments v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). While, the court treats factual allegations as true, it does not treat as true conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of action's elements. Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 681. Finally, a pro se litigant "is subject to the relevant law and rules of court including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).

III. DISCUSSION³

A. Judge David Johnson

1. Damages

Teal claims he was arrested, indicted, and convicted under another individual's social security number. On the day he was sentenced, Teal apprised Judge Johnson of this concern to which Judge Johnson responded "[he] d[id]n't care." Doc. 1 at 5.

Teal's claim against Judge Johnson provides no basis for relief as "judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (internal citation omitted). "Judges have absolute immunity from civil actions for the performance of judicial acts as long as they are not done in the clear absence of jurisdiction." See Jenkins v. Clerk of Court, 150 F. App'x 988, 990 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994)); Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (11th Cir. 1996). Thus, a state court judge is entitled to absolute immunity from damages for actions taken in his official capacity, even when his actions are allegedly erroneous or even malicious. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Wuyisa v. City of Miami Beach, 614 F. App'x 389, 391 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000)). Further, to the extent Teal seeks damages from the judicial defendant in his official capacity, those efforts are foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment. While the doctrine of judicial immunity applies to claims against JudgeJohnson in his individual capacity, he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims asserted against him in his official capacity. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding in a damages action that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" subject to suit under section 1983).

To determine whether a judge is entitled to absolute immunity from money damages under Section 1983, Stump established a two-part test: 1) whether the judge dealt with the plaintiff in a judicial capacity; and 2) whether the judge acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Simmons, 86 F.3d at 1084-85 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 357, 362); Jenkins, 150 F. App'x at 990. For judicial immunity purposes, an act is done in "clear absence of all jurisdiction" if the matter upon which the judge acted is clearly outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which he presides. Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946-47 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Judges cannot be sued for money damages for performing judicial acts, even when the acts result in unfairness and injustice to a litigant. Mireles, 502 U.S. 9; Hyland v. Kolhage, 267 F. App'x 836, 840-841 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that because judge's "actions were taken within his judicial capacity and he did not act in the absence of all jurisdiction, he was entitled to absolute judicial immunity.").

Teal complains about actions taken by Judge Johnson in his judicial capacity, and his allegations against Judge Johnson do not compel the conclusion this defendant acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Teal's claims for monetary damages against Judge Johnson are subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

2. Declaratory or Injunctive Relief

To the extent Teal seeks declaratory or injunctive relief from orders issued by Judge Johnson which have become final under state law, this court lacks jurisdiction to render such judgment in an action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents ...lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by 'state-court losers' challenging 'state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.' Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)." Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1199 (2006). Although "Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine," it remains applicable to bar Teal from proceeding before this court as this case, regarding any claims challenging final orders issued by a state court, is " 'brought by [a] state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.' 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. [at] 1517." Lance, 546 U.S. at 464, 125 S.Ct. at 1201; District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (holding that federal district courts "do not have jurisdiction . . . over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional."). Moreover, a § 1983 action is inappropriate either to compel or to appeal a particular course of action by a state court. Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 254 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that a § 1983 suit...